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The Original Conception of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
Steve Thel*
The Supreme Court has generally construed section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 without reference to its legislative
history or the historical context in which it was enacted. This is unfor-
tunate if the intention of those who drafted and enacted the Exchange
Act is relevant to the meaning of section 10(b). Section 10(b) is seldom
mentioned in the committee reports, floor statements and published
hearings on the Exchange Act, but if the conventional sources of legis-
lative history are "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' in-
tent''2 with respect to the section, there is, nevertheless, an extensive
published record of congressional and popular debate over stock ex-
change legislation. This record, together with documents left by those
who wrote the Exchange Act, show fairly clearly what contemporaries
had in mind for section 10(b).
This article recounts the events that led up to the enactment of sec-
tion 10(b) and argues that the provision was intended to empower the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate any practice
that might contribute to speculation in securities or tend to move se-
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1976, University of
North Texas; J.D. 1979, Harvard University.
I would like to thank my colleagues Marc Arkin, Bob Kaczorowski and Michael Malloy, as
well as Bill Nelson and the members of the New York University School of Law Legal History
Colloquium for reading earlier versions of this article and for their helpful comments and
suggestions; the staffs of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harvard Law School Library, Li-
brary of Congress, National Archives, New York Stock Exchange Archives and Securities &
Exchange Commission Library for their help and, in some cases, for their permission to quote
materials; and Wes Cochran for saving my notes from a burning building.
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter Exchange Act],
provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
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curity prices away from investment value, save perhaps those Congress
subjected to explicit controls in other parts of the Exchange Act. This
interpretation, while consistent with the language and structure of the
Exchange Act, is fundamentally different from the prevailing concep-
tion of section 10(b).
I. Two CONCEPTIONS OF SECTION 10(b)
A. The Prevailing Conception
The prevailing conception of section 10(b) took form in a series of
important Supreme Court cases 3 which held that certain activities are
not actionable under rule lOb-5. 4 The Court did not decide that the
rule permitted the activity challenged in these cases; instead, it held
that the activity did not violate the statutory provision under which the
rule was promulgated, section 10(b). According to the Court, Con-
gress did not intend to authorize the SEC to regulate the conduct at
issue in the cases. While the Court's earlier opinions may have re-
flected nothing more than a conservative determination to restrict rule
lOb-5 liability,5 later opinions suggest that the Court actually believes
that Congress did not intend section 10(b) to confer expansive SEC
regulatory power. 6
It would be very hard to define exactly what section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 forbid.7 It is surely impossible to say it in a nutshell.8 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has portrayed section 10(b) in fairly straight-
forward terms. According to the Court,9 section 10(b) proscribes
3. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); cf.
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (construing similar language in § 14(e) of
the Exchange Act); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (unless a duty exists, fail-
ure to provide information does not violate § 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
5. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. The Court candidly stated that it was putting a
limit on the effective scope of the rule largely on the basis of "what may be described as policy
considerations." Id. One commentator has said that the "common theme [of the cases]
seemed to be that plaintiffs always lost." ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10, at
316 (1986).
6. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court has followed that vision even when an alternative,
reasonable reading of § 10(b) would have been less expansive. See Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1983) (Hochfelder reinforces the conclusion that the action
expressly provided under § I 1 of the Securities Act does not foreclose a § 10(b) right of ac-
tion); cf Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 318 (1985) (no in pari
delicto defense). See generally David M. Phillips, An Essay: Six Competing Currents of Rule lOb-5
Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REV. 625 (1988) (analyzing dominant themes in Supreme Court opin-
ions on rule lOb-5).
7. The tie vote in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), demonstrates the
difficulty the Court has encountered in developing a compelling conception of § 10(b).
8. 1 IA EDWARD N. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE
Acr Pt. 1, at v (1989) (Rule lOb-5 "has been the basis for more litigation than all the other
sections of the federal securities laws taken together."). See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1988); ARNOLD S. JACOBS,
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 101-5 (2d ed. 1989 rev.).
9. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). This formulation has remained the
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knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive or defraud in-
vestors.' 0 If it is unclear just what is within the scope of the section, the
Court has clearly stated what is not within the scope of the section by
interpreting the section as encompassing two restrictions. First, section
10(b) reaches only knowing and intentional misconduct. Since a per-
son violates section 10(b) only if he knows (or perhaps if he should
know) what he is doing is wrong, careless conduct cannot constitute a
violation of the section even if it injures others." Second, only bad
conduct involving deception comes within the scope of the section;
fully disclosed misconduct cannot violate section 10(b).1 2
In its rule 10b-5 opinions, the Court has asserted that its narrow
vision of section 10(b) is consistent with both the language and funda-
mental purpose of the Exchange Act.' 3 The Court has never made
much use of the legislative history in defining the purpose of the Act or
the meaning of section 10(b). 14 Although the Court has declared that
the history of section 10(b) supports its reading, it has usually added
Court's starting point for examinations of § 10(b). See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90
(1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1977). Justice Powell emphasized that § 10(b) limits the scope of rule 1Ob-
5 in his concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755-60.
10. Section 10(b) does not, by itself, proscribe anything. It merely makes it unlawful to
violate Commission rules. Thus, the most that could be said is that § 10(b) and rule lOb-5
together proscribe knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive or defraud inves-
tors. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently said that the section proscribes things, essen-
tially ignoring the role of rules in the statutory scheme.
Perhaps the Court has concluded that rule lOb-5 forbids whatever conduct can be pro-
hibited under § 10(b). On the other hand, perhaps the Court has profoundly misunderstood
the section as a ban on bad conduct rather than as a delegation of authority to the Commis-
sion to regulate misleading, disruptive, or simply useless practices.
11. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691-95; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
12. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. 462; cf Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985)
(to violate § 14(e), conduct must be accompanied by misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or
deception). An interesting question posed by the Court's approach is whether the section
proscribes taking advantage of the ignorance of others. See Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
13. See I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 8, § 2.2 (463) at 2.41-2.44.1 (1988);
R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 309-56; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
438-511 (1985); Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 726-809 (2d ed. 1983
& Supp. 1988); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule lOb-5: Deadlock in the
Supreme Court, 13J. CORP. L. 793 (1988); Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of
Santa Fe: Rule 1Ob-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel,
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981);
Paul D. Freeman, .4 Study in Contrasts: The Warren and Burger Courts 'Approach to the Securities Laws,
83 DIcK. L. REV. 183 (1978); Louis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. LJ. 891 (1977); D. Phillips, supra note 6; Margaret
V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lOb-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied
Recover'?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985);Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule lOb-5: An End to the
Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE L.J. 789 (student author).
14. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 202 ("Neither the intended scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons
for the changes in its operative language [during congressional consideration] are revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act .... ); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226
("INleither the legislative history nor the statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolu-
tion of this case.").
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that section 10(b) has almost no history. 15
The Court's basic position has been that its interpretation is virtu-
ally compelled by the language of section 10(b). "The words 'manipu-
lative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance,'
strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or in-
tentional misconduct."' 6 The Court has suggested that the language of
section 10(b) is " 'sufficiently clear in its context' to be dispositive,"' 7
but, nevertheless, it repeatedly has gone on to insist that its reading
would best fulfill the objectives of the Exchange Act. Limiting section
10(b) to cases of misconduct involving deception, misrepresentation, or
nondisclosure, the Court explained, "is fully consistent with the funda-
mental purpose of the [Exchange] Act 'to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor .... '
B. An Alternative Conception
The Court's conception of section 10(b) is less than compelling in at
least two respects. First, the language of the statute hardly compels
that conception. Second, if the Exchange Act has any fundamental pur-
pose, it is not "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor .... ,
According to the Supreme Court, the language of section 10(b)
demonstrates that Congress intended to proscribe purposeful miscon-
duct. In fact, Congress did not itself proscribe any conduct in section
10(b); at most, it authorized the SEC to proscribe conduct.20 No con-
15, The Court discussed the legislative history of § 10(b) in Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690,
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201-06, and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975). See also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 705-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 765-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. Hoch/elder, 425 U.S. at 197-99 ("the use of the words 'manipulative,' 'device,' and
contrivance' . . . make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct
quite different from negligence"); see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690; Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77;
cf. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 705-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the
words do not demand such a restrictive definition).
17. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201).
18. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963));
see also Schreiber v. Burlingtion N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1985) (quoting Santa Fe); Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 232 (silence may constitute fraud if there is a duty to disclose).
The Supreme Court has frequently cited a supposed congressional concern with disclo-
sure in securities cases, although more often in support of an expansive than a restrictive
reading of the statutes. Some problems created by interpreting the securities statutes by ref-
erence to their purpose are discussed in Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reifi-
cation in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403 (1986), and Dennis S. Karjala,
Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80
Nw. U.L. REv. 1473 (1986).
19. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186.
20. One tenable view of the statutory scheme is that § 10(b) does not authorize the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate anything, but instead simply declares it
unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of SEC rules promul-
gated under the Commission's general rulemaking authority. See Exchange Act § 23, 15
U.S.C. § 78w (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The effect of § 10(b) would then be to subject certain
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duct violates section 10(b) unless an SEC rule prohibits it.21 Had Con-
gress had in mind only "intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors" 22 when it used the words "'manipulative
or deceptive'. . . in conjunction with 'device or contrivance,' "23 pre-
sumably it would have just made such devices illegal instead of leaving
the matter to the SEC. There is no obvious reason that a statute which
intended to proscribe knowing misconduct would leave it legal. More-
over, the Supreme Court has not suggested one. Indeed, it is hard to
understand what administrative role, if any, the SEC would play under
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 10(b).
According to the Court, when section 10(b) provides for the regula-
tion of "manipulative or deceptive... device[s] or contrivance[s]," the
words "manipulative" and "deceptive" have a pejorative connotation.
Even if this is so, it is critical to read the words in their context. Section
10(b) does not authorize regulation of manipulation and deception; it
authorizes regulation of the use of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It would not strain the language to say that a false financial statement is
a deceptive device even if the person responsible for the statement
thinks it is accurate. Under this alternative interpretation, if a Commis-
sion rule banned the use of false financial statements, someone using a
false financial statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a
rule violations to criminal sanctions under § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982 & Supp. V 1987)
(criminal penalties for willful violations of any provision of the statute "or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful . .. under the terms of" the Act).
Congress might have concluded that not all wrongful conduct should lead to imprisonment or
other criminal penalty under federal law; the intended role for the SEC might have been to
decide which misconduct should result in criminal penalty and to publish rules announcing its
decisions.
The Exchange Act is a carefully written, often subtle piece of legislation; the above read-
ing is not implausible just because it is complicated. However, it is probably correct to say
that § 10(b) was intended to authorize the SEC to regulate conduct. The Supreme Court has
always interpreted § 10(b) as if it authorizes some SEC rulemaking. See, e.g., Aaron, 446 U.S. at
687-88. The drafters of the Act and members of Congress commenting on § 10(b) seem to
have thought the section conferred rulemaking authority. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1934) (Section 10(b) "authorizes the Commission by rules and regulations to pro-
hibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which it finds detri-
mental to the interests of the investor."), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES Aar OF 1933 AND SECURrIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 item 17 U. Ellenberger & E.
Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 115 (1934) [hereinafter House Hearings], quoted in Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 202-03, re-
printed in 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 23. Under the first version of the bill that became the
Exchange Act, any willful violation of a rule would have been criminally punishable. S. 2693,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 24 (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 34; H.R. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 24 (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 24. S. 2693 and H.R.
7852 were identical, and both are referred to as the Fletcher-Rayburn bill [hereinafter
Fletcher-Rayburn]. This original bill contained § 9(c), the predecessor to § 10(b) of the Act;
there would have been no reason to include it had its only purpose been to make rule viola-
tions criminally punishable without also creating regulatory authority.
21. Moreover, the statute contemplates that the SEC's rules will regulate-as opposed to
prohibit-conduct. See note 345 infra and accompanying text.
22. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199.
23. Id. at 197.
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security would violate section 10(b) even if he thought the statement
was true.24
The prevailing view of section 10(b) also misconceives the funda-
mental purpose of the Exchange Act. Few would dispute the claim that
the Supreme Court has identified disclosure as the fundamental pur-
pose of the Exchange Act; indeed, the opinion that the Exchange Act is
a disclosure statute is widely held. The Act imposes ongoing disclosure
obligations on some security issuers, 25 and, to that extent, it does "sub-
stitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor." Yet the Act does much more.
In addition to requiring security issuers to disclose information, the
Exchange Act puts the government in control of stock market credit 26
and the activities of market institutions. 27 Most of the Act concerns
market regulation and has little to do with disclosure. The Supreme
Court has characterized legislative intent in terms of disclosure only by
ignoring the market regulation and credit provisions of the Exchange
Act and, remarkably, even section 10 itself.28
24. A different argument for reading § 10(b) narrowly is that Congress would not have
wanted to punish innocent conduct. Cf. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 20 1-10. If this is so, this does
not mean that § 10(b) limits the Commission's rulemaking authority but rather that the reme-
dial provisions of the Exchange Act should be read narrowly. Cf. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 703 (Bur-
ger, CJ., concurring).
The language of § 10(b) does not specify a penalty for violators; the statutory penalty is
set out in § 32 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also § 21, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. V 1987) (injunctions). Section 32 provides for criminal punishment of
only willful violations. Moreover, "no person shall be subject to imprisonment under [§ 32]
for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule
or regulation." § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. An innocent violation of § 10(b) is not criminal.
The Exchange Act also provides a mechanism for administrative sanctions for exchange
members who violate Commission rules. As originally enacted, the Act required that stock
exchange rules provide procedures for disciplining members who willfully violated Commis-
sion rules, § 6(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); and pro-
vided that the Commission could suspend exchange members for violations of Commission
rules, § 19(a)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982)); see also § 19(a)(l) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(2) (1982)) (SEC may sanction the exchanges for failing to
enforce compliance by members). Congress may have intended to impose administrative
sanctions for innocent violations of rules by exchange members. In any case, the Act contem-
plates the promulgation of technical rules that are not directed against purposeful miscon-
duct, and that might well be violated by accident. See, e.g., § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982)
(accounting and record-keeping rules for exchange members).
25. See § 12 (security registration) and § 13 (required reports) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
26. § 7 (margin requirements), § 8 (borrowing by exchange members and others) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78h (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
27. §§ 5, 6 (registration of exchanges), § 11 (limitations on activities of members, bro-
kers and dealers), § 17 (books and records of exchanges and members), § 19 (internal affairs
of exchanges) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f, 78k, 78q, 78s (1982 & Supp. V
1987)); see also § 15 (over-the-counter market) (15 U.S.C. § 78o). As a result of amendments
since 1934 the Exchange Act now provides for the control of the activities of many other
institutions as well. See § 11 A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (national market system and securities infor-
mation processors); § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (municipal securities dealers); § 17A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q-I (clearance and settlement of securities transactions).
28. The only provisions of the Exchange Act adopted in 1934 that have any meaningful
disclosure orientation are the issuer reporting, §§ 12, 13 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
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The theme that ties the Act together is a concern with security
prices. The Act provides for extensive control over several critical fac-
tors affecting prices, including production and dissemination of infor-
mation that might affect prices, the flow of money into and out of the
market, and the basic structure of the securities market.
In section 2 of the Exchange Act, Congress explained why it took
control of the securities markets. Section 2 provides a list of reasons
that transactions in the securities markets are affected with a public in-
terest, the protection of which justifies federal intervention. 29 Section
2 focuses almost exclusively on the critical importance of market
prices.30 It does not even mention full and honest disclosure or the
§§ 781, 78m (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and proxy sections, § 14 (15 U.S.C. § 78n), and, per-
haps, part of the control-person trading section, § 16(a) (15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)). See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1934) (arguing that mandated public reporting of
corporate information would help turn speculators into investors), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 20, item 18; House Hearings, supra note 20, at 44-46 (pools depended on
public ignorance), 783 (distinction between reporting and government control), 937 (consti-
tutionality). According to § 2 of the Act (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982)), the
public interest made it necessary "to require appropriate reports" regardless of the question
of fraud. The proxy provisions seem directed more toward influencing corporate governance
than investment decisions, and indeed, even the disclosure requirements were expounded to
promote changes in corporate behavior. See notes 86 & 90 infra. In any event, during the
Exchange Act debates no one characterized the reporting and proxy provisions as the heart of
the Act. On the contrary, some critics suggested that these provisions addressed problems
best solved by federal incorporation, and therefore had no place in a bill to regulate stock
exchanges. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra, at 30 (minority views) ("So far as this bill
relates to practices of stock exchanges it cannot be severely criticized. But the original funda-
mental objection still remains, namely, that it gives the commission ... indeterminate power
over all issues of stock, and thus over all corporations in this country."); House Hearings, supra
note 20, at 152, 225; cf id. at 480, 482, 513-14 (testimony ofJohn Dickinson), 787 (comment
of Rep. Huddleston), 916-17 (memorandum of the National Automobile Chamber of Com-
merce); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 87 n.61 (1982); Raoul
Desvernine, Memorandum on behalf of commission brokers, quofed in MICHAEL E. PARRISH,
SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 128 (1970) and in J. SELIGMAN, supra, at 95-96;
Investment House Group, Memorandum Re. H.R. 7852, at 5-6 (Feb. 26, 1934) (on file with
the Stanford Law Review) ("The Act regulates corporations under the guise of regulating ex-
changes.") (copy in volume 8 (item 28) ofJames Landis' collection of important papers relat-
ing to the preparation of the Exchange Act [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION],
copies of which collection are available at the Harvard Law School Library (cataloged as "Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, Legislative History of the National Securities Exchange
Act of 1934"), and at the Securities and Exchange Commission Library (cataloged as "Legis-
lative History of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73d Congress 2d Session 1934," under
the call number LH/Sea/1934X)); Press Release of Richard Whitney, President, New York
Stock Exchange 6 (Feb. 14, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ("The provisions
affecting corporations ... have no proper place in a bill regulating stock exchanges. Regula-
tions of this character belong in a national corporation law.") (copy in New York Stock Ex-
change Archives).
29. Current language at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See generally 78 CONG.
REC. 8163 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher, sponsor ofthe Exchange Act in the Senate) (the
section was intended "to declare the intention of Congress, and enunciate specific principles
as a guide to subsequent administration .... We lay the foundation for this legislation in
section 2 of the bill.").
30. Section 2 highlights the role of the market as an appraiser of value; the importance
of market prices to investors, creditors, and the public treasury; and the widespread quotation
of prices established in market transactions. According to § 2, market prices "are susceptible
to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to excessive spec-
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importance of information about issuers. 3' It is hard to believe that
Congress failed to mention the Act's fundamental purpose in this pre-
amble. More likely, the section accurately reflects the public sentiment
of the time and the problems the authors of the Act intended to
address.
One plain-language reading of section 10(b) gives the Commission
broad power to regulate any practice that contributes to disorder in the
securities markets or that displays speculative sentiment. Instead of
limiting section 10(b) to intentional misconduct, the words "manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance" may encompass any practice
that affects securities prices, and section 10(b) may authorize the Com-
mission to regulate any practice that tends to defeat the fundamental
purpose of the Act: to protect the public's interest in the integrity of
security prices.3 2
If the meaning of section 10(b) is to be found with "the Court's
technical linguistic analysis,"' 33 then it seems that any act or practice
that can move security prices is a "manipulative device." The word
"manipulative" does not necessarily have a pejorative connotation;
even in the context of the securities markets, commentators have distin-
guished legitimate from illegitimate manipulation.3 4 In common and
legal usage, "manipulation" is a broad term that refers to skillful han-
dling or treatment.3 5 When the word is used pejoratively, it describes a
ulation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of securities," which
may undermine the credit, tax and banking systems and precipitate, intensify and prolong
national emergencies like the Depression. § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982
& Supp. V 1987)).
31. Congress did express concern about information in another provision of the Ex-
change Act. Section 16(b) stated that "[flor the purpose of preventing the unfair use orinfor-
mation," the short-swing trading profits of control persons are recoverable by issuers.
§ 16(b) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)). While § 16(b) may remove a corpo-
rate insider's incentive to abuse some informational advantages, it does not require disclosure
of the information which control persons might unfairly use. Id.
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 directed the SEC to facilitate the establishment
of a national market system for securities. As part of this initiative, the Exchange Act was
amended to reflect further congressional findings on the public interest in the securities mar-
kets. Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 2, 7, 89 Stat. 97, 97, 111-17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78k-i
(1982)). The 1975 Act amended § 2, but not to reflect any concern with information. The
1975 Act also added § I 1A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1) (1982) (congressional finding that
there is a public interest in assuring broad dissemination of information about securities
prices and transactions).
32. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (It is "quite unclear" that the words of § 10(b) connote knowing or inten-
tional misconduct).
33. Id. at 715.
34. See notes 56, 274 & 313 infra and accompanying texts. The Supreme Court once
quoted a dictionary to the effect that manipulation is synonymous with unfair or deceptive
conduct. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1985). See also TedJ. Fiflis, Of
Lollipops and Law-A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 303, 321 (1986) (criticizing as overbroad the Court's definition of "manipulation" and
calling its use of the dictionary a "stultifyingfauv pas").
35. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2) (1982) ("[R]eimbursable [chiropractic] services are lim-
ited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation of the spine .... ); 15 U.S.C. § 278g-
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use of force that is somehow inappropriate. False statements can apply
inappropriate force to security prices, but so can many other things,
including trading, and in some circumstances, even true statements.
If securities manipulation means anything in particular, it means
conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price
to an artificial level.3 6 Section 10(b) does not authorize the regulation
3(d)(1) (Supp. 1987) ("the term 'computer system' means any equipment . .,. used in the
automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management ... or reception, of data or infor-
mation"); 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1982) (Foreign merchandise may be brought into a foreign trade
zone and "broken up, repacked, assembled, distributed, sorted, graded, cleaned, mixed with
foreign or domestic merchandise, or otherwise manipulated."); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371 (1982)
("The term 'pilot'... shall mean an employee who is responsible for the manipulation of or
who manipulates the flight controls of an aircraft.").
36. See, e.g., R. CLARK, supra note 5, § 8.12.1, at 348 ("Manipulation is behavior aimed at
creating trading, or the appearance of active trading, in a security for the purpose of inducing
others to buy or sell the security."); CHARLES Amlos DICE, THE STOCK MARKET 414 (1926) ("It
is evident to any one that the condemnatory use of the term 'manipulation' ... is often en-
tirely too comprehensive .... By manipulation is usually understood the creation of an artifi-
cial price by planned action, whether by one man or a group of men. A campaign is planned
and executed to run the price of a stock up or to hammer it down."); TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, STOCK MARKET CONTROL 107 (A. L. Berheim, E. Clark, J. F. Dewhurst & M. G. Schnei-
der, eds. 1934) [hereinafter STOCK MARKET CONTROL] ("The term 'manipulation' is ordinarily
understood to mean the deliberate interference with the free play of supply and demand in
the security markets. Usually this term is associated with pool operations designed to raise or
depress prices artificially."); Frederick W. Jones & Arthur D. Lowe, Manipulation, in THE SE-
CURri" MARKETS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND 444 (A. Berheim & M. G. Schneider eds. 1935) [hereinafter THE SECURITY
MARKETS] (the term manipulation "in popular usage has a rather vague and broad connota-
tion. As used in this chapter, the word manipulation will mean planned effort by an individual
or group of individuals to make the market price of a security behave in some manner in
which it would not behave if left to adjust itself to uncontrolled or uninspired supply and
demand."); see also James H. Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securities Exchange Act, 3 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 7 (1936); James Win. Moore & Frank H. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the
Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1934); Criminal Lau-Use of the Mails to Defraud-Stock Market
Manipulation as a Scheme to Defraud, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 541 n.4 (student author) (quoting
Untermyer, Regulating the Stock Exchange, TODAY, Jan. 27, 1934, at 3.).
There was a great deal of discussion of stock market manipulation and its treatment in the
Exchange Act around the time of the Act's adoption, but very little about § 10(b) beyond an
occasional mention of its vague and potentially broad language. See generally C. DICE, supra, at
413-52; JOHN T. FLYNN, SECURITY SPECULATION (1934); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock
Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1931); Adolf A. Berle,Jr., Stock Market Manipula-
tion, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938); Christopher Branda, Jr., Illegality of Stock Market Manipula-
tion, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 500 (1934) (student author);John Hanna, The Federal Regulation of Stock
Evchanges, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 9 (1931); John Hanna & Edgar Turlington, Protection of the Public
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 251 (1935); William B. Herlands, Criminal Lau
Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 153-64, 177-80 (1934); Mathias,
supra; Moore & Wiseman, supra; Eustace Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21
VA. L. REV. 1, 25-31 (1934); John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson MacChesney, The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025 (1934); Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange
Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624 (1937) (student author).
Until recently there has been very little discussion of the Commission's authority to regu-
late manipulation under § 10(b). See Harold S. Blumenthal, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the
Delicate Art-Control and Domination in Over-the-Counter Securities, 1960 DUKE L.J. 196; Arnold S.
Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule lOb-5, 18 N.Y.L.F. 511 (1973). See generally Nor-
man S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
671 (1986); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Lan-
guage of the Secunties Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359.
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of manipulation, but rather, regulation of the use of manipulative de-
vices. Just as the Commission can regulate the use of deceptive devices
by people who do not intend to deceive, it can regulate devices that are
potentially manipulative regardless of the motives of individuals who
employ them.
Finding support in the statutory language is not the biggest obstacle
to a broad reading of section 10(b). The fundamental problem is that
while the Exchange Act was under consideration, there was very little
debate over section 10(b) and no substantial opposition to it. If Con-
gress really intended section 10(b) to give the SEC sweeping control
over every aspect of the stock market, it is somewhat surprising that no
one supported or opposed the section on that basis. In normal circum-
stances, a proposal to give a federal agency plenary power over the
stock exchanges would have been controversial, to say the least, but the
Exchange Act was not the product of normal circumstances. In fact, the
stock exchanges, about to become subject to the plenary power of the
SEC, thought they had achieved a victory; those who pushed Congress
to act had sought even more. The sophisticated, interested participants
in the debates, as well as the authors of the Act, understood that the Act
conferred open-ended rulemaking authority on the SEC. This outcome
reflected a compromise most people were glad to accept.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
The idea that the general public has an interest in the operations
and performance of the stock market sufficient to justify public control
of the exchanges attracted a substantial following around the beginning
of this century. At the same time, pressure was mounting for public
control of the practices of those who sold corporate securities to public
investors.37 Sometimes, the same people pushed for legislation on
both promotional practices and exchange practices; often, initiatives in
either area had implications for the other. Nonetheless, not all of those
who wanted to regulate the exchanges were concerned with the activi-
ties of security promoters. More significantly, those concerned with
promotional practices and those concerned with exchange practices did
not always seek the same ends. Although stock promotion became a
public issue at about the same time as stock exchange practices, the
public's interest in the market was fundamentally different from its in-
terest in marketing.
The government had to take control of sales practices, the argument
went, because securities salesmen often resorted to high-pressure tech-
niques or fraud. Stock exchange practices were said to implicate some-
what broader and more important interests. Stock market reformers
insisted that, from time to time, speculation and manipulation pro-
37. See generally Louis Loss & EDWARD M. CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958); M. PAR-
RISH, supra note 28, at 5-20.
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duced financial panics and widespread unemployment. Advocates of
statutory responses to improper sales practices, which eventually in-
cluded state Blue Sky laws and the Securities Act of 1933,38 usually
characterized them as measures to protect investors from fraud. Those
who championed a statutory response to speculation and manipulation
consistently claimed to be concerned with the interest of the general
public, not just investors.
A. The Panic of 1907
The movement for public control over the stock exchanges is gener-
ally considered to have begun with the panic of 1907. 3 9 In October of
that year, depositors lost confidence in several New York banks which
were thought to be part of a group of stock market operators who met
with financial ruin when they failed to corner the market in the stock of
a copper mining company they controlled. Prices on the New York
Stock Exchange fell precipitously, and the bank run spread. By the
time confidence was restored, the country was in a recession, many
banks had closed, and many small investors had been ruined.40 Before
long, many people came to believe that stock market operators who
stood to profit from lower stock prices had engineered the price col-
lapse. Believing that the price collapse precipitated widespread panic
across the economy, these people demanded that the government
intervene. 4'
38. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
39. James Landis, the first witness to testify before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on the bill that became the Exchange Act, began his presentation by
linking the movement for government regulation of the stock exchanges to the panic. House
Hearings, supra note 20, at 15-16; see also DAVID SAUL LEVIN, REGULATING THE SECURITIES IN-
DUSTRY 18-20 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science, Columbia University); 2 Louis
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1165-66 (2d ed. 1961); cf 1 MARGARET C. MYERS, THE NEW
YORK MONEY MARKET 307-14 (1931) (earlier reform movements).
40. See generally FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE LORDS OF CREATION 112-43 (1935); ROB-
ERT SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET 297-321 (1968). While the stock market was widely held
responsible for the panic of 1907 and the economic contraction that accompanied it, mone-
tary and financial conditions may have played a more important role. See MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ANNAJACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 156-
68 (1963); PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROoss, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
252 (1st ed. 1952).
41.
Shortly after the panic of 1907 began, a rumor became current that 'Wall Street' had
designedly caused it in order to knock down the prices of stocks, frighten weak hold-
ers, and profit by the ruin of the community....
*. . [T]he rumor that they had brought on the panic by design and in selfish
disregard of public interests, had a wide circulation, and was fraught with possibili-
ties of mischief. The danger of ill-considered legislation, supported by ill-advised
public opinion, doubtless moved Governor Hughes to appoint a committee ... to
inquire "what changes.if any are advisable in the laws of the state bearing upon spec-
ulation in securities and commodities, or relating to the protection of investors, or
with regard to the instrumentalities and organizations used in dealing in securities
and commodities, which are the subject of speculation."
Horace White, The Hughes Investigation, 17J. POL. ECON. 528, 528-29 (1909); Letter fromJ.P.
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In January 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt informed Congress
that it would be desirable to adopt measures "to prevent at least the
grosser forms of gambling in securities and commodities, such as mak-
ing large sales of what men do not possess and 'cornering' the mar-
ket." 42 Roosevelt did not, however, propose specific legislation to
control speculation. Although he was certain that speculation had to be
controlled, he was unclear as to what the appropriate legislation would
look like or even that controlling speculation with legislation was
appropriate.
There is no moral difference between gambling at cards or in lotteries
or on the race track and gambling in the stock market. One method is
just as pernicious to the body politic as the other in kind, and in degree
the evil worked is far greater. But it is in a far more difficult subject
with which to deal. The great bulk of the business transacted on the
exchanges is not only legitimate, but is necessary to the working of our
modern industrial system, and extreme care would have to be taken not
to interfere with this business .... 43
Roosevelt identified what was to become the dominant issue in the
debate over the Exchange Act. In the end, Congress concluded that
the only way to curb speculation without destroying the market was to
give control to administrators.
While numerous stock market reform bills were introduced in Con-
gress shortly after the panic, nothing came of them.44 The govern-
Morgan & Co. to Arsbne P. Pujo (Feb. 25, 1913) ("an appreciable portion of the community
has come to believe ... that in large measure the panic of 1907 was actually due to the
machinations of certain powerful men"), reprinted in Richard N. Sheldon, The Pujo Committee
1912, in 3 CONGRESS INvEsTIGATEs: A DOCUMENTED HiSTORY 1792-1974, at 2251, 2344, 2345-
46 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. & R. Bums eds. 1975); cf 2 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1166 (similar
point with respect to the 1929 stock market crash).
42. 42 CONG. REc. 1347, 1349 (1908). Roosevelt's message consisted of a list of initia-
tives "as regards certain of the relations between labor and capital, and between the great
corporations and the public," id at 1347, which were all "part of the campaign against privi-
lege, part of the campaign to make the class of great property holders realize that property
has its duties no less than its rights," id. at 1349.
43. d at 1349. Roosevelt also acknowledged that there was special difficulty in fashion-
ing a federal response, but he still thought that an effort should be made to deal with the
problem, "even if only in a cautious and tentative way." Id
44. Most of the bills were loosely written and proposed little more than to impose taxes
on certain transactions or regulate the use of the mails.
In 1908 it was proposed that the Federal tax on stock sales be revived, not as a
revenue measure, but as a means of penalizing speculation [H.R. 18525, 60th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1908)]. The rate was set at 50 cents for each 100 dollar share, a figure
purposely set high in order to discourage the frequent purchases and sales by which
speculators made their profits. The bill raised a storm of protest; it was referred to
Committee and never heard from again.
1 M. MYERS, supra note 39, at 307-08. See House Hearings, supra note 20, at 16; see, e.g., H.R. 62,
60th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REC. 13 (1908) (restrictions on short sales); H.R. 10474, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REc. 441 (1908) (regulation of margin trading); H.R. 14641, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REC. 952 (1908); H.R. 15250, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REc.
1166 (1908); H.R. 16377, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REc. 1658 (1908); S. 5678, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess., 42 CONG. REC. 2422 (1908); see also 2 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1165 & n.2
(discussing S. 5678).
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ment's most important response to the panic was to investigate.
B. The Hughes Committee
Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New York appointed a commit-
tee to determine "[w]hat changes, if any, are advisable in the laws of the
State bearing upon speculation in securities and commodities, or relat-
ing to the protection of investors, or with regard to the instrumentali-
ties and organizations used in dealings in securities and commodities
which are the subject of speculation. ' 45 The Hughes Committee's June
1909 report focused on securities speculation, especially on the New
York Stock Exchange, which it called "probably the most important fi-
nancial institution in the world."'46
Both critics and defenders of the market devoted a great deal of
energy to defining speculation, but the word never attained a precise
definition. The Hughes Committee adopted a common approach and
defined speculation as trading with a view to profiting from price
changes, thus defining speculation negatively by distinguishing it from
investment.47 "Speculation consists in forecasting changes of value
and buying or selling in order to take advantage of them."'48
Speculation, according to the Committee, "may be wholly legiti-
mate, pure gambling, or something partaking of the qualities of
both."'49 In some cases, speculation is "a necessary incident of produc-
tive operations," serving to moderate otherwise violent price fluctua-
45. Governor's Message to the Legislature 25 (Jan. 5, 1910), DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 133D SESS. (1910). The Governor said he appointed the Com-
mittee "[in view of the evils incident to speculation and of the importance of sound business
methods in connection with our vast transactions in securities and commodities," id., but, as
noted above, Horace Whit , the chairman of the Committee, later suggested that the Gover-
nor acted to diffuse any sentiment for ill-considered legislation. White, supra note 41; see also
CEDRIC B. COWING, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS, AND PROGRESSIVES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF STOCK
AND COMMODITY SPECULATION 1890-1936, at 38-39 (1965).
46. REPORT OF GOVERNOR HUGHES'S COMMITTEE ON SPECULATION IN SECURITIES AND
COMMODITIES 5 (June 7, 1909) [hereinafter HUGHES COMMIrrEE REPORT], reprinted in Gover-
nor's Message to the Legislature, snpra note 45, and in WILLIAM CLARKSON VAN ANTWERP, THE
STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN app. at 415-46 (1913) [all references to the HUGHES COMMIT-
TEE REPORT will be to the report itself]. The Committee examined and reported on the affairs
of several organized securities and commodity exchanges in New York and the Curb market
that eventually became the American Stock Exchange. The Committee's deliberations were
not recorded.
47. For similar definitions, see 42 CONG. REC. 1347, 1349 (1908) (message of Theodore
Roosevelt) ("Legitimate purchases of commodities and of stocks and securities for investment
have no connection whatever with purchases of stocks or other securities or commodities on a
margin for speculative and gambling purposes.");J. FLYNN, supra note 36, at 3-19;JOHN MAY-
NARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 158-59 (1936);
SERENO S. PRATT, THE WORK OF WALL STREET 81 (3d ed. 1930); cf. S. 1826, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1 (1924) (attempting to distinguish the investor from the "gambler in stocks."). See
generally C. COWING, supra note 45; George Soule, The Stock Exchange in Economic Theory, in THE
SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 36, at 3-18, 815-19 (1935). For a recent criticism of stock
market speculation using similar terminology, see Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
WALL STREET (1988).
48. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 3.
49. Id.
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STANFORD LAW REVIEW
tions. In other cases, however, it does "an almost incalculable amount
of evil. In its nature it is in the same class with gambling upon the race-
track or at the roulette table, but it is practised [sic] on a vastly larger
scale." 50 According to the Committee, the gambling variety of specula-
tion dominated the New York Stock Exchange.5'
Like President Roosevelt, the Committee saw the hardest part of
stock market reform to be eliminating speculation "which is wasteful
and morally destructive, while retaining and allowing free play to that
which is beneficial."'52 The best way to reduce wasteful speculation,
the Committee concluded, was simply to discourage those lacking
"means and experience" from participating in the market, at least as
speculators. 53
Although the Committee treated speculation broadly, it did ex-
amine a variety of specific practices. Some of these practices were sub-
sequently prohibited or subjected to regulation by the Exchange Act,
including trading on credit and various strategies designed to influence
price or induce others to trade. Fortunately, the Committee recorded
the criticism that had been leveled against all of these practices, includ-
ing those it concluded were unobjectionable. Moreover, the report
treats the subject of manipulation at some length, and thus may provide
some evidence of the meaning "manipulative" was intended to convey
in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
The Committee recognized that short selling and margin buying
were widely criticized, but declined to recommend their prohibition or
regulation inasmuch as, in its view, trading on credit was just as legiti-
mate in the stock market as in any other market.5 4 The Committee
50. Id. at 4. This species of speculation had "most of the pecuniary and immoral effects
of gambling." Id. "A continuous stream of wealth, taken from the actual capital of innumera-
ble persons of relatively small means, swells the income of brokers and operators dependent
on this class of business; and in so far [sic] as it is consumed like most income, it represents a
waste of capital." Id.
51. "It is unquestionable that only a small part of the transactions upon the Exchange is
of an investment character: a substantial part may be characterized as virtually gambling." Id.
at 5. Recall that only a year and a half earlier, President Roosevelt had told Congress that
"[the great bulk of the business transacted on the [securities and commodities] exchanges is
not only legitimate, but is necessary to the working of our modem industrial system." 42
CONG. REC. 1349 (1908).
52. HUGHES COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 4.
53. Id. at 4. One of the Committee's recommendations was that the New York Stock
Exchange discourage members from attempting "to increase the lure of the ticker" by equip-
ping their branch offices with "creature comforts" that might tempt those who otherwise
would not speculate, id. at 10, and another was that the Exchange should make it more diffi-
cult to buy on margin, id. at 6; cf Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 36, at 1030 (margin trading
leads to improvidence). Many commentators have suggested that participation in the stock
market by persons of small means is inconsistent with the social welfare. See, e.g., C. DICE,
supra note 36, at 8. Keynes even developed the gambling metaphor. J. KEYNES, supra note 47,
at 159 ("It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and
expensive. And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges.").
54. HUGHES COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5. The Committee also concluded
that "short selling tends to produce steadiness in prices, which is an advantage to the commu-
nity. No other means of restraining unwarranted marking up and down of prices has been
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then turned to the subject of "manipulation of [security] prices by large
interests." 55 Manipulation was an important issue, but not all manipu-
lation was considered wrong. In particular, there was nothing wrong
with a syndicate supporting the price of a new issue with bonafide bids
and offers while the securities passed through the hands of speculators
and into those of investors; in fact such support was entirely
appropriate. 56
Some other forms of price manipulation were objectionable, how-
ever. The Committee censured market operators who created price
fluctuations seeking "either the creation of high prices for particular
stocks, in order to draw in the public as buyers and to unload upon
them the holdings of the operators, or to depress the prices and induce
the public to sell."' 57 The Committee found manipulation of this sort
on the New York Stock Exchange, but expressed confidence that these
manipulations were sufficiently patent to experienced observers that
the Exchange could prevent the worst excesses. 58
suggested to us." Id. at 6. The report summarized the history of unsuccessful short selling
legislation in New York, England, France, and Germany. Id. at 7, 18.
55. Id. at 7. The Committee identified two groups of New York Stock Exchange patrons
who allegedly engineered manipulations.
Manipulators, whose connection with corporations issuing or controlling partic-
ular securities enables them under certain circumstances to move the prices up or
down, and who are thus in some degree protected from dangers encountered by
other speculators [and] ....
[fQloor traders, who keenly study the markets and the general conditions of busi-
ness, and acquire early information concerning the changes which affect the values of
securities. From their familiarity with the technique of dealings on the Exchange,
and ability to act in concert with others, and thus manipulate values, they are sup-
posed to have special advantages over other traders.
Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 7. As the Committee used it, the word "manipulation" did not have any nega-
tive connotation, let alone one of misconduct: "The first kind of manipulation [legitimate
price stabilization efforts for 'the purpose of making a market for issues of new securities'] has
certain advantages, and when not accompanied by 'matched orders' is unobjectionable per se.
It is essential to the organization and carrying through of important enterprises .... Id. at 7.
A 1939 case history of the New York Stock Exchange noted that the Hughes Committee
"felt that the manipulation which accompanied the issue of new securities had certain advan-
tages for investors." N.S.B. GRAS & HENRIETTA M. LARSON, CASEBOOK IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
HISTORY 342 (1939); see also C. DICE, supra note 36, at 414, 437-38 (legitimate manipulation).
The authors of the history, in recognizing that the Exchange Act placed "[slevere restrictions
... on the manipulation of security prices," N. GRAS & H. LARSON, supra, at 346, did not seem
troubled by the idea that manipulation can be appropriate.
57. HUGHES CoMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
58. Id. at 7. While the Committee criticized wash sales and disapproved of matched or-
ders even to support the price of a new issue, it concluded that the New York Stock Exchange
could effectively discourage the manipulation of prices through trades that did not result in
any real change in security ownership. Id. at 7-8. In noting that the exchanges had unilater-
ally forbidden wash sales, the Committee suggested that wash sales were no longer enforcea-
ble and were seldom attempted anymore. Id. at 7-8. Matched orders constituted a more
serious problem because they continued to be "legal and binding," while "caus[ing] an ap-
pearance of activity in a certain security which is unreal." Id. at 8. Manipulators could place
matched orders with different brokers, so they did not disclose their machinations to anyone
subject to Exchange discipline. Id. at 7-8; see also W. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 46, at 174-75.
But see STOCK MARKET CONTROL, supra note 36, at 110-I1; Hanna, supra note 36, at 15 (com-
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The Committee felt that the government had little role to play in
discouraging the small speculator or reforming the exchanges.59 In
fact, the Committee was more worried about the possibility of govern-
ment intervention in the market than about excessive speculation. 60
No law, the Committee argued, could clearly distinguish between ap-
propriate and inappropriate transactions, and any effort to reform the
exchanges by statute would hobble and eventually destroy the mar-
ket.61 Insisting that statutes would be counterproductive, the Commit-
tee thought that "the Exchange, with the plenary power over members
and their operations, could provide correctives .... ,,62
Inasmuch as the Committee's report warned against government in-
tervention, the decision to acknowledge that speculation can be harm-
ful may have seemed inconsequential to conservative Committee
members. In retrospect, however, that acknowledgement had greater
implications than anything else the Committee did. By starting from
the position that excessive speculation can undermine the public wel-
mission broker has no incentive to discover matched orders). The Committee nevertheless
thought the Exchange could easily discourage manipulation by matched orders. HUGHES
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7-8. The Committee also urged the Exchange to forbid
large all-or-none orders, which permitted manipulators to publicize large bids or offers with-
out any requirement to actually complete the sale. Id. at 9-10.
59. "In carrying out such a policy exchanges can accomplish more than legislatures."
HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 4. The Committee did recommend legislation
on the transmission of stock quotations, id. at 15-17, and to deal with a few abuses that did not
directly implicate exchange institutions, including false advertisements for securities and
bucket shops-organizations purporting to execute customer orders, but which simply closed
their customers' transactions on the basis of market price movements instead of actually ef-
fecting trades, id. at 5-16; see also 1 M. MYERS, supra note 39, at 311-12.
60. See White, supra note 41. The Committee warned the exchanges that if they failed to
clean up the wrongdoing, the state would take action. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 46, at 10-11.
61. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 4-5. The Committee emphasized the
failure of earlier German legislation, which was discarded only after it had rendered the Berlin
exchange insignificant on the international markets, impaired the financial standing of Ger-
many, and exposed small speculators to even greater evils than had existed before the legisla-
tion. Id. at 21-22. The Committee again echoed President Theodore Roosevelt, who had
offered Germany as an example of overly broad legislation. 42 CONG. REC. 1349 (1908).
The Committee declined even to recommend incorporation of the stock exchanges be-
cause it seemed "distinctly advantageous" to allow the exchanges to discipline members in-
stantly and in a summary manner. Also, it seemed possible that incorporation would involve
the courts in disciplinary matters, introducing delay and technical obstacles that "would im-
pair discipline without securing any greater measure of substantial justice." HUGHES COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 10-11. The Committee also rejected the suggestion to subject
the books of brokers to examination by some public authority. While recommending that the
exchanges periodically inspect their members' books, the Committee feared that public exam-
ination of brokerage records would lead to disclosure of confidential information about cus-
tomers. Id. at 8-9. The President of the New York Stock Exchange made similar arguments to
President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 regarding the inhibiting effect that overly broad legisla-
tion would have on the functioning of stock exchanges. Letter from Richard Whitney to Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt 6-7 (Apr. 14, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 2).
62. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
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fare, the Committee shifted the terms of the stock market debate.63
Once the Committee acknowledged that something was wrong with the
market, it could not deny that something had to be done. On the con-
trary, it had to recommend a solution.
When stock market reform becomes a political issue, the public de-
bate has historically brushed over the question of whether reforms are
necessary and gone directly to their design: the question of what the
reform should be. This rapid progression has shaped the positions of
those involved in the debate and thus the compromises reached. Deci-
sions that at first seem startling appear on second thought to be the
almost inevitable product of a crisis.
When an economic depression prompts a widespread sense that the
stock markets caused the problem, there is seldom any concrete sense
of how it transpired. 64 Even if the convictions of reformers are impre-
cise or groundless, they can be deeply held. Targets of reform may
expect to have more success diverting their critics than educating
them. 65 Because critics never carefully articulated the stock market
problems, it is not surprising that they often proposed drastic changes
rather than finely tailored solutions. When faced with a suspicious pub-
lic demanding action, the exchanges have usually tried to appease the
public by instituting minimal reforms 66 and by arguing that any reform
program should be tentative and incremental since the market is both
very important and quite sensitive.67
The program of flexible reform offered by the exchanges and their
63. As one of the first studies of speculation on U.S. stock exchanges, the Committee's
report was frequently cited during public and congressional debates over the Exchange Act.
64. In 1934, few people claimed to understand how the exchanges worked and what
functions they performed. See Soule, supra note 47, at 4 ("[N]owhere has there been discov-
ered a single complete, systematic and thoroughly critical statement of the place of the stock
exchange in a modem economy."). Most members of the House committee responsible for
the Exchange Act "were not intellectually equipped to evaluate the details of exchange legis-
lation." M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 131-32.
65. The Hughes Committee's vague indictment of speculation is a revealing example.
Although the Committee was deeply conservative, its report did not challenge the popular
perception that the stock market was a casino. Instead, it claimed that government interfer-
ence with the market would only make matters worse. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 46.
66. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 4 ("Especially during periods of popular agita-
tion, or when legislative action has been threatened, the exchanges have taken steps to raise
the standards for the conduct of business by their members and to require corporations to
furnish more adequate information for the benefit of investors."); 1 M. MYERS, supra note 39,
at 307 ("In spite of the continuous criticism which was directed at the activities of stockbro-
kers, it was found to be very difficult to secure effective legislative control over them. When-
ever an outraged public opinion seemed about to be successful in securing the passage of a
regulatory law, the Exchange hastened to change its rules and methods sufficiently to make
unnecessary the proposed legislation.").
67. According to the Hughes Committee, the New York Stock Exchange "affects the
financial and credit interests of the country in so large a measure that its proper regulation is a
matter of transcendent importance. While radical changes in the mechanism, which is now so
nicely adjusted that the transactions are carried on with the minimum of friction, might prove
disastrous to the whole country, nevertheless measures should be adopted to correct existing
abuses." HUGHES COMiMITrEE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
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apologists after the panic of 1909, and again in 1934, in large part coin-
cided with the approach of the small group of relatively sophisticated
critics who realized the limits of their own understanding of the stock
market and suspected that even if reforms were instituted, the market
would grow around them. 68 Both the exchanges and their sophisti-
cated critics took the position that the speculation problem called for a
rulemaking process that could react to developing knowledge and prac-
tices. Of course, the exchanges and the sophisticated critics parted
ways when it came to the question of who should control the process.
Thus, representatives of a broad spectrum of opinion agreed that
stock exchange reform should be accomplished through bureaucratic
regulation rather than statutory fiat. Among the disparate groups that
considered flexible regulation appropriate, it was universally agreed
that the regulatory authority would have very broad rulemaking power.
Exchange critics demanded that any regulatory authority have extreme
powers; the exchanges, inasmuch as they proposed to be the authority
or at least to control it, pointed out the advantages of plenary power.69
Once market reform became inevitable, as it probably had by 1934,
everyone agreed that, at the very least, some administrative body
should have virtually unlimited authority to regulate the market as it
deemed necessary. By the time it was determined that the body would
be a public institution, it was too late for the exchanges to argue that
boundless authority was inappropriate.
C. The Money Trust Investigation
The charge that a few leaders of finance triggered the panic of 1907
helped prompt Congress to investigate "the money trust." 70 In 1912,
the House of Representatives instructed the Banking and Currency
Committee to investigate whether, as "generally believed," control of
industry, railroads and banking had become so concentrated in the
68. For a recent example of the impulse of market critics to respond to crisis by delegat-
ing power to bureaucrats, see Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA), May 24, 1989, at 5 (exchange
support of Market Reform Act of 1989, S. 648); Wirth Tells Corporate Counsel to Expect S&L
Bailout; Sees Little 1989 Progress on Glass-Steagall, Takeovers, 3 Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA), Nov.
16, 1988, at 8 (Senator Timothy Wirth predicting that Congress would respond to the Octo-
ber 1987 stock market crash by delegating more authority to the SEC).
69. "Plenary" was the word used by the Hughes Committee in 1909, see note 62 supra
and accompanying text, and by the stock exchanges in 1934, see notes 220 & 252 infra and
accompanying texts.
70. See generally Aloney Trust Investigation: Investigation of Financial and Monetaiy Conditions in
the United States Under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504 Before A Subcomm. of the Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1913); HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, RE-
PORT To THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TOGETHER WITH THE VIEWS OF THE MINORITY, OF
THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE
THE CONCENTRATION OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913)
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1593], reprinted in part in Sheldon, supra note 41, at 2356-81; F.
ALLEN, supra note 40, at 77-82; Vincent P. Carosso, The Wall Street Money Trust from Pjo through
Medina, 47 Bus. HIsT. REV. 421, 425-26 (1973); BenjaminJ. Klebaner, The Money Trust Investi-
gation in Retrospect, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 393, 394-96 (1966).
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hands of a few financiers as to enable them "to control the security and
commodity markets, to regulate the interest rates for money, to create,
avert, and compose panics [and] to dominate the New York Stock Ex-
change .... -71 Representative Ars~ne Pujo, chairman of both the
Committee and its investigative subcommittee, delegated control of the
investigation to Samuel Untermyer, the subcommittee's counsel.72 Un-
termyer devoted himself to showing that a very few men, particularlyJ.
P. Morgan, controlled a substantial part of the nation's business.
Although its hearings and recommendations dealt primarily with
banking practices, a substantial part of the Committee's efforts went
into investigating the New York Stock Exchange practices.73 The Com-
mittee concluded that the exchange was run for the benefit of its mem-
bers, often to the detriment of investors and competitors, 74 "[b]ut it is
in respect of the extent and character of the speculation in securities for
which it is the agency that the New York Stock Exchange touches most
vitally the affairs of the people of the entire country."'75 Like the
Hughes Committee, which it quoted extensively, the Pujo Committee
similarly concluded that speculative trading dominated the business of
the New York Stock Exchange. 76 Its objection to speculation echoed
that of the Hughes Committee as well: "Such excessive and indiscrimi-
nate speculation... is not only hurtful in the way that all public gam-
bling is hurtful, but in addition it withdraws from productive industry
vast quantities of capital." '77
One particularly troublesome aspect of speculation was
manipulation7 8:
A very important phase of speculation on the New York Stock Ex-
change is the manipulation of prices up or down, as desired, without
regard to the real value of the securities, and the creation of a false
appearance of activity in particular stocks. Besides inciting ... popular
speculation, which rather should be discouraged, this practice prevents
the exchange from faithfully reflecting the current value of securities-
one of its true functions-and gives those controlling great supplies of
capital a further power over the enterprises of the country, since the
credit of corporations in no small degree is affected by the prices of
their securities. 79
71. H.R. Res. 405, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 CONe. REC. 1706 (1912), reprinted in 48 CONG.
REC. 2386-87 (1912); see also H.R. Res. 504, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 CoNG. REC. 5336-44
(1912); H.R. Res. 429, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 CONG. REC. 2382 (1912).
72. Another subcommittee, chaired by Representative Carter Glass of Virginia, worked
on the Federal Reserve Act. See P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 40, at 255-58.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 33-54 (review of evidence on New York
Stock Exchange).
74. Id. at 3342.
75. Id. at 42.
76. "[I]n large measure transactions in shares on the New York Stock Exchange are
purely speculative .... Id. at 43.
77. Id. at 45; see also id. at 116.
78. Id. at 46-52 (review of evidence); Sheldon, supra note 41, at 2255-56.
79. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 46.
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Although the Committee did not undertake an exhaustive investiga-
tion of manipulative practices, it did examine and report on what Pro-
fessor Loss has called "the notorious market pools." 8 0 The pools-
syndicates that manipulated the price of securities toward making a
trading profit-often employed deceptive trading practices like
matched orders and wash sales to encourage people to trade and, thus,
to move prices. 8' Nonetheless, the essential point of the pool was to
take control of the market, not to deceive people.8 2
While it condemned pools, the Pujo Committee considered pools
and manipulation to be only particularly troublesome aspects of the
larger problem of stock market speculation. The Committee did not
lose sight of that larger problem in concentrating on particular prac-
tices. In fact, in discussing the most controversial practice-short sell-
ing-it warned against a narrow focus.
Whilst your committee has not been impressed with the contention
that short selling performs a valuable function .. . there seems no
greater reason for prohibiting speculation by way of selling securities
in the expectation of buying them back at lower prices than by way of
purchasing them in the expectation of at once reselling at higher prices
... [A]ll speculation, whether for the rise or for the fall, needs to be
curbed rather than stimulated.8 3
The Committee concluded that the exchanges should be reformed
and that Congress had the constitutional power to mandate reform.8 4
80. 3 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1529. The Committee's report summarized the practices
several pools used to manipulate prices. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 46.
81. For example, the Committee reported that New York Stock Exchange officers had
admitted "that unreal appearances of activity are created through the giving by the same per-
son or persons of simultaneous orders to buy and sell particular stocks ...." H.R. REP. No.
1593, supra note 70, at 46. In support of this statement the report quoted the amazing testi-
mony of a former president of the New York Stock Exchange, who, when asked whether he
approved of such transactions, answered, "I approve of transactions that pay their proper
commissions and are properly transacted. You are asking me a moral question and I am
answering you a stock-exchange question." Id. at 47, quoting Mone Trust Investigation, supra
note 70, at 812 (testimony of Frank Knight Sturgis).
82. One might call any practice that affects security prices deceptive, on the theory that
the securities market is generally thought to be an impersonal auction in which all trades are
the result of investment decisions and in which prices are not subject to anyone's control. See
Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 36; cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipula-
lion, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59J. Bus. S103, S103 (1986) (describes the "text book
model" in which traders are too small compared with the market to affect prices). But even if
people assume the market works this way, the concept of "deception" encompasses mislead-
ing practices only if a person who misleads without an intent to induce reliance can be said to
deceive. The Supreme Court has not yet embraced such an extension of fraud doctrine.
83. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 52; see also RALPH F. DEBEDTS, THE NEw DEAL's
SEC 4 (1964) (Pujo Committee report's enumeration of objectionable activities emphasized
"those of a speculative nature"); cf Sheldon, supra note 41, at 2269 ("The recommendations
and bills were designed to be weak so as to win unanimous approval among the committee
members.").
84. The constitutional basis for federal control over the exchanges remained an issue,
and Untermyer's strong views on the matter helped shape the New Deal securities statutes.
See note 89 infra, and notes 127-129 infra and accompanying text. According to the Pujo
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The Committee proposed a bill that would have made it unlawful to
transmit through the mails any information relating to transactions or
operations on a stock exchange unless the exchange's charter con-
tained provisions, satisfactory to the Postmaster General, "safeguard-
ing . . . against fraud and deceit in [certain] particulars. ' 8 5 The
enumerated particulars went beyond the usual sense of fraud, requir-
ing, for example, that the exchanges impose a minimum 20 percent
margin for purchases.8 6
The Pujo Committee's conclusions were widely reported, and many
commentators agreed with them.8 7 Louis Brandeis drew heavily on evi-
dence compiled by the Committee in his book Other Peoples Money-and
How the Bankers Use /t.88 Brandeis's recommendations, especially his
prescription of disclosure as a cure for the ills Untermyer had docu-
mented, greatly influenced the New Deal debate on federal securities
regulation.8 9 Still, those who emphasize the roots of the securities laws
Committee, "It is doubtful... whether the Federal Government has power generally to regu-
late stock exchanges. We therefore advise no action by Congress to correct such local abuses
in the operations of the New York Stock Exchange" as including rules limiting exchange
membership or the fixing of commissions. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 115. None-
theless, the Committee believed "that Congress has power unconditionally to prohibit the
mails, the interstate telegraph and telephone, the national banks, and all other instrumentali-
ties under its control, from being used in executing, negotiating, promoting, increasing or
otherwise aiding transactions on ... stock exchanges." Id. at 116; see also id. at 119-28 (discus-
sion of congressional power to prohibit use of the mails, telegraph, telephone, and national
banks for aiding transactions on stock exchanges, and to impose a tax on such business).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 170. The report sets out the Committee's
stock exchange bill. Id. at 170-73.
86. Id. at 171 (§ l(h)). To discourage short sales, the bill would have required ex-
changes to prohibit members from lending customers' securities, even with customer permis-
sion. Id. (§ l(f)); see also id. at 163. Exchanges would have also been required to prohibit
manipulation, id. at 171 (§ 1(d)), defined by the bill as trading for the purpose of creating a
misleading appearance of activity or artificially influencing the market price of the traded se-
curity in order to induce others to trade, id. at 172-73 (§ 5(3)).
Exchanges would also have been required to compel issuers to disclose a great deal of
financial information, including investment bankers' fees and transactions' with officers. Id. at
170-71 (§ 1(a)). While such disclosure requirements are conventionally viewed as devices to
protect investors, they were sometimes advocated as a way to achieve broader ends, particu-
larly changing corporate behavior. See note 90 infra. The Pujo Committee was startlingly
candid in suggesting that Congress should exert power over the exchanges to reform corpo-
rate business practices.
Great and much-needed reforms in the organization and methods of our corpo-
rations may be legitimately worked out through the power wielded by the stock ex-
change over the listing of securities. Much of the confusion and many of the defects
in corporate regulation due to the diversity of State laws and to the bidding of the
States against one another in laxity of administration in order to attract corporations
within their borders may be corrected and uniformity of methods introduced
through the listing department of the exchange.
H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 70, at 114-15.
87. Carosso, supra note 70; Sheldon, supra note 41, at 2264-65. But see Donald A.
Ritchie, The Pecora [all Street Exposi 1934, in 4 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, supra note 41, at 2555-
56 (press hostile to Pujo hearings).
88. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914).
89. 1 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 123; Carosso, supra note 70, at 421-22, 429j 436; Ritchie,
supra note 87, at 2555-56; cf. R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at viii (Brandeis's influence on Frank-
lin Roosevelt); JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW DEAL 99,
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in Brandeis's work sometimes forget that Brandeis saw sunlight as a
means to an end-the distribution of economic power-and not as an
end in itself.90
Although the activities of the Hughes and Pujo Committees were
widely reported and ultimately influential, no significant stock ex-
change legislation was immediately enacted. The effects of the panic of
1907 were short-lived; by the time recommendations were made, the
emergency was over. New York mandated several stock exchange re-
forms,9 1 and the New York Stock Exchange forbade, or at least discour-
aged, some of the questionable practices the Committees uncovered,92
but the Pujo Committee's bill was never enacted into law. 93
Over the next twenty years the stock market grew rapidly, especially
253-54 (1988) (Brandeis's influence on Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen); THOMAS K.
McCGRw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 112-14 (1984);J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 41 (1982)
("Rarely did Roosevelt speak about the stock market without invoking the title of... Other
People's Money.").
Untermyer himself also played an important role. He was the first person asked to write
securities legislation for Franklin Roosevelt, see notes 127-130 infra and accompanying text,
and he played a large part in the public debate over the legislation finally enacted as the
Exchange Act. SeeJ. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 51-52.
90. Ironically, those who accept the protection of investors through disclosure require-
ments as the fundamental purpose of the federal securities statutes often refer to Other People's
Money and cite Justice Brandeis' comments on the efficacy of sunlight as the essential state-
ment of the policy underlying the statutes. See, e.g., A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 329, 339 (1988) (student author).
Other People's Money did not propose extensive required disclosures; it did not cite problems of
fraud to justify even the limited disclosure it suggested; and it was not primarily concerned
with the protection of investors. Brandeis was primarily concerned with the concentration of
economic power. "[T]he thing that troubled him was that ultimately.. . all individuals were
at the mercy of those in whom economic power resided, and that this economic power went
with the control of the fluid capital of the country." Max Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 7, 20 (F. Frankfurter ed. 1932).
In Other People's Money, Brandeis argued that investment bankers had strategically invested
to gain control of finance, industry, railroads, and utilities, using money derived largely from
the excessive fees and commissions they charged issuers and buyers of securities. Issuers paid
exorbitant fees because they were under the control of the bankers. Buyers were simply una-
ware that securities prices were inflated by excessive investment banker profits. Brandeis pro-
posed to "[c]ompel bankers when issuing securities to make public the commissions or profits
they are receiving." L. BRANDEIS, supra note 88, at 101. He would have required sellers to
disclose only this piece of information and nothing more, reasoning that investors would not
buy if they knew how much the bankers were making, and that if investors did not buy, bank-
ers would lose the stream of income which enabled them to control the country. "Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Id. at 92. The disease was
bigness, not fraud. See also id. at 102-03 (incidental benefit to investors).
91. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 11 n.4 (statutes); cf D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 23-24
(New York reform proposals).
92. D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 53-57; 2 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1165; ROBERT SOBEL,
THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 198-99 (1965); Hanna, supra
note 36, at I I n.4.
93. C. COWING, supra note 45, at 56-62; D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 41-42; 2 L. Loss,
supra note 39, at 1166; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 36-38; Carosso, supra note 70, at 428;
Sheldon, supra note 41, at 2269-71. The public may have believed that the Federal Reserve
Act solved the problems identified by the Pujo Committee. Id. at 2271-73.
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the New York Stock Exchange,9 4 but little public discussion of regulat-
ing the markets occurred. Although there was some agitation for re-
form, the public at large was no longer concerned. 9 5 Securities
legislation has historically been the product of calamity. The public did
not again demand government control of the stock exchanges until the
depression of the 1930s.
D. The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression
While the reports of the Hughes and Pujo Committees and the
opinions of courts and commentators that had considered the propriety
of particular stock market practices influenced the drafters of the Ex-
change Act,9 6 the central inspiration for the Act was the combination of
94. N. GRAS & H. LARSON, supra note 56, at 343-44 (total number of shares traded annu-
ally rose from 172,496,774 in 1915 to 1,124,608,910 in 1929).
95. During this period, most proposals for federal securities legislation emphasized the
regulation of issuers and sales practices, not the exchanges. For example, proposals to sup-
plement state "blue sky" laws with federal legislation were frequently advanced. See R.
DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 5-6; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 5-41; D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39,
at 41-53; cf. JOHN BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL STREET 1920-1938, at
96-99 (1969) (extensive criticism of stock market speculation existed during the late 1920s).
The commodities markets were brought under federal control in the early 1920s. See generally
I PHILIP McBRIDEJOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.79, at 213-
14 (2d ed. 1989); 2 P.M. JOHNSON & T.L. HAZEN, supra, § 4.01, at 220 (1982).
An unusually broad 1924 bill contemplated federal control over both exchanges and cor-
porations through a Corporation Commission. S. 1826, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. (1924). The
bill, which was rather loosely drafted, seemed to forbid margin trading, short sales, trading
with the intention of influencing price, watered stock, and some abusive trading by corporate
officers and employees. Id. §§ 3, 4, 5, 6, 10. The rest of the bill was overtly polemical, not
even purporting to fill in the detail of all the substantive reforms it envisioned. For example,
it explained that the nation had invested much more in corporate securities than in banks and
trust companies, "and it is to the shame of our law makers that adequate protection, or in fact
any protection at all, has ever [sic] been given by our National Government for this vast in-
vestment .... " Id. § I 1(d). The "paramount function" of the new Corporation Commission
was to protect investments and afford free, fair, broad, and genuine securities and commodi-
ties markets, "with all forms of gambling and manipulation eliminated; two elements which
are now dominant in our security and commodity markets, and which are now our Nation's
greatest peril and curse." Id. Thus, "all stock exchanges or marts on which securities are sold
should be under the supervision of this commission, with ample laws and power of enforce-
ment to protect the investor. Such powers as are not conferred in this Act to the commission
to enforce its purpose and mandates should be quickly given by amendments and enactment
of future laws by Congress." Id. One of the Commission's first tasks was to draft a national
incorporation law. Id.
96. By 1934 there was a substantial body of case law addressed more or less directly to
stock exchange institutions and practices. See generally SAMUEL P. GOLDMAN, A HANDBOOK OF
STOCK EXCHANGE LAWS (1914); CHARLES H. MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK
EXCHANGES (1931). Courts had considered the propriety of a variety of activities designed to
influence security prices. Writing in 1931, Adolf Berle, probably the era's most influential
commentator on corporate finance, asserted that courts had already gone much further than
commonly assumed to protect the stock market from fraud. Berle, Liability for Stock Market
Manipulation, supra note 36; see also Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 36, at 394-97.
See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1531-40 (manipulation law before the Exchange Act);
Poser, supra note 36, at 697-700.
Although it was contemporaneous with the Exchange Act, Berle's article is particularly
valuable as a statement of public sentiment because it was made before concrete proposals for
a statute had engendered a response from special interest groups. In Berle's view, the courts
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the bull market of the 1920s and the dramatic collapse that ended it.
Conventional wisdom holds that the Exchange Act was passed in
response to the 1929 crash. This view is correct at least in the sense
that stock exchange legislation was inevitable once the public blamed
the stock market crash for the Depression. As the reality of the Depres-
sion settled in, many people came to blame the collapse of the stock
market for their suffering and the country's ruin.97 Others took advan-
had forbidden the manipulation of prices by deceptive statements and practices, but they had
done little, if anything, about the manipulation resulting from concerted trading. Berle, Lia-
bility for Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 36, at 272-73. It was primarily this problem that
cried out for a solution. While Berle believed that the law had accomplished a great deal to
prevent fraud, he noted that
American law has not undertaken to impose any liability upon buyer or seller for so
arranging his transactions as unduly to inflate or depress the price of the stock. This
freedom, which arouses public condemnation more than any other single legal ele-
ment in the situation, is heavily under fire at the moment .... But the principle of
laisserfaire [sic] in American law remains in this regard unbroken; a group may
purchase with the sole aim of raising the price or may sell with the sole aim of de-
pressing it; and granted that they are not connected with the corporation, or have
not in some other way assumed obligations to the market or to investors in that
corporation, the law leaves them strictly alone.
Id. at 272. While U.S. courts had not found concerted trading that influenced price to be
within the scope of the traditional rules against fraud, English judges had denounced such
manipulation by trading in Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., [1892] 2 Q.B. 724 (G.A.),
finding illegal agreements among stockbrokers to purchase shares to induce later purchasers
to believe a legitimate market exists and to convince them the shares are selling at a premium,
"[wlithout," according to Berle, "relying on any specific line of tort reasoning .... " Berle,
Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 36, at 272. But see Schreiber v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1985) (Scott "placed emphasis on the presence of deception."). Berle
hoped American courts might reach the same result on the theory that it is somehow fraudu-
lent to trade for the purpose of creating a market price that does not represent the trader's
own appraisal of value. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 36, at 273, 279.
See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1533-34, 1538-39. The problem of concerted trading
is essentially different from the problem of deception, and the manipulation provisions of the
Exchange Act may have been intended to address the former at least as much as the latter.
97. First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933), reprinted in 2 Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 239, 240 (H. Commager 8th ed. 1968); Letter from Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Sam Rayburn (Mar. 26, 1934) ("The people of this country are, in overwhelming
majority, fully aware of the fact that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities
was one of the most important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted 'boom'
which had so much to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929."), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 2. Telford Taylor, who helped draft the Exchange
Act, later wrote that "[tihe New Deal was born of the Great Depression and, to the naked eye
of the ruined investor and the unemployed apple-seller, the depression had been touched off
by the stock market panic of October, 1929." TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST, THE STORY
OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 65 (1955); see also D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 59 ("Few
people realized what the crash portended until some time after it occurred, but there was
hardly an American who was not aware of its occurrence and who did not date hard times
from, and associate his distress with, the black days of October 1929."). See generally C. Cow-
ING, supra note 45, at 5-98; R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 27-30.
Economists continue to disagree on the nature and extent of economic impact the 1929
stock market crash actually had. Compare M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 306-
07 ("Partly, no doubt, the stock market crash was a symptom of the underlying forces making
for a severe contraction in economic activity. But partly also, its occurrence must have helped
deepen the contraction .... ") andJOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1954)
(speculative stock market bubble of 1920s and its collapse contributed substantially to the
depression of the 1930s) and SUSAN PREvIANT LEE & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEw
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tage of popular animosity toward Wall Street.98 By the time Franklin
Roosevelt was elected president, most interested parties recognized
that the issue was not whether there would be stock exchange legisla-
tion, but rather what form the legislation would take.
No one questions that the Exchange Act was the product of the
unique circumstances of the Depression, but the speculative boom of
the 1920s, the 1929 crash, and the horrible devastation that followed
do not inform the Supreme Court's perspective of the Exchange Act.
Instead, underlying the Supreme Court's rule lOb-5 cases is the image
of a statute directed at nothing more than promoting candor and elimi-
nating fraud. Yet surely, one trying to explain the enactment and
objectives of the Exchange Act cannot forget that in 1934 there was a
widespread consensus that excessive stock market speculation and the
collapse of the stock market had brought down the economy, and that
those who enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with
preventing a recurrence.99
The spectacular rise of the market in the 1920s and the even more
spectacular fall that began in 1929 were important in the broader sense
that they shaped public and congressional perceptions of the stock mar-
ket. The premises of much current securities law commentary are that
stock prices reflect investors' perceptions of stock issuers,' 00 and that
prices will more accurately reflect those perceptions-and to that ex-
tent be improvedl 0l-if more extensive and reliable information is
available to investors. From this premise, it follows that the appropri-
ate role of securities legislation is to facilitate the efficient discovery and
dissemination of accurate information about issuers. According to the
prevailing view, Congress intended the Exchange Act to fill that role;
the Act's fundamental purpose was "to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."
The analytical model of the stock market that prevailed during the
depression was very different from the current model. The argument
that the stock market will work properly if information is available to
market participants assumes that market participants and mechanisms
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 372-83 (1979) (decline in consumption caused by stock market decline
may have contributed to depression) and 1 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 160 (1956) ("By shattering confidence, the crash knocked out any hope of auto-
matic recovery.") with THOMAS K. MCGRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 180 n.49 (1984) ("This
connection between the crash and the depression, though valid in the minds of New Dealers,
has been challenged by modem scholars.").
98. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 97, at 160; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 47, at 103-04.
99. To appreciate the historical context, it is necessary to bear in mind how depressed
the country really was. C. DWIGHT DOROUGH, MR. SAM 220 (1962). For a particularly wrench-
ing account of the situation, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEw DEAL (1963).
100. See generally William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986).
101. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988).
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are rational and will, if given the necessary information, price securities
at their fundamental value. Perhaps the stock market is in fact rational,
but the Exchange Act was written on the assumption that it is not.
Given the debacle of 1929, Congress could hardly have concluded
otherwise in 1934.
The tremendous rise in stock prices during the 1920s and the pre-
cipitous drop that began in 1929 proved to many that speculation,
rather than sound, long-term investment, was the engine that drove the
market. In this view, speculators were concerned not with fundamental
value but with predicting the changing prejudices and circumstances of
other market participants.10 2 For many who thought the crash had
caused the depression, the country's survival depended on restraining
speculators; no one suggested that speculation would end if everyone
was required to tell the truth. 10 3 While speculation had long been criti-
cized on moral grounds as profligate gambling, it began to be seen as a
direct cause of terrible and tangible suffering.' 0 4
"The prime instrument of perdition on the Stock Exchange [was]
supposed to be short selling."10 5 Rumors that bankers were selling
short began to spread as soon as the market collapse began in October
of 1929.106 The public eventually concluded, just as it had after the
102. See generally J. GALBRAITH, supra note 97, at 6-28, 174-76; WARREN F. HICKERNELL,
WHAT MAKES STOCK MARKET PRICES ix (1932); J. KEYNES, supra note 47, 147-64; R. SOBEL,
supra note 92, at 262-90; JOHN BURR WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE 33-34
(1938); Adolf A. Berle, High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 20, 31 (1933).
103. See generally D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 59-96 (response of the academics and gov-
ernment officials to the crash).
104. When the Senate Banking and Currency Committee took up the bill that became
the Exchange Act, the first witness, Doctor E.A. Goldenweiss (the director of research and
statistics for the Federal Reserve Board), explained that stock prices affect economic activity
and that the very efficiency of the market accelerates price movements. Stock Exchange Practices:
Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 6436-39 [hereinafter Stock Ex-
change Practices], reprinted in part in 6 & 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 22.
[T]he bill under consideration here is actuated, as I understand it, by the desire to
moderate and regulate the activities of stock exchanges in such a way as to prevent a
recurrence of the excesses of appreciation in stocks, of fantastic rises in stocks...
and also to prevent the disastrous drops in securities prices, with their repercussions
Id. at 6439-40.
105. J. FLYNN, supra note 36, at 216; see also J. BROOKS, supra note 95, at 137-43; 2 L.
Loss, supra note 39, at 1224 ("short selling has been a favorite whipping boy. . ."); STOCK
MARKET CONTROL, supra note 36, at 95 ("volume" and "intensity" of criticism and defense of
short selling "varied inversely with the business cycle"); Hanna, supra note 36, at 11 ("Some
persons, concluding that the stock market is evil only when it registers declines, seek to isolate
the cause of the declines ... and propose to abolish the short seller or bear."); D.S. LEVIN,
supra note 39, at 98 (by the end of 1931, "[s]hort selling.., eclipsed the other issues and
became the bMte noire of... Congress and the administration."). Not all critics of stock market
practices condemned short-selling, however. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 36, at 13 (no evi-
dence short sales significantly depress price); G. Wright Hoffman, Short Selling, in THE SECUR-
rrY MARKETS, supra note 36, at 356-401.
106. VINCENT CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 305 (1970); C. COWING, supra
note 45, at 197-200; R. SOBEL, supra note 92, at 273-74; see alsoJ. GALBRArrH, supra note 97, at
118-20.
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panic of 1907, that speculators had pushed the market to unreasonable
heights and that short sales had precipitated the collapse. 10 7 Several
bills to regulate various aspects of the stock market were introduced
even before the end of 1929; many more were introduced before the
Exchange Act was adopted in 1934. For Congress, as for the public,
short selling was the chief villain. Most of the bills proposed to do little
more than prohibit, tax, or regulate short sales.' 0 8
President Hoover thought manipulators trying to depress prices
were demoralizing the stock market, ' 09 and he encouraged Congress to
investigate short selling."10 The Senate went further in March of 1932,
directing its Banking and Currency Committee to make a thorough and
complete investigation of stock exchange practices."lI The committee
looked into short selling and accumulated evidence of a variety of unsa-
vory practices, 1 2 but did not at first develop a very impressive indict-
107.
It is of more than passing interest . . . that the blaze of popular wrath against the
[New York Stock] Exchange flamed up not when people found themselves stripped
of their life's savings in the disorderly declines of 1929 and 1930, but later in 1931
when the notion got about that the decline was the work of a group of wicked bear
raiders-professional speculators-who by selling short were driving prices lower
and preventing recovery.
2 L. Loss, supra note 39, at 1166 (quotingJ. FLYNN, supra note 36, at 216); accord R. DEBEDTS,
supra note 83, at 12, 17-22; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 109-11; Cf WILLIAM 0. DouGLAs,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 63-73 (J. Allen ed. 1940) (short sales contributed to market collapse
in 1937). Public suspicion of short selling grew as the Depression continued and worsened.
D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 86-96.
108. Many of the bills introduced after the crash are collected in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLECTION, note 28 supra. Several of the bills are cited and discussed in D.S. LEVIN, supra
note 39, at 64-70, 107, 114 n.2;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 5 n. 18, 9 nn.38-40; Hanna, supra
note 36, at 11 n.4, 18 n.9; see also Digest of bills (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in
Library of Congress, James Landis Papers, box 150); cf. C. COWING, supra note 45, at 229-32
(stock and tax bills).
A relatively sophisticated bill introduced in 1932 would have subjected exchanges to reg-
ulation by the Postmaster General and required them to prohibit "the manipulation of securi-
ties, of the prices thereof, and of transactions therein, and all fictitious purchases and sales of
securities (including matched orders and wash sales), and all other dealings or transactions
that are intended or the effect of which is to deceive or mislead the public." S. 4647, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. § (d) (1932); see also S. 782, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. § (d) (1932) (same).
109. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION,
1929-1941, at 125-30 (1952); see also R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 12-17; 2 A. SCHLESINGER,
JR., supra note 97, at 434; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 8-13 (Hoover's concern with bear
raids); cf Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 12 (1923) (quoting Hoover's earlier
congressional testimony on the overall depressing effect on market prices of practices which
manipulate commodity prices by buying or selling); Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2557-58 (Hoo-
ver hoped to prove that Democratic financiers were among the bear raiders).
110. Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2557-58.
11. S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., Ist Sess., 75 CONG. REC. 447 (1932).
112. R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 16-24; D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at ch. 4; Ritchie,
supra note 87, at 2558-61. See generally Stock Exchange Practices, Letterfrom the Counselfor the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency under S. Res. 84, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (Comm. Print 1933),
repnnted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 15:
Among other things, evidence was presented to the committee of the existence
of pools; manipulation of the market; the employment of traders to "stabilize"
prices; the use of the knowledge of a specialist to aid those with whom he was associ-
ated; the activities of the brokers themselves in the formation of pools, and in trading
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ment. Only after Franklin Roosevelt's election, when Ferdinand Pecora
was appointed chief counsel to the committee, did the investigation
"capture the public's attention."'1 13 "[Any description of [the federal
securities laws'] legislative history must begin with the dramatic hear-
ings that Mr. Pecora conducted."' "14
Pecora investigated every aspect of the securities business that
promised scandal. 1' 5 Before Roosevelt was even inaugurated, Pecora
revealed fabulous excesses in investment, commercial banking, and the
financing of public utilities. 1 6 Among other things, he showed that in
the years before the crash, some respected bankers had controlled the
market price of securities in which they held an interest by effecting
huge purchases or sales as the situation required. 1 7 Instances of such
manipulative trading were uncovered repeatedly throughout the course
of the hearings." 18 1
on their own accounts; the buying and selling of stocks by officers of corporations
who had inside information of the affairs of the corporations and whose transactions
on the exchange were conducted in such a manner as to prevent the public from
knowing of their dealings; the operations of specialists on their own account; the
subsidizing of newspaper men and others whose business it was to disseminate infor-
mation for brokerage houses and traders with regard to a particular stock in order to
aid the market manipulations ... the improper use by officers of corporations of the
stock of the corporations; examples of short selling and selling against the box; the
pegging of prices in order to permit issues to be sold to the public at a fixed price;
and the manipulation of the affairs of trading corporations and investment trusts for
the benefit of those who had the matter of their affairs within their control and to the
detriment of the investing public.
This letter, which amounted to a preliminary report, has generally been ignored in dis-
cussions of the history of the Exchange Act. The Committee's most fascinating revelations
did not begin until after Ferdinand Pecora was appointed counsel. See note 113 infra and
accompanying text. However, the committee did not publish its final report until after the
Exchange Act was enacted; thus this letter was one of the few thorough and relatively dispas-
sionate criticisms of stock exchange practices available while the Exchange Act was under
consideration. The report of the Twentieth Century Fund was another such criticism. See
note 182 infra.
113. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 20; see also Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2561-62.
114. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, at xiii, xiv. See generally FERDINAND PECORA,
WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939) (reprint); Ritchie, note 87 supra. The published record of
the investigation is 27 volumes long. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104. The part of the
record that includes hearings on the Exchange Act is reprinted in volumes 6 and 7 of LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 20. The Committee's detailed findings are set out in "STOCK Ex-
CHANGE PRACTICES" REPORT OF THE SENATE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITrEE, S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 21.
115. Pecora's attitude is epitomized in the subtitle of his book about the investigation:
The Story of Our Modern Money Changers. F. PECORA, note 114 supra. President Roosevelt
also railed against the "money changers" in his first inaugural address. 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 12 (1938).
116. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 21-29; Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2562-63.
117. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 23 n.99, 29 n.l 11.
118. Perhaps the most troubling revelation was that Albert Wiggin, the retired chairman
of Chase National Bank, had made tremendous profits for himself and his family by selling
short the common stock prior to the market collapse. While he was selling short, affiliates of
the bank supported the price by effecting offsetting purchases totaling over $800,000,000.
Wiggin also shared in the profits of the affiliates' trades and participated in pools in other
securities. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 114, at 62-63, 173-84, 186-99, 325-28; Ritchie, supra
note 87, at 2572. Wiggin had been highly respected and even beloved, but these revelations
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The revelations of Pecora's investigation set the stage and colored
the atmosphere in which the Exchange Act was proposed, considered,
and adopted."i 9 After exposing the outrageous excesses of the bank-
ers, Pecora redirected the investigation toward stock exchange prac-
tices. 120 While Congress deliberated, Pecora was busy uncovering
evidence that many exchange members participated in pools like those
Untermyer had uncovered twenty years earlier. 12 1 Pecora, however,
undertook a much more thorough investigation of the pools. While the
Hughes and Pujo Committees had focused on inherently deceptive
trading practices like wash sales and matched orders, 122 Pecora showed
that the pools employed a much wider variety of practices to control
prices, not all of which were deceptive. The pools' common objective
was to influence supply and demand. When deceit was likely to be ef-
fective, they deceived; but when the truth was the best way to influence
price, they told the truth. 123 The basic manipulative strategy-buying
in order to increase price and selling to depress it-did not depend on
communication at all, but rather on the brute force of concentrated
economic resources. 124
destroyed his reputation. Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2572. In Pecora's view, the investigation
revealed no more egregious use of an inside position for private profit. F. PECORA, supra note
114, at 113-16. The disclosure of Wiggin's abuses was in large part responsible for § 16 of
the Exchange Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 13 ("These provisions have been
called the 'anti-Wiggin provisions.' ").
119. While the hearings created substantial pressure for stock exchange legislation,
Pecora and his staff were generally unsuccessful in shaping the legislation. Donald Ritchie,
The Legislative History of the Pecora Investigation, 5 CAPITOL STUDIES 87 (1977). Ritchie and Levin,
see D.S. LEVIN, note 39 supra, both describe the legislative history of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act in tandem with the progress of the hearings.
120. Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2572-73.
121. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-36 (1934) (summarizing evidence), re-
printed in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 21. The Committee's final report, pub-
lished shortly after the enactment of the Exchange Act, concluded that "[t]he exposure of the
extent and effect of manipulative practices upon organized exchanges was one of the most
salutary and important accomplishments of the investigation." Id. at 30. Donald Ritchie, the
leading historian of the investigation, also views the exposure of market manipulation as a
chief accomplishment of the investigation. Ritchie, supra note 119, at 87.
122. See notes 52 & 81 supra and accompanying texts.
123. One way the pools induced outsiders to trade was by convincing them that substan-
tial interests were trading. ("One sure method of pulling traders into a pool is to show a
rising market on heavy volume.") House Hearings, supra note 20, at 110 (statement of Thomas
G. Corcoran, counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation); see also Jones & Lowe,
supra note 36, at 471. Rumors of pool operations and other manipulations often circulated,
and reporting of the transactions of a pool could greatly aid its success. See Michael J.
Meehan, 2 S.E.C. 588, 598 (1937); House Hearings, supra note 20, at 112;J. BROOKS, supra note
95, at 106, 109; Jones & Lowe, supra note 36, at 477-81. Some operators, hoping to excite
public interest and trading, employed agents to inform brokerage firms that a pool was about
to create a price move. W. HICKERNELL, supra note 102, at 58; Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.,
Conclusions and Recommendations, in THE SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 36, at 689; Herlands,
supra note 36, at 159, 164;Jones & Lowe, supra note 36, at 444, 465-71. See generally Thel, note
36 supra.
124. See House Hearings, supra note 20, at 830-33 (discussion of depressing effect of short
sales); Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 36, at 626 n.10 (manipula-
tors banded together in order to aggregate their economic power and move the market).
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E. The Election of Franklin Roosevelt
In the 1932 presidential campaign, Franklin Roosevelt denounced
speculation and called for federal regulation of the securities mar-
kets.' 25 The Democratic Party platform advocated "[r]egulation to the
full extent of federal power, of .... [e]xchanges in securities and com-
modities." 126 Soon after the election, the new administration asked Sa-
muel Untermyer to prepare a stock exchange control proposal.
Untermyer responded with a revision of his Pujo proposal that required
the exchanges to regulate themselves, subject to the supervision of the
Postmaster General.' 2 7 This scheme was not acceptable to the admin-
istration because of doubts about involving the Post Office Department
and about self-regulation.' 2 8
Federal securities laws might be quite different today had Unter-
myer produced a satisfactory stock exchange bill. Because of his fail-
ure, the submission to Congress of stock exchange legislation by the
Roosevelt administration was delayed for a year, and the first of the
New Deal securities statutes instead addressed the discrete subject of
the initial distribution of securities. The exchanges were better able to
influence legislation in 1934 than they would have been in 1933.129 Fi-
nally, the men who succeeded Untermyer as draftsmen were particu-
larly talented and left their mark on both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.
125. R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 25-27; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 43-44 (1970);J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 19-20. Roosevelt consistently characterized the issue of exchange
regulation in terms of speculation. See, e.g., 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 115, at 171 ("A highly organized and expensive campaign of propa-
ganda was directed against the [Exchange Act] by those who did not wish to have speculation
in securities limited to decent standards."); id. at 413, 415 (second "fireside chat" of 1934);
notes 174 & 176 infra and accompanying texts.
126. 7 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2742-43 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. ed.
1985). The platform also advocated protecting "the investing public by requiring to be filed
with the government and carried in advertisements of all offerings of foreign and domestic
stocks and bonds true information as to bonuses, commissions, principals invested, and inter-
ests of the sellers," id., embodying the Brandeis proposals put forward in Other People's 1moni.
See notes 88 & 90 supra.
127. D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 259-60; RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 84, 176-
77 (1939); RAYMOND MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL 308-10 (1966); M. PARRISH, supra note 28,
at 44, 113-14; A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 97, at 440, 456; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at
51-52; see also note 86 supra and accompanying text. A copy of the Untermyer proposal is
included in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 1, and another is at-
tached to a letter from John Dickinson to Adolf Berle (Oct. 5, 1933) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review) (copy in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22, Stock Market Investiga-
tion-John Dickinson file). The Untermyer proposal was very similar to S. 4647, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. See supra note 108; see also Memorandum from GrosvenorJones to John Dickinson
(August 18, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in National Archives, Record
Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493, folder 4).
128. R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 127, at 177; R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW
DEAL, supra note 127, at 310; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 113.
129. Benjamin Cohen, who was responsible for much of the drafting of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, hardly overstated the case when he later said that in 1933 the
financial interests "were so discredited in the public eye that Congress was ready to pass
anything." D.B. HARDEMAN & DONALD C. BACON, RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY 152 (1987).
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Although President Roosevelt was not satisfied with Untermyer's
work, he was determined to introduce some form of securities legisla-
tion during the special session of Congress held immediately after his
inauguration.13 0 He asked his aides for another bill even while Unter-
myer was at work on an exchange bill.' 3 1 The new effort was more
narrowly focused, and on March 29, 1933, Roosevelt recommended a
truth-in-securities bill to Congress, suggesting that a stock exchange
bill would follow shortly.' 3 2
Roosevelt's proposal set in motion the process that led to the enact-
ment of the Securities Act, but his bill was poorly constructed and even
more poorly advocated, and it encountered intense opposition.' 33 As a
result, Raymond Moley, one of the President's closest advisors, asked
Felix Frankfurter for help with the statute. Frankfurter brought in
three of his former students, James Landis, Benjamin Cohen and
Thomas Corcoran, who rewrote the bill over one weekend. After fur-
ther refinements, their revision was adopted as the Securities Act.134
It is fair to say that the fundamental purpose of the Securities Act is
to "substitute," at least within the narrow area of the initial distribution
of securities, "a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of ca-
veat emptor."' 35  By enacting a disclosure statute first, President
Roosevelt and Congress may have led the courts to interpret all future
securities statutes as if they were fundamentally intended to be disclo-
130. DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS 44 (1980);J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 52.
Commentators disagree over the importance of regulating financial institutions to the New
Deal's overall program. Compare M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 3 (financial regulation central
to New Deal), with 2 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 97, at 444. President Roosevelt helped pro-
mote the securities bills. Raymond Moley, one of his closest aides at the time, subsequently
said that Roosevelt thought securities legislation was important. R. MOLEY, AFrER SEVEN
YEARS, supra note 127, at 84, 176-77; R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEw DEAL, supra note 127, at 308-
10. However, Roosevelt seems to have left most particulars of exchange legislation to others.
But seeJ. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 93 ("Roosevelt assumed personal direction of the efforts
to rewrite the bill").
131. R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 127, at 177-78. moley later wrote that he
was "sure that Roosevelt brought in [the second drafting group] ... through sheer forgetful-
ness." R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 310-11. However, Roosevelt had
not informed Moley of his decision, and most commentators suggest that Roosevelt set up a
second team because he wanted a securities bill and was not sure Untermyer would produce a
proposal quickly enough. M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 44-47; D. RITCHIE, supra note 130, at
44-45;J. SEIGMAN, supra note 28, at 52-53; cf D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 260 n.3 (Roosevelt
may have been angry with Untermyer).
132. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 3.
The President said that the securities bill "should be followed by legislation relating to the
better supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges."
133. R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 127, at 178-79; R. MOLEY, THE FIRST
NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 311-12; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 47-56.
134. R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 127, at 179-81; R. MOLEY, THE FIRST
NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 312-13; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 57-70; D. RITCHIE, supra
note 130, at 45-48;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 56-57, 61-70;James M. Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
135. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see Milton Cohen,
"Truth in Securities"- Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340 (1966); note 132 supra and accom-
panying text.
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sure statutes too. Certainly the several securities statutes are often
treated as related.' 3 6
One might assume that the Securities Act was meant to be the cen-
terpiece of the federal securities statutes inasmuch as it was the first
enacted.' 3 7 However, the record clearly reveals that the reason for its
early enactment was not that it encompassed the most important policy
goals, but that the Roosevelt administration was unable to prepare a
satisfactory stock exchange bill quickly enough.13 8 In fact, those most
closely involved with the development of the federal securities legisla-
tion did not consider the Securities Act to be critical to what they
wanted to accomplish.' 39 In the larger community, influential com-
mentators criticized the Securities Act as it was enacted, on the grounds
that full disclosure was not enough to protect investors or the
public. 140
The Roosevelt administration's efforts to draft a stock exchange bill
136. It is not clear that those responsible for these statutes saw their work as a cohesive
whole. It is noteworthy that the statutory schemes of the different acts do not fit together very
well. For example, security issuers must comply with one set of disclosure rules upon the
initial public distribution of securities, and another when those securities thereafter trade
publicly. The SEC has worked hard to improve the interaction of these rules, and has pro-
moted the integration of their requirements. See, e.g., Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982) (adoption of integrated disclosure system).
137. Another factor that may give an incorrect appearance of prominence to the infor-
mation provisions of the securities laws is the frequency with which they are encountered.
Courts most often apply the securities laws in rule lOb-5 fraud cases. General corporate law-
yers also tend to encounter the securities laws in rule lOb-5 cases, or in preparing disclosure
documents. Even lawyers who specialize in a securities practice are unlikely to deal often with
the detailed provisions that regulate the business of brokerage firms and other market profes-
sionals.
The fact that the disclosure provisions create the most work for lawyers and courts hardly
means that they were the main focus of their authors, who sought mainly to control
speculation.
138. If anything, the relative ease with which the Securities Act was drafted, considered,
and enacted is evidence that it addressed fairly noncontroversial issues-not the sort of funda-
mental realignment of power contemplated by some proponents of the Exchange Act.
139. R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 127, at 178 ("I protested . . . that if
securities legislation was to be separated from stock exchange legislation the latter ought to
precede the former. Strictly speaking, there was nothing of an emergency nature about the
securities act."); id. at 183-84; see also D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 261-62; R. MOLEY, THE
FIRST NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 311;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 52-53; cf JOSEPH ALSOP,
F.D.R.: A CENTENARY REMEMBRANCE 150 (1982) (Exchange Act was "much more important"
than Securities Act); Letter from Benjamin Cohen to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 1933) (on file
with the Stanford Law Review) (commenting on criticism that Securities Act dealt only with new
issues of securities: "I thought, and assumed, that the Untermyer bill will cover the sale of
securities already on the market.") (copy in Library of Congress, Benjamin V. Cohen papers,
box 8).
140. William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521 (1934); William 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ. 171 (1933); see Berle,
supra note 102, at 42-43 (Blue Sky laws leave "unsolved the major questions" posed by specu-
lative securities markets); see also JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VI-
SION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 88 (1987); Richard W.Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 928-31 (1964); cf. Reliance Elec. Co. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 439 n. 12 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Different poli-
cies, of course, underlie the 1933 and 1934 Acts."); Olga M. Steig, H'hat Can the Regulator.
Securities Act Accomplish?, 31 MICH. L. REV. 775 (1933).
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fell off after the President decided to focus on enacting the Securities
Act. 14' The matter did, nevertheless, continue to receive some atten-
tion, 142 and by October 1933, Assistant Secretary of Commerce John
Dickinson had established a committee to study stock exchange legisla-
141. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 53; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 108-14; D.S. LEVIN,
supra note 39, at 261-62; cf Letter from Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper to Richard
Whitney (May 26, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (no exchange bill likely until
following winter) (copy in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493).
142. A so-called interdepartmental committee representing the Justice Department, De-
partment of Commerce, and Post Office, continued to work on exchange legislation during
1933. SeeJ. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 53, 80-8 1; Letter from Secretary of Commerce Daniel
Roper to Adolf Berle (July 18, 1933) (copy in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 20,
correspondence file). This committee was seldom mentioned during the public debate over
exchange legislation, and it is not clear what role, if any, it played behind the scenes. Most
historical commentary on the Exchange Act has overlooked this committee.
This committee revised Untermyer's bill. See A Bill to Be Known as the Stock Exchange
Regulation Act (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in National Archives, Record
Group 40, File 80553/21, box 492); THE STOCK EXCHANGE BILL (A SYNOPSIS AND COMMEN-
TARY BY THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CoMsTrrEE) (prepared by Grosvenor M. Jones, Chief of
Finance and Investment Division, Department of Commerce (May 1933)) [hereinafter SYNOP-
sisi (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copies in National Archives, Record Group 40, file
80553/21, box 492 and in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22, Stock Market Inves-
tigation-John Dickinson file); see also Memorandum from Grosvenor M.Jones to Secretary of
Commerce Daniel Roper (June 16, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (describing
discussion between Jones, Whitney, and Redmond of New York Stock Exchange about the
interdepartmental committee's revisions, with Jones emphasizing that the committee's pro-
posals were unofficial and tentative) (copy in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/
21, box 493).
The synopsis of the revised bill started by commenting that stock exchanges had been
investigated frequently "because of widespread complaints as to the harmful effects of certain
forms of speculation in securities," SYNOPSIS, supra at 2, and concluded with an interesting
collection of statements by leading economists on stock exchange speculation, id. at app. A.
Despite this broadly stated concern about speculation, the bill was designed to correct the
principal evils disclosed in the Pecora investigation, "namely, those related to short selling,
pool operations and other forms of manipulation, the activities of 'specialists' ... the partici-
pation of corporation officers and directors in stock exchange operations, publication of cor-
porate earnings, etc." Id. at 2.
The revised bill was relatively polished. Its central mechanism, like that in the Exchange
Act, was the requirement that exchanges submit to federal control as a condition to the use of
the mails or any means of interstate commerce. The Postmaster General was to only license
those exchanges agreeing to conduct their affairs in accordance with the detailed standards
set out in the bill. Interestingly, the Postmaster General was authorized to go beyond the
statutory standards and regulate stock exchange conduct in order to protect the public against
fraud, oppression, and unfair dealing by prescribing "uniform rules and regulations, in fur-
therance of or in addition to and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Certain of
these regulatory decisions were reviewable by a Stock Exchange Commission, made up of the
Postmaster General, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury, the Attorney General,
and the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.
The licensing provisions of this bill encompassed most of the matters subsequently ad-
dressed by the Exchange Act. According to the bill, before an exchange could have received a
license to operate, it would have had to adopt governing instruments requiring: periodic
disclosure by issuers of listed securities of a variety of information; prompt reporting by of-
ficers of their sales of issuer securities, and a prohibition on short selling by insiders; a scheme
that would make all short sales identifiable on the ticker; a minimum margin of 20% on all
transactions; rules banning specialists trading for their own accounts and exchange members
trading puts or calls on listed securities; and rules against any member "engaging in the ma-
nipulation of the sale of any securities or of the price thereof." The bill defined "manipula-
tion" in terms of deception.
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tion.143 Dickinson was markedly more sympathetic to business inter-
ests than were most of the others involved in formulating federal stock
exchange policy.14 4 In fact, some of them suggested privately that his
participation would further delay the progress of exchange legisla-
tion. 145 Nonetheless, James Landis, who was already deeply involved
in the administration of the Securities Act and who viewed the commit-
tee as important, asked to join, and Dickinson allowed him to do so.146
Adolf Berle and two practicing lawyers also joined the committee at
Dickinson's invitation. 147
The members of Dickinson's Committee attacked the question of
stock exchange reform from radically different positions. Their report,
received by President Roosevelt and sent to Congress in January 1934,
set out what the members could agree upon and ignored what they
could not. 148
With the spectacle of the Depression and Pecora's revelations in the
143. Dickinson's committee, separate from the Justice, Commerce, Post Office collabo-
ration, note 142 supra, was also sometimes called the interdepartmental committee. See, e.g.,
House Hearings, supra note 20, at 517; NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-197 1, at 109 (B. Berle & T.
Jacobs eds. 1973). Grosvenor M. Jones, who chaired the Justice, Commerce, Post Office col-
laboration, sometimes sat in on meetings of Dickinson's committee, serving as a secretary. See
Report on Meeting of Stock Exchange Committee (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy
in National Archives Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493).
144. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 80-8 1; George L. Haskins,John Dickinson: 1894-1952,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1952).
145. J. LASH, supra note 89, at 156-58; Letter from Benjamin Cohen to Felix Frankfurter
3 (Oct. 9, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ("My guess is that the real purpose of
the Committee will be to delay rather than to encourage proper legislation."); Letter from
Benjamin Cohen to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 8, 1933) (on file with the Stanford Law Review);
Letter from Thomas Corcoran to Felix Frankfurter 1-2 (Oct. 13, 1933) (on file with the Stan-
ford Law Review) ("a really disturbing indication ... supporters of this Senate investigating
committee are furious "); Letter from Max Lowenthal to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 26, 1933) (on
file with the Stanford Law Review) (copies of all these letters are in the Library of Congress,
Felix Frankfurter Papers, Oxford Correspondence file).
146. D. RITCHIE, supra note 130, at 54. Dickinson had already invited the other members
to join. See, e.g., Letter from John Dickinson to Adolf Berle (Sept. 25, 1933) (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) (copies in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493,
and in the Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22).
147. The lawyers were Henry Richardson and Arthur Dean. Dean was already engaged
in a campaign to amend the Securities Act, which had been enacted a few months before. D.
RITCHIE, supra note 130, at 51;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 77; cf. Arthur H. Dean, Twenty-
Five Years of Federal Securities Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 COLUM. L.
REV. 697, 698-706 (1959) (Dean's vision of theory of federal securities law).
148. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., LETrER FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMIrEE ON BANKING AND CUR-
RENCY WITH AN ACCOMPANYING REPORT RELATIVE TO STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION (Comm.
Print 1934) [hereinafter LETrER FROM THE PRESIDENT], reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 20, at item 16. See generally M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 113-14;J. SELIGMAN, supra
note 28, at 80-85; D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 336-45. According to Max Lowenthal, Berle
toldJohn Flynn that he wrote the Dickinson committee report. Letter from Max Lowenthal to
Felix Frankfurter 5 (Apr. 17, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in Library of
Congress, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Oxford Correspondence file). It seems that each of the
members wrote part of the initial draft of the committee's report. See Letter from John Dickin-
son to Adolf Berle (Nov. 21, 1933) (copy in Roosevelt Library, Berle Papers, box 22) (Copies
of drafts of the report are in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, at items 12-
16, and in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22.).
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background, the report of the Dickinson Committee started from the
premise that stock exchange reform was imperative. Corporate officers
and pool operators had "artificially influenced" share prices to their
own ends, and their practices together with "unintelligent and sense-
less speculation" on the part of the general public had "stimulated se-
curity values to unsound levels from which they have inevitably receded
with disastrous consequences to the whole national economy."' 49
Most of the report was devoted to "the major problem involved in
any consideration of proposed stock-exchange regulation... the meth-
ods and mechanism through which the proposed regulation is to be
applied."' 50 The committee concluded that a traditional approach
would not work.
Stock exchanges raise essentially new problems in Federal regulation.
They do not present a static situation susceptible to fixed standards.
On the contrary, it is a highly dynamic, ever-changing picture, subject
to untold and unknown possibilities and combinations that are today
unpredictable. The thing to be avoided is the placing of this complex
and important mechanism in a straitjacket.15 '
The committee rejected the suggestion that legislation should
"cover in its detailed provisions all known unfair, inequitable, and un-
social practices by express provisions with a minimum discretionary
power of regulation by the governmental body responsible for enforce-
ment." 15 2 An administrative agency able to change rules as experience
and circumstances dictated would be better suited than Congress to
deal with speculation and other problems like those Pecora had uncov-
149. Report to Secretary of Commerce of Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation 3
[hereinafter Report to Secretary of Commerce], reprinted in LETrER FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 148.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6. The committee proposed no specific legislation. Henry Richardson out-
lined a bill addressing "what might be regarded as some of the essential features of the prob-
lem" and circulated it to the other members of the committee in November 1933. Henry
Richardson's Draft of Stock Exchange Legislation (Nov. 16, 1933) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, at item 2); see M.
PARRISH, supra note 28, at 114;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 82. This proposal was generally
an accurate prediction of what the final Exchange Act would provide.
Richardson would have required certification of exchanges using the mails or interstate
commerce by a federal stock exchange commission. Richardson's Draft, supra, at 1. This new
commission would have included representatives of the general public, as well as agriculture,
industry, and the stock and commodity exchanges-all appointed by the President-together
with a "federal fiscal representative" from the Federal Reserve Board or Treasury Depart-
ment. Id. at 3-5. To be approved, an exchange would have to adopt governing documents
designed to "secure fair dealing . .. [and] prevent fraud . . . manipulation . . . and other
practices inimical to the public welfare .... Id. at 7. Richardson proposed that the statute
would require the documents to contain certain provisions, and would address short-selling,
specialists, member trading, pools, publicity, wash sales, and margin trading, and would pro-
vide minimum standards for listing a security on an exchange, including perhaps require-
ments as to number of shareholders and aggregate value of securities. Richardson also raised
the possibility of delegating administrative authority to the commission, permitting it to re-
quire the exchanges to adopt additional provisions. Id. at 8.
152. Report to Secretary of Commerce, supra note 149, at 6.
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ered.153 If regulation of such a complicated business was desirable, the
committee recommended the creation of a "Federal Stock Exchange
Authority," either a new agency or a separate division of the FTC,
which could study the problem and create and administer solutions. 154
Even then, in the view of the committee, primary responsibility should
rest in the stock exchanges themselves. 155
It would have been hard to pick a more distinguished group to ad-
dress the "methods and mechanism" of control than Dickinson, Landis,
and Berle. All three were deeply interested in the central issue of the
New Deal: the role of government in economic affairs. Berle was a
leading proponent of the view that big business (and, thus, concen-
trated economic power) had become a fundamental part of life in the
United States, and that the federal government should take a leading
role in supervising and organizing it.156 Landis and Dickinson were
153.
Your committee believes that the most practical solution from a long-range view-
point, assuming such legislation to be desirable, is to enact a measure which will
provide a system embodying the minimum of specific regulatory provisions in the
statute itself and the maximum of discretionary powers of regulation in an adminis-
trative agency.
Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 3, 13.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. 6-7.
[W]hile it is possible to outline legislation devised to correct known wrongs, it will be
of little value tomorrow if it is not flexible enough to meet new conditions immedi-
ately as they arise and demand attention in the public interest....
While it is possible to fix by law certain basic standards as a guide to conduct in
the matter of regulation of exchanges, these must be limited to minimum require-
ments. The point specifically is that while certain provisions might be included in
any regulations, such provisions should not be the only power of correction left open
to an administrative agency, but it should have broad discretion to operate directly
on various abuses as the future may prove them to exist. It is not proposed that the
Government so dominate exchanges as to deprive these organizations of initiative
and responsibility, but it is proposed to provide authority to move quickly and to the
point when the necessity arises.
Id. at 6.
156. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY viii (1932). Berle's biographer concluded that "Berle and Means laid the
ideological foundations for much of the New Deal's industrial, banking, and finance legisla-
tion, especially the Securities Exchange Act ....... J. SCHWARZ, supra note 140, at 61.
Although many of Berle's ideas may have influenced the final Exchange Act, Berle was not
active in the drafting or consideration of the legislation; he was away working for the City of
New York at the time. Id. at 91-95.
Berle's writings devote considerable attention to stock market practices and the market
as an institution. Id. at 52-55; see generally A. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, supra
note 36; Berle, supra note 102 (one problem in the stock market stems from an effort to make
inherently non-liquid assets liquid); Letter from Adolf A. Berle to James M. Landis (Jan. 17,
1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ("But the deep question-how far we are going to
make non-liquid property liquid, impersonal and irresponsible-whether we can-whether we
ought to-whether it is safe to go any farther-of course remain unsolved and we cannot solve
it. Better therefore indicate the problem, open up the question and have some agency to
regulate.") (copy in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22); Letter from Adolf A.
Berle to James M. Landis (Jan. 16, 1934) (on file with the Statiford Law Review) (copy in
Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22). Nonetheless, Berle apparently thought that
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both very interested in administrative law and each had made seminal
contributions to the field.157
Dickinson's influence on the Exchange Act has not been fully recog-
nized. Dickinson was largely frozen out of the drafting process, despite
the fact that his Committee's report was frequently cited in the debate
over the Exchange Act and surely influenced the opinions and actions
of some policymakers.158 Nonetheless, at an early stage in the debate,
Dickinson articulately advocated flexible control and legislative delega-
tion. Like many of his contemporaries, Dickinson was quite comforta-
ble with the idea of delegating legislative power to administrative
bodies. 159 Delegation was in vogue in 1934, which no doubt influenced
Congress in framing section 10(b). In particular, a broad cross-section
of the public and its leaders, including influential representatives of
reform of other institutions, particularly large corporations themselves, was more important
to the public's well-being than stock market reform. In a speech at the New York Stock Ex-
change on December 14, 1933, Berle said that "[t]he bottom of the problem lies, it seems to
me, not in the exchange, but in the fundamental control of corporations themselves." Speech
by Adolf A. Berle, New York Stock Exchange (December 14, 1933) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review) (copy in Roosevelt Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22). According to Berle,
given the lack of responsible government action, the New York Stock Exchange was perhaps
the only institution exerting a positive influence on corporations. But because one very clear
manifestation of widespread unsatisfactory corporate practices was across-the-board declines
in stock prices, "the result was that there gradually came to be a general feeling that the New
York Stock Exchange was, somehow, responsible." Id.
157. See, e.g., JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES (1927);JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). Seegener-
ally D. RrrcHIE, supra note 130; T. McCRAw, supra note 97; Haskins, supra note 144.
158. J. LASH, supra note 89, at 161, 166; Cable fromJohn Dickinson to Felix Frankfurter
(Mar. 5, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ("[n]ever saw present exchange bill nor
knew of any of its provisions until it was printed in present form .... Some of your friends
here have pursued very double dealing course with me.") (copy in Library of Congress, Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Oxford Correspondence file) (draft in National Archives, Record Group
40, file 80553/21, box 492); see alsoJ. LASH, supra note 89, at 159. Dickinson testified before
the House and Senate committees that considered the bills that became the Exchange Act.
House Hearings, supra note 20, at 505-25, 540-58, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 23;
note 310 infra and accompanying text (executive session of Senate committee). During the
hearings, the Committee's report was repeatedly cited and several amendments based on its
recommendations were offered. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8163 (statement of Senator King),
8579 (statement of Senator Gore) (Gore introduced a bill based on the committee's report,
but did not offer it as an amendment) (1934). In the end, Dickinson was probably responsible
for the "deceptive or manipulative" language so important in the construction of § 10(b). See
notes 310-316 infra and accompanying text.
159. See Memorandum from Max Lowenthal to Sen. Duncan Fletcher 1 (Dec. 20, 1933)
(on file with the Stanford Lau, Review) (minutes of conference with Dickinson) ("It is Mr. Dick-
inson's view that the Government Commission administering the [securities exchange] law
should have considerable discretion and leeway .. ") (copy in National Archives, Sen. 73A-
F3, Investigation of Stock Exchange Practices, Correspondence file-Cohen). Dickinson and
Landis both favored flexible control, but Dickinson favored exchange self-government under
public supervision, while Landis favored more direct federal involvement. M. PARRISH, supra
note 28, at 113-16; D. RITCHIE, supra note 130, at 54 (Landis agreed "with Dickinson on the
desirability of granting discretionary power, but, unlike Dickinson, he wanted that power
placed solidly in the hands of a regulatory agency.");J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 81-85; D.S.
LEVIN, supra note 39, at 336-38. Dickinson's position corresponded with that taken in the bill
Richardson drafted for the committee, note 151 supra, and, as discussed below, by the stock
exchanges in their opposition to the Exchange Act. See D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 337.
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business interests, supported the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which contemplated private-public cooperation in determining indus-
trial policies.160
Dickinson had participated in drafting the National Industrial Re-
covery Act,161 and was sympathetic to its goals and methods, at least as
he saw them. 162 His attitudes reflected those of many conservative,
business-oriented people who thought the solution to the depression
was state-supervised self-regulation by business. By 1934, many who
might have been expected to oppose legislation were willing to have
Congress delegate authority over the exchanges to an administrative
body. One explanation of the difference between the Supreme Court's
conception of section 10(b) and that of the drafters of the Exchange Act
may be the marked contrast between modern and depression-era atti-
tudes toward both the stock market and the appropriate role of admin-
istrative agencies. Clearly, such attitudes changed radically in the years
immediately preceding the enactment of the Exchange Act, and per-
haps they have changed radically since then.
Although the Dickinson Committee's report concentrated on
"methods and mechanism," it also explored some troubling stock mar-
ket practices in depth. 163 The objective of the Committee in highlight-
ing these practices was to show that the situation called for "broad
160. National Industrial Recovery Act, Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196
(1933) (declared unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
See generally FRANK BURT FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT-LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL 408-
35;J. LASH, supra note 89, at 115-29, 147; 2 A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 97, at 87-176;
REXFORD G. TUGWELL, ROOSEVELT'S REVOLUTION 79-82, 108-09 (1977).
161. F. FREIDEL, supra note 160, at 422-24; R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note
127, at 188-89; R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 288-90; 2 A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 97, at 96-98.
162. John Dickinson, The Major Issues Presented by the National Recovery Act, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 1095 (1933); John Dickinson, Understanding and Misunderstanding the Recovey Program, 172
ANNALS 1 (1934); cf John Dickinson, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Self-Regulation of Industty, 18
A.B.A. J. 600 (1932); Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 561, 561 (1947); John Dickinson, Speech to American Academy of Political and Social
Science, in Philadelphia, Pa. 5 (Jan. 5, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ("This
principle of voluntary regulation [under the National Industrial Recovery Act] with the Gov-
ernment acting as a stimulating and supervisory agency represents a major contribution of the
present administration to the technique of government.") (copy in Library of Congres,
Thomas Corcoran Papers, box 218).
Dickinson thought that industry self-regulation under government supervision would
work better than regulation directly administered by a government agency. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 20, at 512-14 (testimony of Dickinson) (development of industry-wide
uniform accounting methods under National Industrial Recovery Act would be substantially
better than single set of nation-wide standards established by FTC under Fletcher-Rayburn),
reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 23; Dickinson, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Self-Regulation
of Industr., supra; cf note 159 supra (Dickinson compared with Landis). He also thought that
giving government officials unconstrained discretionary power was "incompatible with the
essential nature of government by law." John Dickinson, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PmLoso-
PHY OF LAw: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 91, 104 (1941); see also Haskins, supra
note 144, at 7, 13. Dickinson was in fact one of the few credible critics of proposals to include
open-ended administrative power in the federal stock exchange statute. See note 313 infra and
accompanying text.
163. Report to Secretary of Commerce, supra note 149, at 13.
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discretionary authority vested in an administrative agency rather than
... detailed and specific statutory prohibition and requirement of par-
ticular practices .... 164 For example, the problem with prohibiting
speculative pools, "the chief evil for which a remedy is demanded,"1 65
was that the trading techniques employed by manipulative pools were
legitimately used during the initial distribution of a security to support
its market price. No statute could distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate pools. To attempt to establish a regime of "hard and fast
rules" would risk hampering the ability of corporations to attract new
investment while inviting fresh abuses.' 66 A Federal Stock Exchange
Authority with "broad discretionary authority," on the other hand,
could study the pool problem, develop solutions, and generate and re-
fine regulations to reflect the lessons of experience over time. 167
The Committee's emphasis on the "methods and mechanism" of
stock market reform should not obscure what the report reveals about
contemporary attitudes regarding the need for reform. The Committee
was able to focus on administration only after its members agreed on
the nature of the stock market problem and on the broad outlines of a
solution. The Committee unanimously and unequivocally condemned
both speculation and manipulation as serious problems which had con-
tributed significantly to the depression. While this remarkable unanim-
ity did not extend to the question of how to accomplish reform, the
Committee members were still able to agree that any solution had to be
flexible despite their diverse backgrounds and interests.' 68 The dis-
pute came down to deciding who should administer the solution.
By the beginning of 1934, it was apparent that Congress would soon
turn its attention to stock exchange legislation and would focus on
164. Id at 13.
165. Id at 13.
166. Id. at 13-14.
167. Id. at 13-15. The Committee also recommended that the Authority be empowered
to require exchanges to "prevent abuses of short selling of such a character as to demoralize
the market," and further in "times of grave temporary emergency" to act in conjunction with
the Federal Reserve Board to suspend short selling for a limited period. Id. at 17.
The report covered most of the trading practices addressed in the Exchange Act. The
Committee recommended flexible treatment of margin trading and specialists and further
study of the segregation issue, which was seen as too important to be left to an administrative
agency. Id. at 15-17, 19-20. It unequivocally condemned wash sales and matched orders. Id.
at 15. The Committee recommended that exchanges require issuers of listed securities: to
report the granting of stock options; to refrain from participating in, or financing, any pool
trading in their securities other than publicized new-issue pools; to report their knowledge of
any price-oriented pool; to disclose to shareholders directors' and officers' trading; and to
prohibit directors and officers from participating in price-rigging pools or from disclosing
nonpublic information to any pool other than an original-distribution pool. Id. at 17-19. The
report recommended that the sales personnel employed by exchange members be required to
disclose their participation in pools or the position of themselves or of their firm in the recom-
mended securities. Id. at 19.
168. Dickinson's failure to include any hardline reformers on the Committee-despite
the fact that the members of the Committee had divergent backgrounds and interests-may
have contributed to the hostile attitude of Pecora's staff toward the Committee.
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short sales, margin trading, and pools. The critical question at hand
was the proper "method and mechanism" for federal intervention in
the stock market. Pecora's staff wanted the statute to mandate specific
changes in the way business was done on the stock exchanges. 169
James Landis, who was by this time an FTC Commissioner with respon-
sibility for administering the Securities Act, favored flexible administra-
tion. 170 Leaders of the securities industry tried to forestall any
legislation, 17' but many who considered legislation inevitable argued
that Congress should delegate responsibility for regulating the market
to bureaucrats, perhaps motivated as much by the hope of co-opting
the administrators as by the prospect of educating them in the com-
plexity of the securities business. 172
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 10(b)
A. The Fletcher-Rayburn Bill
During the deliberations of the Dickinson Committee, Landis had
his staff at the Federal Trade Commission at work drafting a stock ex-
change bill. By January 1934, Corcoran and Cohen had joined the
drafting effort at the request of subordinates of President Roosevelt
and Pecora; eventually, Cohen assumed drafting responsibility. When
Pecora received a version late in January, he insisted on revisions that
would extend its reach and substitute rigid provisions for flexible ones
in several areas. 173
169. M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 124. Moreover,
[r]ather than grant broad discretionary powers to any regulatory agency, they wanted
the bill to specifically prohibit all forms of stock manipulation, such as short selling,
pools, and wash sales. Furthermore, they insisted that the bill forbid brokers from
buying and selling for their own accounts at the same time they transacted business
for their clients .... John Flynn, who passionately distrusted all bankers and brokers,
warned that any vague sections in the bill would permit shrewd Wall Street lawyers
to circumvent its basic intent.
Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2575; see also id. at 2561-62.
170. M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 116 n.7, and 124; see also id. at 61-62 (Cohen, Corco-
ran and Landis all favored flexibility); MATrHEW JOSEPHSON, INFIDEL IN THE TEMPLE 304
(1967) (To the remark that the SEC promised no basic changes, "Cohen replied that he him-
self was opposed to drastic planning of everything by the state and hoped that the Roosevelt
administration would remain 'flexible, experimental... dealing with the complex character of
modern economic life.' "); D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 346-404 (history of the Securities
Exchange Act).
171. The New York Stock Exchange tried to convince President Roosevelt that it would
put an end to any damaging abuses, and after the Dickinson Committee's report was released,
Richard Whitney, the president of the Exchange, unsuccessfully argued that any legislation
would be deflationary. D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 352-54. Whitney indicated that in order
to end manipulative operations the Exchange would regulate member participation in pools
and forbid specialists from either accepting options from manipulators or disclosing order
imbalances. Id.; see also id. at 356 n.4 (citing Wall St.J., Feb. 14, 1934) (most of the provisions
of the bill were already part of the Exchange's rules); R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 62-66.
172. M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 124-25.
173. R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 59-60;J. LASH, supra note 89, at 159-62; D.S. LEVIN,
supra note 39, at 347-56; D. RITCHIE, supra note 130, at 54-55; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at
82-85; Ritchie, supra note 87, at 2575; Thomas Corcoran, Dictated Notes for Autobiography
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On February 9, 1934, President Roosevelt, citing the evil of "naked
speculation" ranging from margin trading to manipulative pools, told
Congress that "it should be our national policy to restrict, as far as
possible, the use of these [securities and commodities] exchanges for
purely speculative operations." 174 The President, who had already
seen the final version of Cohen's bill, 175 recommended that Congress
enact legislation to regulate the operations of exchanges "for the pro-
tection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it may
be possible for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive
speculation."' 76 The same day, Senator Duncan Fletcher introduced
19-20 (Nov. 25, 1979) (copy in Library of Congress, Thomas Corcoran papers, box 586b)
(Pecora asking Moley to have Cohen and Corcoran draft a bill); Letter from David Schenker,
Associate Counsel, Senate Banking Committee, to Benjamin Cohen 3 (Feb. 10, 1934) (on file
with the Stanford Law Review) ("In reading the Act... our staff find that various of the sugges-
tions which they consider absolutely vital . . . have been omitted from the bill.") (copy in
National Archives, Sen. 73A-F3, Investigation of Stock Exchange Practices, Correspondence
file-Cohen); see also M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 115-16 (Pecora supported the idea of Lan-
dis, Corcoran, and Cohen to significantly change the internal organization of the exchanges).
I.N.P. Stokes, II and Telford Taylor were responsible for the early drafts, many of which
are collected in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28. Early in the process,
Stokes characterized the task at hand in terms of manipulation.
Federal protection of investors seems essential in three respects-(1) new issues; (2)
Manipulation [sic] of exchange prices; and (3) other abuses of power by corporate
managers and majority share holders. The first of these is taken care of by the Secur-
ities Act, and the second is the immediate subject of proposed legislation. The third
is, of course, the product of corporate laws ....
Memorandum re Regulation of Stock Exchanges 2 (Nov. 24, 1933) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 9).
174. President's Message to Congress, 3 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, supra note 115, at 90-91, reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934), and in S. REP. No.
792, supra note 20, at 1-2, and in H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 1-2. Roosevelt usually
emphasized speculation when he discussed the Exchange Act or criticized the stock ex-
changes. See Letter from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau to Roosevelt (Mar. 22, 1934) (on
file with the Stanford Law Review) (cover letter for Roosevelt's memorandum of stock exchange
bill policy: "[tihe objective is this: That speculative trading must be very greatly curtailed-
that means, inevitably a much smaller volume of trading on the stock exchanges.") (copy in
Roosevelt Library, Official file 34); Henry Morgenthau, Diary (Feb. 26, 1934) (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) ("Lunched with the President .... The President made a very interesting
statement. He said, I believe that all speculators who were in and out of the market daily...
should gradually be eliminated.") (copy in Roosevelt Library, book 1 at 15).
175. J. LASH, supra note 89, at 161-62.
176. President's Message to Congress, supra note 174. Proponents consistently argued
that the goal of the Exchange Act was to control speculation and manipulation. See, e.g., House
Heanngs, supra note 20, at 44-46, 86 (Corcoran), 808 (Federal Reserve Board), 925 (brief of
Corcoran and Cohen); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6465-66 (Corcoran), 7415
(Federal Reserve Board), 7470 (Treasury Department); S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 3-5;
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 2; 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, items 8, 10, 13,
14 (reprinting floor debate); see also note 174 supra.
Opponents usually expressed the bill's goals in similar terms, often supporting the goal
of curbing speculation but voicing reservations about the bill's mechanics. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 20, at 735-36 (New York Stock Exchange), 752 (Connecticut Investment
Bankers Association); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7443 (municipal bond dealer),
7538 (New York Stock Exchange); Memorandum to Members from National Association of
Manufacturers (Feb. 21, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in New York Stock
Exchange Archives, New York Stock Exchange Subject Files, Series 4: Regulation, box 61);
Press Release of Richard Whitney, President, New York Stock Exchange, supra note 28, at 7
("[T]he Exchange is in hearty sympathy with the purpose of the bill insofar as it seeks to
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the final version of Cohen's bill as the National Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.177 Sam Rayburn, chairman of the House Commerce Commit-
tee, introduced the same bill in the House.178
The Fletcher-Rayburn bill evolved into the Exchange Act over the
next several months. With the exception of the establishment of the
SEC, all of the important features of the Act trace back to Fletcher-
Rayburn. Predecessors of the enacted broker-dealer regulation, credit,
issuer reporting, and proxy provisions can be found in Fletcher-Ray-
burn. However, while an outline of the Exchange Act can be found in
Fletcher-Rayburn, the Exchange Act is in fact a very different piece of
legislation.
Even though the Exchange Act addresses the same subjects as
Fletcher-Rayburn and incorporates its structure, the Act's approach to
stock exchange regulation differs fundamentally from it. Fletcher-Ray-
burn was destined to go through tortuous consideration, and through
repeated and substantial amendment, before it became the Exchange
Act, one of the most controversial statutes ever enacted. 179 Many of
the specific reforms proposed in Fletcher-Rayburn were virtually elimi-
nated. Instead of mandating detailed reform itself, Congress estab-
lished the SEC, authorized the Commission to deal with vaguely
defined problems, and ordered studies of several particularly difficult
issues.
Section 2 of Fletcher-Rayburn explains the need for federal control
of the securities exchanges, asserting that manipulation of security
prices and excessive speculation can cause not only depressions 8 0 but
prevent manipulation of security prices and unwise or excessive speculation .... We feel,
however, that in seeking to achieve these sound purposes the bill has, unfortunately, included
a number of rigid and inflexible provisions which would prove unworkable in practice and
which may result in freezing all organized security markets."); cf House Hearings, supra note 20,
at 730, 760 (Rayburn's comments on industry's approval of the principle of the legislation).
Some witnesses did mention full disclosure as a goal of the legislation. The director of
the Twentieth Century Fund, for example, listed issuer reporting along with limitations on
margin trading, segregation, and prevention of price manipulation as essential components of
federal regulation. Id. at 780-81.
177. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 2264-70 (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 34.
178. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 2378 (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 24.
179. See Letters from President Roosevelt to Senator Fletcher and Representative Ray-
burn (Mar. 26, 1934), 3 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note
115, at 169-70, reprinted in S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 2, and in Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 104, at 7577-78 ("It has come to my attention that a more definite and more highly
organized drive is being made against effective legislation to this end [federal securities regu-
lation] than against any similar recommendation made by me during the past year."); State-
ment of Rep. Rayburn, Apr. 30, 1934, reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 7693 (1934) ("Few bills have
ever had such thorough consideration as this stock-exchange bill .... [w]e have worked out
the terms of this bill under the pressure of the most vicious and persistent lobby that any of us
have ever known in Washington .... ).
180. "National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the disloca-
tion of trade, transportation, and industry and which burden interstate commerce and ad-
versely affect the public welfare are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation
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also unreasonable price fluctuations which interfere with the supply of
credit, the calculation of taxes, and the proper functioning of financial
institutions. According to the bill, regulation of exchange transactions
is "imperative in the public interest for the protection of interstate
commerce, and the national banking and Federal Reserve System."' 8 1
While section 2 offered an overwhelming indictment of the stock
market, the basic problems Fletcher-Rayburn addressed were specula-
tion and manipulation.1 82 Although the justification stated in the stat-
ute may not reflect the true motivations of the drafters, 83 it seems
and control of prices and excessive speculation on exchanges." Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note
20, § 2.
181. Id.
182. In February of 1934, the Twentieth Century Fund released a study of the stock
market, and proposed regulating and controlling the markets. The Fund subsequently pub-
lished a summary of its findings. STOCK MARKET CONTROL, supra note 36. The Fund's conclu-
sions and its influence on the Exchange Act were discussed in congressional hearings on the
Act. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 83-85 (statement ofT. Corcoran); Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 104, at 6467 (same). The Fund published its complete findings and an assessment
of the Exchange Act in 1935. THE SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 36.
The Fund's conclusions were not surprising, but the explicit nature of its indictment of
speculation is revealing. Whereas earlier investigators usually criticized speculation as waste-
ful and as a form of gambling, the Fund criticized it in broader terms: "[Tihe unduly large
volume of uncontrolled speculation, coupled with the frequent interference with the free play
of supply and demand by manipulative activity, interferes with the performance of the proper
functions of security exchanges and also has a serious disruptive effect on the national econ-
omy." STOCK MARKET CONTROL, supra note 36, at 163.
The Fund did not propose to abolish speculation. The trading of speculators hoping to
profit on minor price fluctuations contributed immensely to liquidity and price continuity, but
had the disadvantage of moving securities prices away from their fundamental value. Id. at 89.
A vivid presentation of what Pecora had revealed of the manipulative practices of pools
sharpened the Fund's critique. For example, while the Fund concluded that the much-criti-
cized practice of short selling had little effect on market-wide price moves, id. at 97-107, the
notorious "bear pools" used it successfully to drive prices down enough to trigger substantial
independent sales in response to stop loss orders and margin calls. This caused prices to
collapse to a level at which the "bears" could turn a profit. Id. at 106-07. The Fund con-
cluded that short selling tends to accelerate the decline of prices early in major market moves,
but seems to ameliorate the decline in the long run. Id. at 105. This conclusion helped fore-
stall a blanket statutory prohibition of short sales. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104,
at 6953.
183. The drafters included § 2 in the bill because the Supreme Court had upheld the
Grain Futures Act, in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923), on the basis of a
similar, explicit congressional finding that the Act promoted important national interests.
Thus, the section might have represented an assertion that the bill addressed a subject
uniquely fit for federal regulation. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 28-29 (statement ofJames
Landis, Commissioner, FTC), 41-42 (Letter fromJ. Landis to S. Rayburn, Chairman (Feb. 19,
1934) supplementing his statement); see also D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 348, 350; cf. John H.
Stassen, Propaganda as Positive Law: Section 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act (A Case Study of How
Economic Facts Can Be Changed by Act of Congress), 58 CI. KENT L. REV. 635 (1982) (suggesting
that the findings of fact contained in § 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act were included to
persuade the Court that the Act was constitutional); Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 36, at
1037 n.*. A draft in James Landis's papers (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in
Library of Congress, James Landis Papers, box 150) suggests that the section may have been
written by Paul Freund. Freund worked for Corcoran. J. LAsH, supra note 89, at 153.
Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the Fletcher-Rayburn introductory statement,
§ 2 of the Exchange Act retains the language more or less intact, focusing on speculation and
manipulation without mentioning fraud. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982 &
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
doubtful that they were very concerned about full disclosure inasmuch
as they made no allusion to fraud or secrecy.
The cornerstone of the regulatory framework envisioned by
Fletcher-Rayburn was exchange registration. No one could lawfully ef-
fect trades on an exchange, or report exchange trades, unless the ex-
change was registered with the FTC.18 4 Building on the foundation of
exchange registration, Fletcher-Rayburn provided for the regulation of
exchange members, stock market credit, and manipulative practices. It
further required issuers of securities which were to be traded on a reg-
istered exchange, and anyone soliciting proxies relating to such securi-
ties, to disclose information.
The most radical change contemplated by Fletcher-Rayburn was the
segregation of broker and dealer functions.185 Many stock exchange
members did business as both brokers and dealers; to segregate these
functions completely, as the bill envisioned, would have substantially
restricted their businesses and might have driven many of them, and
perhaps some of the smaller exchanges, out of business.18 6 Almost as
radical, and perhaps more controversial, was the proposal to regulate
the extension of credit by and to exchange members.18 7
Under Fletcher-Rayburn, security issuers became subject to regula-
tion only upon registering their securities with an exchange, a precon-
dition for participation in the exchange market.188 Such issuers were
obliged to file periodic reports with the exchange and with the FTC.'8 9
Anyone soliciting proxies for registered securities had to disclose cer-
tain specified information; the FTC would have the authority to require
more. 190 The bill also addressed trading by officers, directors, and
owners of at least 5 percent of any class of a particular registered secur-
ities. It required them to report their initial holdings and subsequent
trades of the issuer's securities, and forbade them to sell the issuer's
registered securities short, "sell against the box,"'191 or to disclose con-
Supp. V 1987). There is no reason to believe that many members of Congress regarded the
purpose of the Act as anything other than the one articulated in § 2.
184. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 4; see also id. § 5 (registration procedures). The
bill left regulation of participants in the over-the-counter market to the FTC. Id. § 14.
185. The bill accomplished this by forbidding any exchange member, or anyone trans-
acting a brokerage business through a member, to be a dealer or underwriter in securities. Id.
§ 10.
186. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 123 (statement of Thomas Corcoran) (The "bill
provides for the kind of segregation against which the stock exchange will put up the strong-
est argument."); seeJ. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 86 ("Section 10 was tantamount to a decla-
ration of war.").
187. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, §§ 6, 7.
188. Id. § 11.
189. Id. § 12.
190. Id. § 13. Among other things, the bill would have required anyone soliciting a
proxy for an exchange-registered security to provide both the FTC and the targets of the
solicitation with a list of the names and addresses of all persons solicited.
191.
In a sale against the box, the seller owns enough securities to deliver the shares that
have been sold but chooses to borrow securities in order to make the delivery. Sub-
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fidential information regarding such securities for other than a neces-
sary or proper purpose. The bill also declared it unlawful for such
insiders to buy securities of the issuer with the intention of selling
within six months and provided that any profit from a sale within six
months after a purchase would inure to the issuer.' 92
The original version of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was sec-
tion 9(c) of Fletcher-Rayburn.1 93 Section 9(c) authorized the FTC to
forbid the employment of any "device or contrivance" in connection
with the purchase or sale of a registered security.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of
any facility of a national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange any device or contrivance which, or any
device or contrivance in a way or manner which the [FTC] may by its
rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the
proper protection of investors.1 94
The other parts of section 9 authorized to the FTC to pursue the
public interest and the protection of investors. Only section 9(c) re-
ferred to the "proper" protection of investors.
On its face, section 9(c) seems to empower the FTC to outlaw any-
thing done in connection with trading in exchange-registered securi-
ties. 195 The only express limit on the FTC's power is the requirement
of making a finding; other-wise the section contains no particular limita-
tion on the subject matter of FTC initiatives, unless one is implied from
section 9's title: "Regulation of the Use of Manipulative Devices."' 96
sequently, the seller completes the transaction by buying stock or using his own stock
in order to repay the lender.
ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of
Insider Trading Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. Lw. 1087, 1098 (1987). Fletcher-Rayburn
made it illegal for specified insiders "[t]o sell any such registered security, if the person selling
does not own the security sold or if the person selling owns the security but does not deliver it
against such sale within five days." Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 15(b)(2).
192. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 15.
193. The organization of Fletcher-Rayburn survived in the Exchange Act, but the sec-
tion numbers changed with the insertion of § 4, establishing the SEC.
194. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 9(c).
195. Section 18 actually conferred the FTC's rulemaking power. See note 20 supra and
accompanying text.
196. One might read the section to permit no more than the regulation of trading strate-
gies, allowing the FTC only to forbid effecting purchases or sales in a manner it finds detri-
mental. This is a rather strained reading, but one foreseen by Stokes. A memorandum
Landis attributed to Stokes proposed striking the words "the purchase or sale of" from § 9(b)
of the bill because "[i]t is conceivable that methods of manipulation will be evolved which do
not involve a purchase or sale, as, for instance, the publication of fictitious bids and offers."
Memorandum Re Amendments to Draft of April 3, 1934 (Comm. Print 1934) (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 22).
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act might also be read to require that trading itself be an
element of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, but the "in connection with"
language of the section has been interpreted as ajurisdictional predicate, requiring little more
than that the device or contrivance touch the securities market. See Blue Chip Stamps v.
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In fact, section 9(c) was almost certainly intended to encompass
only practices like those enumerated in the rest of the Fletcher-Rayburn
bill, or even particularly in section 8 and the rest of section 9-that is,
practices that contribute to speculation or tend to move prices away
from those prices which would prevail if only long-term investors
traded in the market. Perhaps the lack of limiting language in the bill
simply reflects the difficulty of characterizing such practices.
Sections 8 and 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn, which became sections 9 and
10, respectively, of the Exchange Act, are usually considered related to
each other; considering them together may help in interpreting section
10(b) of the Act.' 97 The two sections were treated as closely related in
the Congressional debate, and the predecessor provision to section
10(b) was treated, albeit casually, as authorizing administrators to deal
with practices similar to those addressed by the provisions that became
section 9 and the rest of section 10.198 Even if the drafters did not view
sections 8 and 9 of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill as integrated, 199 the sec-
tions may provide the best evidence of the intended meaning of "ma-
nipulative" in section 10(b) of the Act. While neither section defined
or even employed the term in an operative provision, the title of each
includes the word "manipulative" or "manipulation."
Section 8 of Fletcher-Rayburn carried the same title as section 9 of
the Exchange Act: "Prohibition Against Manipulation of Security
Prices." Section 8(a) declared it unlawful to effect a variety of transac-
tions relating to exchange-registered securities, or to participate in dis-
seminating certain types of information relating to such securities. 200
All these practices had been commonly identified with stock exchange
operators who were suspected of encouraging speculative trading.20'
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs must have bought or sold a
security to maintain a § 10(b) action); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); R. CLARK, supra note 5, at 317 ("[E]ven after Blue Chip no one suggests
that defendants in Section 10(b) actions must have bought or sold a security.").
197. The Supreme Court has considered the language of § 9 of the Exchange Act in its
efforts to interpret § 10(b), although usually only that of § 9(a)(1). E.g., Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v, Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204-08 (1976);
see also 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 8, § 5.01, at 1-176 nn.13 & 14; text accompanying note 8 supra.
198. During the hearings on the Act, almost everyone who brought up both sections
discussed them together. Corcoran and Landis each said § 9(c) of Fletcher-Rayburn was a
catch-all for manipulative practices even before the word "manipulative" appeared in the sec-
tion. See note 276 infra; cf. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 18 (predecessor of § 10(b)
authorizes regulation of "other manipulative or deceptive practices").
199. See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 8, § 5.01, at 1-176 & 1-177 n.14 (legislative history on
the relationship between §§ 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act is uninformative).
200. Section 8(a)(9) of the bill made it unlawful for an investor to execute an option
transaction on any exchange, or for an exchange member to have any interest in an option
relating to any registered security. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(9). The other sub-
parts of § 8(a) and all three subparts of § 9 were also limited in scope to acts related to ex-
change-registered securities. Id. §§ 8(a)(1)-(a)(9), 9.
201. Cf S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 17 ("The practices covered by [the successor
of § 8(a) of Fletcher-Rayburn] include those commonly resorted to by manipulative pools.").
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Section 9 of the Act reaches all of the practices targeted by section 8 of
Fletcher-Rayburn except the practice of cornering the market.20 2
Fletcher-Rayburn contemplated only a modest FTC role in adminis-
tering section 8. While the rest of the bill delegated the FTC expansive
powers, 203 section 8 created a private right of action,20 4 and contem-
plated a very small role for the FTC in defining offenses under the
section. 20 5
The FTC had a much more prominent role in section 9, the prede-
cessor to section 10 of the Exchange Act, entitled "Regulation of the
Use of Manipulative Devices." In fact, section 9 did nothing more than
define a role for the FTC, declaring it unlawful to engage in a variety of
practices in violation of FTC-promulgated rules.20 6 Sections 9(a) and
202. Exchange Act, supra note 1, § 9(a)-(d). Section 8(a)(8) of Fletcher-Rayburn made it
unlawful "[t]o acquire substantial control of the floating supply of any security registered on a
national securities exchange for the purpose of causing the price of such security to rise on
the exchange because of such control of the floating supply." The inclusion of this provision
deserves comment for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that "manipulative," as used in the
title of § 9, was not intended to connote deceptive practices. Put differently, if cornering the
market was seen as a "deceptive" practice, the word "deceptive" had a broad meaning that
did not necessarily signify a purpose to mislead or induce reliance. Second, the decision to
drop the provision from the Exchange Act suggests that the drafters intended § 10(b) to give
the SEC relatively broad authority. It has been suggested by some commentators, it seems
wrongly, that Congress intended § 10(b) "to be limited to use in connection with manipula-
tive devices which were new and unknown in 1934." David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative lntent, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 658 (1963). The historical
record does not support this position. The record suggests that everyone connected with the
drafting, consideration or adoption of the Exchange Act thought the practice of cornering the
market was reprehensible. This provision of Fletcher-Rayburn was omitted only because cor-
ners were no longer considered an extensive problem and the exchanges would and could
solve it themselves. See House Hearings, supra note 20, at 207; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note
104, at 6514-15; N. GRAS & H. LARSON, supra note 56, at 341 (from the late 1800s to the early
1900s, operators and "corners" (those seeking to corner the market) were replaced by pools,
short selling and margin trading as the perceived obstacles to freely competitive trading on
the New York Stock Exchange). It is inconceivable that anyone connected with the drafting or
the passage of the Exchange Act would have said in 1934 that § 10(b) did not give the SEC
the power to regulate or forbid cornering the market in any 'security. Thus, whatever the
intended limitations to the scope of § 10(b), the SEC was empowered to regulate some de-
vices which were known in 1934.
203. See, e.g., Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, §§ 14 (over-the-counter markets), 18
(special powers of the FTC), 20 (injunctions and the prosecution of offenses).
204. A person participating in a transaction in violation of § 8(a) was liable to anyone
who traded at prices "which may have been effected" by the transaction. Id. § 8(b), (c). The
applicable measure of damages was the difference between the price of the trade and the best
price during the 90 days before and after the trade, together with any additional actual dam-
ages. ld; cf id § 8(d) (contribution available for those held liable under § 8).
205. Of the several parts of Fletcher-Rayburn's § 8, only the one requiring traders to
report stabilizing transactions gave the FTC any discretion, lIt § 8(a)(7). In fact, no other
part of § 8 even mentioned the FTC. The titles of §§ 8 and 9 suggest that the drafters con-
sciously segregated forbidden from regulated practices. The historical record of the drafting
process suggests the same inference. For example, one late draft provided for the regulation
of options in § 9. Draft by Benjamin V. Cohen, with annotations by I.N.P. Stokes 16 (Feb. 5,
1934) § 9(b) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLEC-
TION, supra note 28, item 17). The bill, as introduced, prohibited the use of options in some
situations in § 8. See Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(9); notes 200-202 supra and ac-
companying text.
206. The section's language might be construed to outlaw short sales and stop-loss or-
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9(b), respectively, which governed transactions in exchange-registered
securities only, made it unlawful to effect short sales or stop loss orders
except in accordance with FTC rules. Section 9(c) is discussed
above. 207
The decision to split the provisions directed at manipulation into
two sections is instructive. Pecora and others had identified a number
of stock market practices which, in their view, served no legitimate pur-
pose and which were generally agreed to be improper; these practices
were listed and forbidden in section 8 of Fletcher-Rayburn. Some crit-
ics believed that the noninvesting public had an interest in curtailing
such practices inasmuch as they compromised stock exchange efficiency
and, in turn, reduced general economic welfare. However, these prac-
tices were suspect mainly because they directly injured investors. Sec-
tion 8's investor-protection orientation is underscored by its provision
of a private right of action for injured investors.
Section 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn, like most of the rest of the bill, ad-
dressed what proponents of reform considered a broader problem criti-
cal to the public interest: speculation. Some stock market practices,
particularly short selling and margin buying, were thought to be en-
tirely inimical to the public interest; it was imperative that the govern-
ment control these practices, regardless of the reason they were
employed or their effect on individual investors. These practices had
been widely condemned, not because they caused direct, measurable
injuries to investors, but because they encouraged speculation that
could undermine the stability of securities prices. 208 A universal prohi-
bition of these practices was infeasible because investors often em-
ployed them legitimately, and they had, according to their proponents,
the positive effect of moderating price fluctuations. Accordingly, the
drafters of Fletcher-Rayburn did not prohibit these practices but, in-
stead, subjected them to regulation.
Section 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn, especially section 9(c), seems di-
rected at protecting the general public from the harms of speculation.
In exercising its rulemaking authority under the section, the FTC was
explicitly directed to consider the general public interest as well as the
protection of investors. Furthermore, as if to highlight their broad con-
cerns, the drafters refrained from creating a private right of action for
investors injured by violations of the section.20 9 Instead of attempting
ders not executed in compliance with FTC rules. This does not seem to be the intention of
the drafters, and as noted below, see note 306 infra, the section was later rewritten to state
explicitly that in the absence of prohibitive rules these practices did not violate the section.
207. See note 90 supra; text accompanying notes 194-197 supra.
208. Cf S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 18 (The predecessor of Exchange Act "sub-
jects to regulation by the Commission short sales and the use of stop loss orders, which
greatly facilitate speculation.").
209. The propriety of a private right of action for violations of § 10(b), either in the
modern environment or in the context of the immediate post-depression securities markets, is
beyond the scope of this article. However, it is difficult to dispute the conclusion that "Con-
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to proscribe only knowing and intentional misconduct designed to
deceive investors, the drafters of section 9(c) seem to have intended to
authorize the FTC to regulate even innocent conduct that might injure
the public at large.
Thomas Corcoran explained Fletcher-Rayburn to Congress on be-
half of its drafters. Corcoran did not say much about sections 8 and 9
during his extensive testimony before either the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce or the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee. He spent only a few minutes explaining how pool opera-
tors used the various practices addressed in section 8,210 and he had
even less to say about section 9. Conceding that there was substantial
pressure to ban short selling across the board, Corcoran explained that
the bill did no more than delegate administrative authority over the
practice because no one knew enough about the potentially beneficial
effects of short selling or the best means of regulating it.211 In the
House, he said, "[o]f course ... [section 9(c)] is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to
that kind of a clause. The... [FTC] should have the authority to deal
with new manipulative devices." 2 12 Corcoran did not even mention
section 9(c) in the Senate hearings.
The bill's proposal to use specific rules to make extensive changes
in the financial markets galvanized the opposition of those who would
be most directly affected. 213 The securities industry opposed most of
gress did not intend to create an implied right of action for violation of a Rule promulgated
under Section 10(b) .... " Ruder, supra note 202, at 685. I.N.P. Stokes asked in his annota-
tions to Cohen's draft whether the provision of civil liability was the chief difference between
the subject matter of the two sections. Draft by Benjamin V. Cohen, supra note 205, at 15; cf.
H. R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 10-11 (an attempt at distinguishing between prohibited
and regulated manipulative practices in a bill without any provision analogous to § 10(b),
concluding "[t]o make effective the prohibitions against manipulation civil redress is given to
those able to prove actual damages from any of the prohibited practices."); Annotated Copy
of H.R. 8720 at 27 (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (comment on § 9: "Why not civ liab
for these too, how else enf?") (copy in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLEcrION, supra note 28,
item 7).
210. See House Hearings, supra note 20, at 110-15. Several representatives told Corcoran
they were concerned about the possibility of unintentional violations and civil awards in ex-
cess of any actual injuries. Id. at 112-13.
211. See id. at 115; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6520; cf. House Hearings, supra
note 20, at 26 (testimony ofJames Landis) (bill regards short selling as a device capable of
manipulating price, but permits it under the FTC's discretion), 110 (testimony of Thomas
Corcoran) (stop loss sales can depress prices, and short sellers who succeed in depressing
prices trigger known stop loss orders which further depress prices, but bill subjects them to
regulation rather than prohibition).
212. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 115; cf id. ("Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices.' "). Landis described § 9(c) in similar terms. Id. at 21 ("In
section 9 some of the most important powers granted to the Commission are set forth,
namely, the power over short selling.... [S]ection (c) gives the general power to the Commis-
sion to prescribe the rules and regulations governing any other manipulative devices.").
213. See W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 99, at 90 ("No single act did more to mobilize the
business community against Roosevelt than his message of February 9, 1934, asking Congress
for legislation to regulate the Stock Exchange."); M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 121 ("Seldom
has one measure antagonized so many different constituencies.");J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28,
433
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:385
the bill, especially the segregation requirement. Financial institutions
and their regulators opposed the margin and credit provisions. Corpo-
rate managers opposed the reporting requirements and regulation of
proxy solicitation.
The president of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Whitney,
spearheaded the opposition to Fletcher-Rayburn. 214 In addition to
orchestrating an intense lobbying campaign, 2 15 Whitney appeared fre-
quently before Senate and House committees considering the bill, in-
sisting that his exchange had promptly addressed the problems Pecora
uncovered. While denying that any government action was necessary,
Whitney insisted that the New York Stock Exchange would gladly ac-
cept the supervision of a governmental body over its efforts to combat
fraud, excessive speculation, and price manipulation. 216 As Whitney
saw it, the critical problem was finding a constructive role for the fed-
eral government: the stock exchanges were too complex, and their
problems too subtle, to be subject to a broad and inflexible statutory
regime.217 His problem with Fletcher-Rayburn was that, although it
purportedly addressed exchange abuses, it would in fact "establish in-
directly a form of nationalization of business and industry which has
hitherto been alien to the American theory of Federal Government. ' ' 21 8
at 85-87; see also note 179 supra (Roosevelt and Rayburn on opposition to proposals for re-
form); note 221 infra.
214. J. BROOKS, supra note 95, at 200-04; C. CowING, supra note 45, at 240-42; R. DE
BEDTS, supra note 83, at 65-66; D. HARDEMAN & D. BACON, supra note 129, at 156-57;J. LASH,
supra note 89, at 162; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 123; D. RrrcHIE, supra note 130, at 55-56; 2
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 97, at 462-63;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 89; THE MAKING
OF THE NEW DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 131 (K. Louchheim ed. 1983) (Gerhard Gesell's recol-
lection of Whitney as "the leading proponent of Wall Street groups in opposing SEC legisla-
tion"); 78 CONG. REc. 7696 (1934) (referring, generally, to the campaign of protest against
the bill).
215. On Whitney's lobbying efforts, see, e.g., J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 89. The
New York Stock Exchange Archives contain a great deal of material opposing the Exchange
Act (New York Stock Exchange Subject Files, Series 4: Regulation; Securities & Exchange
Acts of 1933, 1934), as do the files of Secretary of Commerce Roper and Assistant Secretary
Dickinson in the National Archives (Record Group 40, file 80553/2 1, boxes 492,493) and the
files of Thomas Corcoran in the Library of Congress (boxes 266, 267).
216. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 178, 211-12; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104,
at 6584.
217. According to Whitney,
Any attempt to regulate by statute and in minute detail the operation of security
markets is impossible of accomplishment. Rules of law effective today would be
worse than useless tomorrow and the harm that would be done before the Congress
could assemble and amend them would be beyond repair. The purpose of Federal
regulation should be to establish supervisory powers with authority to prevent
abuses as time and circumstances require.
Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6582.
Whitney took a different approach to issuer regulation. He suggested Congress address
"abuses in corporate procedure" by requiring federal incorporation of all companies engaged
in interstate businesses. Id. at 6583; see also House Hearings, supra note 20, at 225 (Whitney's
prepared statement that "bad practices" necessitate federal incorporation law).
218. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6584; House Hearings, supra note 20, at 152.
Alarmist criticism was widespread in Congress, see id. at 142-48 (statement of Rep. John G.
Cooper) (FTC regulation of exchange listing standards compared to government control of
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Whitney proposed the creation of a new federal coordinating au-
thority consisting of representatives of the exchanges, private industry,
and federal agencies historically involved with finance and credit. 219
He proposed giving this agency "broad supervisory power," including,
among other things, "plenary power to require stock exchanges to
adopt rules and regulations preventing not only dishonest practices but
also all practices which unfairly influence the price of securities or un-
duly stimulate speculation. ' 220
Representatives of the other exchanges, investment banks, firms en-
gaged in specialized businesses involving the stock market, and issuers
of exchange-traded securities followed Whitney to denounce part or all
of Fletcher-Rayburn before the House and Senate committees. They
criticized the segregation requirements, especially as applied to the
smaller exchanges, and the credit regulation, issuer-reporting, and
proxy-solicitation provisions.221
Sections 8 and 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn were exceptional in that they
aroused little substantive opposition. Indeed, the bill's supporters
never expected these sections to generate much controversy. 222 The
conciliatory attitudes of the few witnesses who did discuss sections 8
and 9 contrasted starkly with the antipathy almost all witnesses ex-
pressed toward the rest of the bill.223 Opponents of the bill usually
found it expedient to concede that the manipulative practices forbidden
private capital allocation), 759-73 (testimony ofJames H. Rand, Jr.) ("Are we being pushed
along the road from Democracy to Communism?"), and the press, seeJ. SELIGMAN, supra note
28, at 85, 93; D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 372-74.
219. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6584.
220. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 212; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6582-
85. On Feb. 23, 1934, the New York Times ran a front page story on Whitney's House testi-
mony under the headline "Whitney Proposes A Federal Board on Stock Trading-Favors a
Stock Exchange Coordinating Authority with Plenary Powers." N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1934, at
1, col. 5.
221. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6768-79 (statement ofW. G. Paul,
Secretary of the Los Angeles Stock Exchange), 6860 (statement of G. Herman Kinnicutt,
Member of the Investment Bankers' Association), 6885-88 (statement of Y.E. Booker, Presi-
dent of the Washington Stock Exchange), 6888-89 (statement on behalf of United Fruit Co.,
objecting to the reporting provisions), 6917-20 (testimony ofJohn C. Legg,Jr., broker-dealer,
criticizing the segregation and credit provisions), 6963-73 (statement of Howard Butcher, Jr.,
Vice President of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange); House Hearings, supra note 20, at 412-15
(testimony of John S. Newbold, on behalf of ten Philadelphia investment houses), 367-69
(testimony of E. Burd Grubb, President of the New York Curb Exchange).
222. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 85 (testimony of Thomas Corcoran) ("The provi-
sions of this bill, as to manipulations upon stock exchanges, are agreed to practically every-
where."), 110 ("Section 8 embodies a proposal with which very few people disagree."). Even
the business community had criticized the New York Stock Exchange for permitting short
selling and pools that allegedly contributed to the sharp decline in stock prices in July 1933.
M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 109, 111.
223. The attitude of the Detroit Board of Commerce was typical: "While we all recog-
nize that individual investors are entitled to the maximum protection from fraud or manipula-
tion, the [rest of the] present bill, it seems to us, steps way beyond the necessary limits .. "
REPORT OF THE NAT'L LEGISLATIVE COMM. 1 (Feb. 24, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Lau,
Revieu,) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 27); see also STOCK
MARKET CONTROL, supra note 36 at 208 (quoted in House Hearings, supra note 20, at 775)
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in section 8 were properly banned and that those regulated in section 9
required reforms, 224
Whitney testified that most practices forbidden by section 8 were
already prohibited under New York law; he agreed that if they were not
forbidden elsewhere they should be.22 5 Other witnesses expressed an
industry-wide condemnation of various practices designed to upset the
market and excite trading, although some argued that self-regulation
had been, and would continue to be, more effective in curbing these
practices than government initiatives. 226 The president of the New
(greater public confidence would strengthen the markets and improve the fortunes of the
securities business).
Even James Rand, a vicious critic of the bill who saw it as part of a plan to overthrow the
established social order in favor of a planned economy, see House Hearings, supra note 20, at
759, conceded that the prevention of manipulation was a legitimate aim of federal legislation.
Id. at 755. For discussions of Rand's allegations and the response to them, see M. PARRISH,
supra note 28, at 131; 2 A. SCHLESINGER,JR., supra note 97, at 457-60;J. SELIGMAN, supra note
28, at 96; D.S. LEvIN, supra note 39, at 387.
224. There are several probable explanations for this lack of criticism. The practices
forbidden by § 8, even if they were pervasive and profitable, did not go to the heart of ex-
change institutions in the same way as those practices addressed by the more controversial
provisions of the bill. In general, for strategic if for no other reasons, provisions that pro-
vided only for administrative regulation, such as those in § 9, were seldom criticized.
225. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 203-07; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at
6608-09, 6615-17 (New York Stock Exchange rules), 6657; cf House Hearings, supra note 20, at
186, 194-95 (Whitney testifying about the lack of need to regulate speculation); Stock Exchange
Practices, supra note 104, at 6506-12 (comment of Roland Redmond, counsel to New York
Stock Exchange, on the lack of need for certain stock market regulations), 7736 (testimony of
Samuel Untermyer). On the other hand, Whitney testified in the Senate that legislators could
not identify in advance all the "manipulative" trading practices that had been, or could be,
designed to influence market prices. According to Whitney, a better method of reform would
address these practices on a case-by-case basis, "perhaps the way ... the common law was
written." Id. at 6616; see also Memorandum from F.T. Boyd, Asst. Sec., New York Stock Ex-
change, to Roland Redmond (counsel, New York Stock Exchange) (Apr. 7, 1934) (on file with
the Stanford Law Review) ("Section 8 [of H.R. 8720] ... [p]rohibits manipulative devices. The
Exchange is heartily in accord with the purpose of this section, as it enables the Exchange to
enforce its own existing rules upon nonmembers now beyond its jurisdiction.") (copy in New
York Stock Exchange Archives, New York Stock Exchange Subject Files, Series 4: Regulation,
box 60).
On April 14, 1933, Whitney wrote Roosevelt that the New York Stock Exchange had
already forbidden specialists to participate in pools or hold options on stocks in which they
specialized and suggested that the Exchange would, if necessary, take steps to prevent brokers
as well as officers and directors of issuers from participating. Letter from Richard Whitxney to
President Roosevelt (Apr. 14, 1933), supra note 61. Soon after Fletcher-Rayburn was intro-
duced, Whitney announced that "[i]n effect... most of the prohibitions against the manipula-
tion of security prices, contained in Section 8 of the bill, are already in the rules of the
Exchange." Press Release of Richard Whitney, supra note 28, at 4.
226. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 277 (statement of Frank C. Shaughness, President
of the San Francisco Stock Exchange), 336-37 (brief of New England securities dealers), 343
(statement of Michael J. O'Brien, President of the Chicago Stock Exchange), 456 (testimony
of G. Herman Kinnicutt, Investment House Group), 508 (statement of John Dickinson); see
also A. Vere Shaw, Open Letter to Investors (Jan. 29, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law
Review) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 19); Lothrop
Withington, counsel to the Boston Stock Exchange, Memorandum Concerning Proposed
Stock Exchange Legislation 2-3 (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 30); cf House Hearings, supra note 20, at 603-04, 606-
07 (proposed Investment Bankers Code would have regulated stabilization and the publica-
tion of quotations), 882-83 (self-regulation by exchanges has historically been more effective
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York Curb Exchange, the predecessor of the American Stock Exchange,
believed that the rules of his exchange had "effectually restrain[ed] ma-
nipulative practices and unwarranted activity, which, when all is said
and done, stimulated movements in securities. ' 227 Nevertheless, given
public insistence on a legislative solution, he indicated that the mem-
bers of his exchange were "prepared to recommend the licensing of
exchanges by Federal authority, and the enactment, with certain modifi-
cations looking primarily to clarity, of the provisions of section 8 of the
pending bill which deal with manipulative practices." 228
In line with their general acceptance of the explicit prohibitions
contained in section 8, few witnesses disagreed in principle with the
regulatory provisions of sections 8 and 9. While many stressed that
they did not consider the practices regulated by these sections neces-
sarily objectionable, 229 no one questioned the propriety of regulation.
Most witnesses who criticized sections 8 and 9 did not question the
goals of the provisions; their criticisms centered on the language em-
ployed to secure those ends, and several joined the president of the
New York Curb Exchange in suggesting modifications "looking primar-
ily to clarity." 2 30 The sections on manipulation were refined in subse-
quent versions of the bill to reflect these suggestions.
The most consistent criticism directed against either section 8 or 9
was that section 8 treated misrepresentations too broadly and imposed
too great a penalty.2 3 1 Put simply, anyone making a false statement of a
than government statutes); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6901 (self-regulation
more flexible than government regulation).
227. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7104. He also felt that these rules made it
much less urgent for the federal government to act against "margin, loaning on securities,
options, listing requirements, and other controversial problems sought to be covered by the
present bill .. " Id at 7104; see also id at 7130-34 (testimony of William Lockwood, counsel
for the New York Curb Exchange).
228. Id. at 7104. He went on to say that "these prohibitions [in § 8] ... hit [] at the
practices which are the starting points of manipulation and market activity. They are the prac-
tices which fan the flames of public buying." Id; see also id. at 7131 (testimony of William
Lockwood, counsel for Curb).
229. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 20, at 204-07 (Whitney), 400 (pools), 432 (stabili-
zation), 434-40 (stop-loss orders). Corcoran had made much the same point about stop-loss
orders, ia at 110, and short sales, ide at 115. Several witnesses pointed out that the federal
government supported the market when it sold bonds. Id at 205, 256, 494; Stock Exchange
Practices, supra note 104, at 6512, 7737; see also House Hearings, supra note 20, at 590 (assertion
thatJohn D. Rockefeller "saved the utter collapse of American finance" by making substantial
purchases that helped stabilize the stock market during the 1929 crash).
230. See, e.g., Investment House Group, supra note 28, app. at 7 (§ 8 "should be drawn
with greater clarity so that whether or not a given transaction is within the prohibitions can be
readily ascertained.").
231. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 204-05, 207-08, 303-04, 464-65, 485-86, 494, 501-
02, 535-36, 595, 646; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6511, 6939, 6952, 7138, 7143,
7167, 7227; see also House Hearings, supra note 20, at 112-13 (discussion between Rep. Huddle-
ston and Corcoran); Richard E. Christie, Jr., Memorandum Regarding the Proposed National
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 7-8 (Mar. 8, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review)
(submitted on behalf of the Investment Bankers Association of America) (copy in 8 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 33); Standard Statistics Company, Inc., Pro-
posed Amendment to H.R. 7852 and confidential memorandum (Mar. 7, 1934) (on file with
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material fact about an exchange-registered security, with reason to be-
lieve he might induce trading, violated section 8(a)(5) of the bill unless
he acted in good faith and, in the exercise, of reasonable care, had no
basis for believing his statement was false. Several witnesses at the
hearings said that if a violation of section 8(a) (5) was to be criminal, the
section should not reach negligent misrepresentation. The explicit pri-
vate right of action conferred by section 8, however, generated more
concern. 232 Witnesses warned that careful men faced with such far-
reaching liability would simply refuse to talk about securities, let alone
give advice.233
Other parts of section 8(a) that forbade the dissemination of infor-
mation were not criticized;234 in fact, their scope broadened in subse-
quent versions of the bill.2 35 Section 8 (a)(4) of the bill forbade dealers,
brokers, and exchange members from disseminating information that
security prices were about to change because of market activity if they
believed they might thereby induce trading. Section 8(a)(6) made it
unlawful to pay any third party to disseminate such information. These
provisions made it illegal to disseminate true reports of market opera-
tions. The problem was not that these reports misled investors about
particular facts, but, as Corcoran explained, that operators used them
to excite the markets in order to exploit investors.23 6
the Stanford Law Review) (proposing limiting § 8(a)(5) to dealers, brokers, and exchange mem-
bers and their employers) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item
33). Although most criticism of the private remedy was in connection with § 8(a)(5), there
was general criticism of the remedy. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 20, at 258 (Associated
Stock Exchanges "unalterably opposed" to § 8(b)-(d)); see also Investment House Group, supra
note 28, app. at 8 (The indefinite description of the prohibited transactions and the severity of
the penalty will "open the door to innumerable 'strike' suits").
232. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(b)-(e); see note 204 supra and accompanying
text.
233. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 207-08, 303-04; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note
104, at 6909, 7143. The liability provisions of the Securities Act were the subject of intense
criticism at the same time, and they were eventually modified in Title II of the Exchange Act.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-29 1, §§ 206-208, 48 Stat. 881, 907-08 (1934)
(amending §§ 11, 13, 15 of the Securities Act of 1933).
234. Whitney said that these provisions merely codified existing New York Stock Ex-
change rules. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 204-05. But see id. at 303 (questioning the effect
of the rules on broker-customer communications).
235. See notes 262-263 & 270-272 infra and accompanying texts.
236. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 111-12 (testimony of Corcoran) ("Paragraph (4)-
That relates to tipping .... Tipping pools, as for instance, a broker tipping that there is or
may be a pool operating. It is one of the factors in the success of pools .... [D]uring the
boom times, there was a great deal of tipping by brokers-that there was a pool operating in
connection with a particular stock that the customer had better get in."); see also note 123
supra. The drafters' intention to reach even true statements is evidenced by their concern that
brokers who knew of pending market operations would be in a bind: forbidden on the one
hand to tell their customers about pending operations and liable on the other for misrepre-
sentations if they made any recommendation without also disclosing what they knew of the
operations. See Comment on 7820, at 3-5 (Mar. 8, 1934) (typed with handwritten changes,
indexed by Landis as "Draft # 2 for Memorandum, by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd") (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 21)
(copy of an earlier draft with handwritten comments on file with the Stanford Lau, Review and in
a collection of documents at the SEC Library, 1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73d Cong.,
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Section 8(a)(9)'s flat prohibition of options-related transactions was
clearly overbroad. 23 7 The bill's proponents did not charge that options
were misleading or even susceptible to use as a misleading device. The
bill prohibited options trading simply to attack a practice the drafters
thought indispensable to pool operators, who used options to take po-
sitions in securities at relatively little cost. 2 38 Several witnesses insisted
that, despite the abuse by pool operators, options were not inherently
evil. Citing a variety of legitimate roles for options, 239 some recom-
mended that Congress simply delegate regulatory authority over op-
tions to an administrative agency, rather than impose an inflexible
ban.
2 4 0
In the hearings, critics noted a number of potentially harmful, pre-
sumably unintended consequences of other provisions of sections 8
and 9. Section 8(a)(7), for instance, made it illegal to engage in a series
of transactions with the purpose or effect of pegging, fixing, or stabiliz-
ing the price of a security without first reporting to the exchange and to
the FTC whatever information FTC rules required regarding the trans-
actions. Some witnesses were concerned that this might reach arbi-
trage between an exchange and another market, which may have the
effect of bringing together prices across different markets, 241 as well as
2d Sess. 1934, item 29.) [hereinafter SEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (This is not the SEC collec-
tion mentioned in note 28 supra.).
There was little more discussion of these provisions while the Act was under considera-
tion, and they were enacted as §§ 9(a)(3) and (5) of the Exchange Act. Contemporary com-
mentators recognized that these provisions forbade the making of certain true statements. See
J. FLYNN, supra note 36, at 284 (Flynn was a member of Pecora's staff); CHARLES H. MEYER,
THE SECVRITIEs EXCHANGE Aar OF 1934 ANALYZED AND EXPLAINED 73-74 (1934) (§ 9(a)(3) "is
in part directed at the practice... [of] recommending the purchase of a stock on the ground
that a pool is operating in it. Such statements may no longer be made even if they are true.") (emphasis
in original); Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 36, at 630; cf. Legisla-
tion: Federal Regulation of Securities: Some Problems of Civil Liability, 48 HARV. L. REV. 106, 112 n.36
(1934) (student author) ("Subdivision (3) [of § 9(a)] is a purely punitive regulation which
does not involve fraud at all."). But see marginal index notation to Exchange Act, § 9(a)(3), 48
Stat. 881, 889 (1934) ("[clirculate false information concerning market operations"); Poser,
supra note 36, at 702.
237. Section 8(a)(9) made it illegal to use any exchange facility to trade either an option
or any security on which the trader had an option. It forbade a broker to trade a security for a
person he had reason to believe had an interest in an option, and prohibited exchange mem-
bers from owning or guaranteeing any option on an exchange-registered security.
238. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 6, 114 (testimony ofThomas Corcoran), 207 (testi-
mony of Richard Whitney); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6515-17; S. REP. No.
792, supra note 20, at 9.
239. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 457-61 (publicly traded options), 477-78, 485 (em-
ployee options), 304, 485, 495, 507, 595 (warrants), 304, 507, 595 (convertible bonds), 646
(acquisition of firm); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7062, 7168 (option to acquire a
corporation), 6953; see also Christie, supra note 231, at 8 (warrants and convertibles); Invest-
ment House Group, supra note 28, app. at 7-8 (subscription rights); Press Release of Richard
Whitney, supra note 28, at 5 (such a harsh rule will destroy the odd-lot business).
240. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7205-07; cf House Hearings, supra note 20,
at 257 ("permit options under proper conditions")
24 1. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 206-07; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at
6514.
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any short-swing, in-and-out trading practices. 242 One witness com-
plained that any large transaction might by definition have the forbid-
den effect of pegging a security's price and suggested limiting the reach
of the section to the transactions motivated by a purpose to stabilize
prices. 243 Others considered unworkable, and unwise, the requirement
that the FTC be notified of all stabilizing transactions before they were
executed. 244
There was also some criticism of the language of section 9. Most
frequently, critics expressed concern that the section made short sales
and stop-loss orders illegal in the absence of FTC rules permitting
them.245 Some witnesses mentioned the broad language of section
9(c). Whitney, for example, called it "a surprising delegation of power,
particularly as any violation of the rules or regulations of the Commis-
sion would be a criminal act .... "246 Even though the delegation of
authority in section 9(c) was not yet limited by the "manipulative or
deceptive" standard eventually added, it drew very little comment,2 47
and that generally mild.
One might argue that this lack of criticism demonstrates that no one
thought section 9(c) had a very broad scope. 248 Given the plain lan-
242. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 204.
243. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7167-68 (testimony ofA. Sewall on behalf
of Pennsylvania businessmen) (Sewall's remarks were made a part of the record of the House
committee. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 645-46); cf Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104,
at 6616 (bargain hunters driving up price by their purchases); Investment House Group, supra
note 28, app. at 7.
244. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 205-06; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at
6512-13.
245. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6520, 6728-29, 7233-34; cf. Letter from
Duncan Fletcher to Thomas Corcoran (Feb. 17, 1934) (request for views on whether bill pro-
hibited stop-loss orders) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in Library of Congress,
Thomas G. Corcoran Papers, box 266, correspondence folder no. 1). Whitney made this
assertion in a circular distributed to all New York Stock Exchange members shortly after the
introduction of Fletcher-Rayburn. Circular letter from Richard Whitney to New York Stock
Exchange members (Feb. 14, 1934) ("Section 9 prohibits all short selling unless the Federal
Trade Commission shall permit this practice by specific rules and regulations. It likewise pro-
hibits stop-loss orders."), reprinted in Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7281-82, and in
78 CONG. REC. 2827-28 (1934). Conipare Fletcher-Rayburn supra note 20, § 9(a) & (b) ("except
in accordance with ... rules") with Exchange Act § 10(a) ("in contravention of... rules").
246. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 209; see also id. at 258 (Eugene E. Thompson), 305
(Frank R. Hope) ("the section ... might be construed to mean almost anything"); Stock Ex-
change Practices, supra note 104, at 6910 (repetition of testimony of Frank R. Hope in House
Hearings), 6938 (testimony of Alfred L. Bernheim, director of the Securities Market Survey of
the Twentieth Century Fund); Investment House Group, supra note 28, app. at 9 ("[t]his
seems to be a power unlimited in scope"). There was also blanket criticism of the unprece-
dented delegation of authority in the Act. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 485 (John
Hancock).
247. For example, the first circular on Fletcher-Rayburn that Whitney sent to the mem-
bers of the New York Stock Exchange, Circular letter, supra note 245, did not mention the
delegation of power in § 9(c), even though the letter was a section-by-section indictment of
the bill.
248. The Supreme Court suggested this in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder when it discounted
criticism of the provision's breadth. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "Remarks of this kind made in the
course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons responsible for the preparation
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guage of the section however, such an argument comes down to the
unlikely assertion that the critics of Fletcher-Rayburn missed section
9(c). Again, a better explanation of the failure of witnesses to comment
on section 9(c) is that both the stock exchanges and their critics wanted
Congress to delegate broad rulemaking power.249
The dearth of criticism of section 10(b) and its predecessor section
is interesting, but not surprising given the circumstances in which the
Exchange Act was considered. Many securities industry witnesses were
particularly critical of rigid statutory regulation.250 At the time, busi-
ness leaders generally favored cooperation between industry and gov-
ernment;25 1 many witnesses supported Whitney's proposal to
substitute "plenary" power for the more inflexible Fletcher-Rayburn
proposal.2 52 They could hardly challenge the scope of the power which
or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight.... This is especially so with regard to the
statements of legislative opponents who '[iun their zeal to defeat a bill . . . understandably
tend to overstate its reach.'" Id. at 203 n.24 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964)) (citations omitted).
249. Proponents of the bill emphasized the flexibility it gave administrators to try new
approaches reflecting regulatory experience. James Landis was the first witness to testify for
Fletcher-Rayburn before the House Commerce Committee. House Hearings, supra note 20, at
15. Landis did not address fundamental questions such as the need for legislation regulating
the stock exchanges, which he felt the Pecora hearings had already demonstrated, id., nor did
he explain specific provisions of the bill. Instead, he focused on the constitutional basis for
federal control, defending the delegation of decisions on the implementation of regulation to
bureaucrats.
I think it is the general viewpoint of nearly all persons that have dealt with stock
market regulation that two aims are desirable:
One is flexibility of administration. The problem is very complex, very delicate,
very technical. Moreover, our knowledge about many of these things is quite inade-
quate ....
The second thing, and I think that every one is agreed about this, is that that
being so, what is needed is to intrust [sic] the administration of an act of this type to
the best possible administrative agency ....
Id. at 20. Landis cited the Dickinson Committee's report as support for delegation, id. at 23-
27, specifically referring to the treatment of short-selling in § 9 of the bill. Thus, for example,
short sales were subjected to regulation rather than prohibited, even though "the bill pro-
ceeds upon the theory of regarding short selling, generally, as a device capable of manipulat-
ing prices .... Id. at 26.
250. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 399-402 (Dean Witter), 440 (H.I. Harriman, Presi-
dent, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("infinitely better to leave to the commission wide discre-
tionary powers along very definite lines"), 452 (G. Herman Kinnicutt), 480-81 (John M.
Hancock on margins), 508 (Dickinson); see also Standard Statistics Company, Inc., supra note
231, at 13 ("extremely difficult" to distinguish between unethical and honest trading tech-
niques by statute). But see House Hearings, supra note 20, at 481, 486 (John Hancock) (calling
for statutory prohibitions of specific conduct, and further study).
251. See text accompanying notes 159-162 supra.
252. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 309-10 (Frank R. Hope), 532 (Frederick H. John-
son); see also notes 283-286 infra and accompanying text; cf House Hearings, supra note 20, at
350 (Michael O'Brien) (flexibility), 451-55 (G. Herman Kinnicutt) (the Securities Act and ex-
change control should fall under the same specialized agency), 510-11 (John Dickinson) (flexi-
ble regulation of margin trading); Aew Path Charted on Exchange Bill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1934,
at 1, 4 col. 3 (New York Board of Trade opposes strict rules which would impair liquidity);
Press Release, N.Y. Board of Trade (Apr. 12, 1934) (announcing Board's unanimous resolu-
tion proposing a Stock Exchange Coordinating Authority with "plenary powers with respect
to all necessary rules and regulations that will prevent fraudulent practices, the use of exces-
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Fletcher-Raburn delegated to administrators, as Rayburn forcefully
pointed out to those who did.25 3
B. Modification in the House-Manipulation
Proponents of stock-exchange legislation divided over how to re-
spond to the attack on Fletcher-Rayburn, but Rayburn responded by
having the bill revised. In an attempt to appease opponents and build a
coalition for some form of federal control, he brought representatives
of affected interests into the revision process. 254 The Exchange Act
was actually the product of negotiations among many competent and
interested actors. Fortunately, there is a record of its consideration,
amendment, and perfection. One might argue that this record was
never made known to legislators in a fashion that permitted Congress
to ratify it. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was not created for public
consumption and that it contains honest, frank, and subtle discussions
of legislative goals and negotiated tradeoffs may be its greatest strength
as evidence of what Congress intended. Rather than serving as a repos-
itory for provisions that legislators and staff members could not get en-
acted, the record is an account of the process by which extraordinary
people constructed the Exchange Act.2 55
On March 19, Rayburn introduced a revised proposal that retreated
sive credit for security speculation, and the manipulation of security prices.") (copy in New
York Stock Exchange Archives, Security & Exchange Acts of 1933, 1934 file, SEC Material
box).
253. House Hearings, supra note 20, at 309-12 (Frank Hope, President of the Association
of Stock Exchange Firms), 394-95 (William Lockwood, counsel to New York Curb Exchange);
see also H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 6 ("Representatives of the stock exchanges con-
stantly urged a greater degree of flexibility in the statute and insisted that the complicated
nature of the problems justified leaving much greater latitude of discretion with the adminis-
trative agencies than would otherwise be the case. It is for that reason that the bill in dealing
with a number of difficult problems singles out these problems... but leaves to the adminis-
trative agencies the determination of the most appropriate form of rule .... "); see note 332
infra and accompanying text.
254. M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 124-29; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 93-95; D.S.
LEVIN, supra note 39, at 375-84; see also House Hearings, supra note 20, at 625 (opening state-
ment by Rayburn), 674 (Corcoran testimony);J. BROOKS, supra note 95, at 201-02; D. HARDE-
MAN & D. BACON, supra note 129, at 157; ALFRED STEINBERG, SAM RAYBURN 117 (1975); cf. T.
MCCRAW, supra note 97, at 178 (drafters repeatedly consulted financiers, brokers, and ac-
countants during debate over Exchange Act); I.N.P. Stokes's master draft of comments on
Fletcher-Rayburn (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 2) (annotated to show criticism). During the subsequent
floor debate, members of the Commerce Committee emphasized that they had carefully re-
vised the bill to respond to criticism. See 78 CONG. REC. 7866 (statement of Rep. Maloney),
7921 (statement of Rep. Mapes), 7935 (statement of Rep. Bulwinkle), 7938 (statement of Rep.
Milligan) (1934).
255. Those most responsible for drafting the Exchange Act became renowned for their
ability to forge political coalitions and enact legislation. As one of the most influential Ameri-
can statesmen ever, Rayburn's greatest skill was getting legislation through Congress. "The
avoidance of open controversy [was] his genius." NEIL MACNEIL, FORGE OF DEMOCRACY 108
(1963) (quoting Rep. Lee Metcalf). Rayburn often advised new members of Congress to go
along if they wanted to get along. See ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, CONGRESSMAN SAM RAYBURN 161
(1984); N. MACNEIL, supra 107-08, 129; WALTERJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND
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from most of the original bill's controversial provisions. 256 President
Roosevelt endorsed the revision one week later,257 decrying the intense
campaign against stock-market legislation and reiterating his insistence
on laws that would not only effectively curtail speculation and manipu-
lation, but would also give federal authorities "such definite powers of
supervision over exchanges that the Government itself will be able to
correct abuses which may arise in the future. '258
Rayburn's new bill modified the margin and credit regulations and
allowed some exchange members to continue as both brokers and deal-
ers.2 59 The bill also loosened the restrictions on insider trading, most
importantly by omitting the Fletcher-Rayburn proscription against dis-
closing confidential information. 260
The revisions affected language in sections 8 and 9, but without al-
tering their basic thrust. 26' Whereas each part of sections 8 and 9 in
the original bill applied only to acts or transactions relating to ex-
change-registered securities, the revised sections reached securities
"not so registered" as well. 2 62 Apparently, this change was intended to
THE POLICY PROCESS 25 (1984). See generally A. CHAMPAGNE, supra; C. DOROUGH, supra note 99;
D. HARDEMAN & D. BACON, supra note 129; A. STEINBERG, supra note 254.
Corcoran and Cohen were adept at drafting legislation that would bring together and
wed diverse constituencies. Theirjoint biographer concluded that they were both influential
participants in the New Deal precisely because they responded positively to criticism and for-
mulated compromise proposals that could progress through Congress. J. LAsHt, supra note 89,
at vii (Cohen and Corcoran had a remarkable "sixth-sense feeling for the programs that were
politically feasible not simply ideally desirable."); see also id. at 166-67; Thomas Corcoran,
Dictated Notes for Autobiography 3-4 (Nov. 26, 1979), supra note 173 (Corcoran and Cohen
redrafted the bill overnight after Roosevelt insisted they work out problems with conservative
Senators, influential critics within the administration, and the Federal Reserve Board). Ray-
burn later said of them: "Taken together these two fellows made the brightest man I ever
saw. They never insisted on their views. When I told them what I wanted, they started to
work to put it into the legislation, and they wrote it in such a way as to make it stick." A.
STEINBERG, supra note 254, at 113.
256. H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 20, at 625, and
in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 28.
257. See Letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Fletcher (Mar. 26, 1934), reprinted in
S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 2, and in Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7577-78.
258. Letter from President Roosevelt to Representative Rayburn (Mar. 26, 1934), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 2; Letter from President Roosevelt to Senator
Fletcher, supra note 257. Both letters contain this quotation.
259. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, §§ 6, 7, 10. The bill did, however, direct the FTC to
study the feasibility and desirability of complete segregation. Id. § 10(f).
260. Officers, directors and 5% shareholders were no longer forbidden to buy with a
view to selling within six months, but any profit from such a purchase and sale would inure to
the issuer. Compare id. § 15(b) with Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 15(b). The proscription
on sales against the box, see note 191 supra, was rewritten to extend the time allowed for
delivery to 20 days. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 15(c).
261. According to Parrish, "[tihe sections on manipulative devices . . .underwent no
substantive revision." M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 128. Seligman does not even mention
§§ 8 and 9 in discussing the rewrite of Fletcher-Rayburn. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 97-
100 (discussion of Fletcher-Rayburn rewrite). Levin's exhaustive account of the modification
does note the changes in § 8. D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 381-83. Whitney did not discuss
the manipulation sections in any detail when he testified in opposition to the revised bill.
House Heanngs, supra note 20, at 723-36, 729.
262. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(I)-(8), (e). The regulation of options affected
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extend the reach of the provisions to all non-exempt securities, even
though the bill gave the FTC ample power to regulate the over-the-
counter market.263 In general, the FTC was given discretion to define
the effective scope of several section 8 restrictions that had, in their
original form, simply outlawed manipulative practices. Specifically, the
revised bill made it unlawful to peg, fix, or stabilize the price of securi-
ties in contravention of FTC rules, 264 and regulated, rather than pro-
scribed, option trading.265
Portions of the revised section 8(a) included the element of pur-
pose,266 responding to the concern that Fletcher-Rayburn imposed
mandatory sanctions against wholly innocent conduct without giving
market participants adequate guidance as to what was forbidden. 267
For example, the first bill reached persons who disseminated false
statements with "reason to believe" they might thereby induce trading,
but the revision reached only those misrepresentations made for the
only transactions employing exchange facilities, § 8(a)(9); the revision similarly limited the
scope of regulations affecting short selling and stop-loss orders, § 9(a), (b).
263. The revised bill still provided for extensive regulation of the over-the-counter mar-
ket. Compare Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 14, with H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 14.
In his Senate testimony, Roland Redmond, counsel for the New York Stock Exchange,
had questioned whether there was any reason to restrict § 8 of Fletcher-Rayburn to exchange-
registered securities. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6506-07, 6511. I.N.P. Stokes
made the same point even before Fletcher-Rayburn was introduced. Draft by Benjamin V.
Cohen, supra note 205. Cohen's Mar. 4 draft revision of Fletcher-Rayburn, which predated
eight days of conferences which hammered out the revisions backed by Rayburn, see note 256
supra, had already extended several provisions of §§ 8(a) and 9(c) to include variations of the
"not so registered" language that Rayburn included in the revised package. BVC's Revision
of Bill, Mar. 4, 1934, at 13-19 (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 19). A memorandum entitled "Principal Changes in
New Draft of March 4, 1934" attached to Cohen's Mar. 4 revision in the Documentary History
Collection notes that in several parts of § 8(a) the "[p]rohibition of manipulation [was] ex-
tended to unregistered securities." Id.
264. Fletcher-Rayburn had authorized the FTC to require disclosures of stock price sta-
bilizing operations. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(7). The bill had also reached
transactions with the "purpose or effect" of stabilizing price. The revised bill only reached
transactions undertaken for the purpose of stabilizing stock prices. H.R. 8720, supra note 256,
§ 8(a)(8); see also note 266 infra.
265. Conpare H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(9) with Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20,
§ 8(a)(9). Rayburn also deleted the prohibition of cornering the market in a security "for the
purpose of causing the price of such security to rise on the exchange .... See Fletcher-
Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(8).
266. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(2) (prohibition of matched orders "for the pur-
pose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading.., or ... in respect of the
market for such security"); § 8(b) (private remedy for willful violation of § 8(a)).
Only false statements made for the purpose of inducing trading violated § 8(a)(5) of H.R.
8720; under H.R. 7852 it was enough that the speaker had reason to believe his statements
would induce trading. But see H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(b) (party not liable in private
action if he "did not believe that the statement was false or misleading"). Section 8(a)(8), the
stabilization section of H.R. 8720, reached only transactions executed for the purpose of sta-
bilizing prices, while H.R. 7852 had reached any transaction that had a stabilizing effect. See
notes 241-244 supra and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 20, at 256-58, 485-86; Stock Eochange Practices,
supra note 104, at 6508-10; notes 229-244 supra and accompanying text.
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purpose of inducing trading.268 The revision also dropped the ban on
trading for the purpose, or with the expectation, of creating a mislead-
ing appearance of the market, although it still outlawed trading for the
purpose of influencing price.269
The revised bill's sections regulating true statements reflected the
same overarching concern with whether statements induced trading--
as opposed to whether they were honest. 270 The changes brought
more people and situations within the prohibitions of the dissemination
of certain kinds of accurate information, and, at the same time, nar-
rowed the scope of the false-statement provision. For example, the re-
vision made it illegal to receive payment for circulating information
which tended to suggest that any security's price was likely to change in
response to market activity, 2 7 ' or to circulate or disseminate informa-
tion about a security in exchange for consideration from a buyer or
seller of the security, unless the information was published as an
advertisement. 272
Although it probably did not seem so at the time, the most signifi-
cant Rayburn revision in the manipulation provisions was the addition
of the word "manipulative" to section 9(c):
It shall be unlawful for any person... [t]o use or employ in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered any manipulative
device or contrivance which the Commission may by its rules and regu-
lations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protec-
tion of investors. 273
This was the first time the word "manipulative" appeared in a sub-
stantive provision of the bill.274 The record of the House committee's
268. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(5).
In addition to requiring purpose for false statements to be illegal, the new bill changed
the good faith defense. Fletcher-Rayburn had forbidden the dissemination of false or mis-
leading information if, among other things, the person "does not prove that he acted in good
faith and in the exercise of reasonable care had no ground to believe that the statement was
false or misleading." Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(5). The revision deleted the
reasonable care requirement from the good faith defense, but moved the defense from the
prohibition subsection to the private action subsection, suggesting there would be no good
faith defense to a criminal charge. Compare id. with H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(5), (b); cf.
H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(c) (right of contribution except in certain cases of fraudulent
misrepresentation), § 25 (penalties including fine and imprisonment for willful violations of
the statute or making false statements "subject to the provisions of section 8(a)(5)"). The
measure of damages in private actions was changed from one based on changes in securities
prices to actual damages, which the bill did not define. Id. § 8(b).
269. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(3).
270. Id. § 8(a)(4), (6).
271. Id. § 8(a)(6). Fletcher-Rayburn only proscribed making the payment, not receiving
it or acting in consideration of it. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(6).
272. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(7).
273. Id § 9(c).
274. Fletcher-Rayburn § 2 noted the problem of price manipulation, and the titles of
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deliberations on Rayburn's revision does not explain this change.27 5 It
seems fair to conclude that the word was simply intended to make it
clear that the delegation of authority was not, in fact, absolute.276
Rather than extensively delimit FTC authority in section 9(c), the Ray-
bum revision adopted the word "manipulative" to define the FTC's
power by reference, either to the rest of the bill or to section 8 and the
rest of section 9.277 The revision employed this technique of defining
§§ 8 and 9, the precursors to §§ 9 and 10, respectively, included the words "manipulation"
and "manipulative."
Other proposals explicitly purported to regulate manipulation. For example, Represen-
tative Bulwinkle and Senator Gore introduced bills to create a new stock exchange commis-
sion that would grant an exchange license to operate only if, among other things, its rules
"reasonably guard against undue speculative activity and unwarranted manipulative prac-
tices." H.R. 8575, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b) (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 20, item 27; S. 3234, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b) (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 20, item 35. This language suggests that the sponsors did not think that
all manipulative practices were unwarranted. See also note 142 supra (interagency committee
bill that defined manipulation in terms of deception).
275. A mimeographed statement outlining the principal changes was distributed to
members of the House Committee on Mar. 19, but it is not included in the record. See House
Hearings, supra note 20, at 674. An undated mimeographed memorandum entitled "Principal
Changes Embodied in New Draft for National Securities Exchange Act of 1934" (on file with
the Stanford Law Review) (copies in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item
13 and in Library of Congress, Thomas G. Corcoran Papers, box 266, Exchange Act Drafts
file) may well be the statement distributed to the committee. Landis indexed the memoran-
dum as "Principal Changes Embodied in New Draft of Bill-as introduced Second Time."
The memorandum describes many of the provisions of H.R. 8720 that differ from those of
Fletcher-Rayburn.
The memorandum describes several changes made in § 8 and goes on to say "[tihe Com-
mission's power under section 9 to prohibit 'any device or contrivance' which it may deem
detrimental to the public interest is confined to 'any manipulative device or contrivance.'" A
document entitled "Stock Exchange Bill" is appended to the copy of the memorandum in the
Documentary History Collection. Senator Fletcher submitted this digest when he introduced
Fletcher-Rayburn. 78 CONG. REC. 2264, 2271 (1934) ("The Commission is also given power
to forbid any other devices in connection with security transactions which it finds detrimental
to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors.").
276. Benjamin Cohen had drafted the revised version of § 9(c) by March 4. BVC's Revi-
sion of Bill, supra note 263, at 19. The memorandum entitled "Principal Changes in New
Draft of March 4, 1934," supra note 263, does not mention this change. In their congressional
testimony, Landis and Corcoran had discussed § 9(c) of Fletcher-Rayburn as though it in-
cluded the word "manipulative," describing the language as a catch-all for "other manipula-
tive devices." See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
An untitled memorandum in Thomas Corcoran's papers, which appears to be a discus-
sion of Corcoran's response to criticism of Fletcher-Rayburn, says of § 9(c):
The stock exchange mechanism is so complicated and the variety of possible
transactions so manifold that it would be idle to expect any detailed prohibitions to
include all abuses which may be developed. Some power must be given the Commis-
sion to regulate or prohibit practices at present not in evidence which may be re-
sorted to to defeat the manifest purposes of this legislation. This is the purpose of
subsection (c). If the Committee fears that the language used goes beyond this end,
it may wish to consider appropriate modification.
(on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in Library of Congress, Thomas G. Corcoran Pa-
pers, box 266, Exchange Act Drafts file).
277. A memorandum dated Mar. 8, 1934, entitled "Suggested Amendments to Stock
Exchange Bill," which Landis indexed as "1934, March 8-Draft # 1 for Memorandum, by
I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd," suggested adding the following language to the end of Fletcher-Rayburn
§ 9(c): "and tending to defeat the purpose of any provision of this Act or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder." The memorandum explained that "[t]he limitation suggested seems harm-
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the boundaries of the FTC's rulemaking power by reference in an enor-
mously important provision that authorized the FTC to regulate the
over-the-counter market.278
If, by "manipulative" devices and contrivances, Rayburn meant the
speculative excesses revealed in the Pecora investigation or practices
like those listed in sections of Fletcher-Rayburn labeled manipulation
provisions-matched trades, false statements, communications about
pools, tactics to corner the market, option trading, stabilizing transac-
tions, short selling and stop-loss orders-the term had hardly any
meaning.2 79 Sections 8 and 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn, and the successors
of these sections incorporated in the Act, gather together a wide variety
of practices with nothing more in common than a possible influence on
security prices. So defined, the word "manipulative" would encompass
a great deal of innocent conduct.
One change that Rayburn did not make to section 9(c) is more in-
structive than any that he did make. The most settled tenet of modern-
day Supreme Court interpretation of section 10(b) is that Congress in-
tended to proscribe only knowing and intentional misconduct. It is
clearly significant that Rayburn added purpose requirements to most of
the provisions of section 8,280 but not to section 9. In fact, no one ever
even suggested such a change to section 9. This open-ended section
was intended to authorize administrators to prohibit stock market prac-
tices, regardless of the motives of those who employed them, which
were found detrimental to the public interest or the proper protection
of investors. 28i
The House hearings on Rayburn's revision focused primarily on the
credit provisions; there was almost no discussion of sections 8 and 9, or
the changes therein.28 2 Whitney, who was by this time speaking for
most of the exchanges, 28 3 expressed general opposition to Rayburn's
revision.28 4
less and will silence considerable criticism. It may well be argued that if the present wording
stands all the other provisions of the Act regarding stock exchange practices are superfluous."
Suggested Amendments at 10 (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copies in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 20, and in Library of Congress, James Landis Pa-
pers, box 149, and in I SEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 236, item 23). On Mar. 9,
Senator Fletcher forwarded Landis a memorandum stating that § 9(c) "can mean almost any-
thing." The portion of the memorandum copy included in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLEC-
TION, supra note 28, item 34) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) does not identify the author.
278. The almost limitless delegation in Fletcher-Rayburn was rewritten to authorize the
FTC to proscribe rules appropriate to give over-the-counter investors protection comparable
to that provided to exchange investors. H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 14; see D.S. LEVIN, supra
note 39, at 383.
279. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
280. See notes 266-269 supra and accompanying text.
281. Short selling is probably the best example of a device many thought dangerous
regardless of motive.
282. But see House Hearings, supra note 20, at 749 (discussion of § 8(a)(2), (5), (8), (9)),
885-86, 915 (discussion of § 8(a)(9)).
283. Id. at 729-30.
284. Id at 723-24.
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[I]nstead of having a fixed rule of law which can only be changed by
an act of Congress, and cannot be changed if Congress is not in ses-
sion-instead of having a fixed rule of law, we advocate the power be-
ing put in a commission to make these rules and regulations, which, if
they are wrong, they can immediately change. If they are right, then
these rules and regulations will stay in effect.2 85
To this end, Whitney again proposed replacing the pending legislation
with a measure giving administrators "full power to prevent excessive
speculation and to regulate unfair practices in security transactions. '286
Without backing away from his basic objection that direct statutory
control was a fundamentally flawed approach, Whitney suggested spe-
cific amendments. Among other things, he would have empowered
regulators to require the exchanges to adopt and enforce rules neces-
sary for the protection of investors or for insuring fair dealing, which
would expressly include rules with regard to pools formed for the pur-
pose of influencing security prices, short sales, stop-loss orders, and the
cash settlement of transactions tending to corner the market in any se-
curity. 28 7 Whitney felt that with these changes, section 9 could be elim-
inated. 288 He also suggested, without elaboration, that several other
provisions should be "amended or qualified. This is true of section 8,
which describes manipulative transactions in very broad terms .... ,,289
Lothrop Withington, a lawyer representing the Boston and Chicago
Stock Exchanges, followed Whitney and testified in favor of flexible
regulation. According to Withington, his clients were concerned that
there was "a general misapprehension with regard to the real and sin-
cere desire of exchanges for regulation. I have yet to find any exchange
that has not only reached the conclusion that they are going to be regu-
lated, but welcomes regulation .... -2o0 Withington agreed that legis-
lation should ban practices considered morally wrong by all, citing
section 8 of the bill as appropriate government action, although he be-
lieved it was worded so generally that "no jury, as a practical matter,
285. Id. at 726.
286.
The New York Stock Exchange and, I am sure, every other exchange in the country,
stand ready to furnish your committee with all the technical and expert advice at
their command and to assist in drafting amendments to the pending bill or in draft-
ing a new bill, which will give whatever administrative authority may be chosen, full
power to prevent excessive speculation and to regulate unfair practices in security
transactions.
Id. at 730.
287. Id. at 725-27 (testimony of Lothrop Withington, counsel for committee of New
England brokers and dealers); see also id. at 739-40 (Chicago and Boston exchanges in accord),
801-02 (testimony of R. Cassatt, representing Philadelphia investment bankers) (federal re-
serve banks should have absolute control over stock market credit), 881 (Investment House
Group in accord). But see id. at 741-42 (testimony of Whitney) (Congress should make some
manipulative practices criminal and should subject others to commission rulemaking, with
sanctions limited to exchange or Commission action).
288. Id. at 728.
289. Id. at 729.
290. Id. at 736.
448 [Vol. 42:385
January 1990] CONCEPTION OF § 10(b)
would convict."291 His chief concern was that in several respects the
pending legislation mistakenly adopted inflexible restrictions on legiti-
mate business practices. Toward the end of improving the bill, With-
ington proposed vesting "the entire credit control with regard to the
margins ... in the Federal Reserve Board.... Putting that check in the
Federal Reserve, giving them that uncontrolled check, is a tremendous
concession .... -"292 As for segregation, the FTC "should be given full
arbitrary and uncontrolled power to make rules which would control
those exchanges .... ,,293
C. Modification in the Senate-Deception
Senator Fletcher's Committee also reviewed Rayburn's March revi-
sion, even though it was never introduced in the Senate.2 9 4 Whitney,
the day after his House testimony, testified against the Rayburn revi-
sion before the Senate Committee. He repeated his opposition to the
291. Id. at 741.
292. Id at 739.
293. Id at 740. When asked why the exchanges had not prepared an alternative bill if
they recognized the necessity for regulation, Withington assured the committee that he had,
in fact, put together an outline in cooperation with representatives of other exchanges. Id. at
745; see Withington, Memorandum Concerning Proposed Stock Exchange Legislation (on file
with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28,
item 30). Withington subsequently submitted a substitute bill to the Senate. Stock Exchange
Practices, supra note 104, at 7751 (the table of contents identifies the proposal as "Copy of
Whitney substitute stock exchange bill, draft no. 6," id. at unnumbered page facing 7411, but
it is, in fact, Withington's bill); see Draft Bill for Regulation of National Stock Exchanges
Presented by Lothrop Withington (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copies in Library of
Congress, Thomas G. Corcoran Papers, box 266, Exchange Act Drafts file, and in New York
Stock Exchange Archives).
Withington's substitute bill, reviewed by representatives of almost all the stock ex-
changes, prohibited "unfair practices" generally, Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at
7755 (§ 9, "Unfair Practices Unlawful; Powers of Commission"), and several specific decep-
tive practices, id at 7753 (§ 3, "Manipulative Practices Prohibited"), but otherwise left ex-
change practices under the control of administrative agencies. The extension and
maintenance of margin credit was subjected to "such rules as may be established from time to
time by the Federal Reserve Board for the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit
for speculation." Id at 7754 (§ 4, "Regulation of Margin Requirements"). Exchanges were
required to be licensed by a newv Federal Stock Exchange Commission, with licensing condi-
tioned upon having rules "adequate to prevent unfair practices in security transactions and to
protect investors .... Id. at 7755 (§ 6(b), "Licensing of National Stock Exchanges"). For the
purpose of preventing unfair practices, the Commission could require exchanges to adopt
such rules as deemed necessary for the protection of investors. Id. at 7755 (§§ 9, 11, "Orders
of Commission"); cf id at 7756 (§ 14, "Court Review of Orders") (orders of the Commission
reviewable by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States or the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia).
294. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7414, 7538; see also SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., CONFIDENTIAL COMM. PRINT No. 2 SHOWING
CHANGES TO THE TEXT OF H.R. 8720 AGREED TO BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY AND PROPOSED CHANGES RECOMMENDED BY THE SUBCOMMIrEE (Confidential
Comm. Print 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 6); 78 CONG. REC. 8163-64 (1934). In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court said that H.R. 8720 was introduced in the Senate and the
House. 425 U.S. 185, 201-02 (1976); see aiso 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 8, § 5.01 at 1-175 n.6.
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revision and suggested several amendments. 295 A few days later, Ro-
land Redmond, counsel to the New York Stock Exchange, explained
most of the Exchange-sponsored amendments, including several to sec-
tion 8 that Whitney had not mentioned in his testimony.296 Redmond
said that the Exchange would favor giving administrators the rulemak-
ing power conferred by subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 9 of the Ray-
burn revision-the stop-loss and short sale provisions that eventually
became section 10(a) of the Act-but that the Exchange would omit
section 9(c), which Redmond called "a general grant of power to the
[FTC] to define as a crime any practice which they thought was manipu-
lative, [which] seemed to us to be an altogether too broad grant of
power to any aldministrative body."'297
On April 20, Senator Fletcher introduced his Committee's own
bill.298 The most important development in Fletcher's substitute was
the creation of a Federal Securities Exchange Commission to adminis-
ter the Act.299 The change was made to keep the Federal Reserve
Board and the FTC out of the regulation of stock market credit.300 It
was also something of a victory for the securities industry, which had
pressed for a new agency from the start.
The Senate revision also modified the manipulation sections of
295. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7479-90; see also id. at 7527 (Eugene E.
Thompson, President of the Associated Stock Exchanges, on H.R. 8720). The New York
Stock Exchange submitted two memoranda of proposed amendments to H.R. 8720. Id. at
7488, 7517-22, 7533, 7579-85.
296. Id. at 7539-86. Redmond would have rewritten § 8 to limit it almost exclusively to
deceptive practices. Among other changes to § 8, he proposed limiting clause 3, the forerun-
ner of § 9(a)(2) of the Act, to trading undertaken for the purpose of creating a misleading
appearance of volume or "establishing price quotations ... which do not truly reflect the
market value of such security," and limiting the tipster sheet provisions, the forerunners of
§§ 9(a)(3) and (5), to speech intended to induce trading at prices not reflecting actual market
value. Id. at 7559-60, 7580. Specifically, the Exchange would have replaced the 4th through
7th clauses of § 8(a) of H.R. 8720 with two clauses directed at deceptive practices. The first
would have made it unlawful to disseminate false information with the intent to deceive and to
induce trade. The second would have made it illegal, in connection with any attempted trade,
to pay or accept payment for disseminating as news or disinterested opinion information in-
tended to induce trading at prices not truly reflecting market values. Id. at 7580.
297. Id. at 7562. Some people at the New York Stock Exchange thought § 9(c) of H.R.
8720 was too broad. See Comments On Revised Stock Exchange Regulation Bill as Published
March 20, 1934, at 6 (undated, marked "Return to Library Office of the Economist") (on file
with the Stanford Law Review) ("What comprises a manipulative device?... If they know what
manipulative devices are, why not specify them? This Section, in the hands of a belligerent or
hostile Commissioner, could be used to forbid anyone, or any class of persons, from buying
or selling securities for whatever purpose and in any fashion, even for cash.") (copy in New
York Stock Exchange Archives, Securities & Exchange Acts of 1933, 1934, SEC box).
298. S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (Apr. 17 (calendar day, Apr. 20), 1934), reprinted
in 11 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 20, item 37.
299. Id. § 4. The new Commission would have been responsible for administration of
the whole Act, except regulation of the extension of securities credit by member banks by the
Federal Reserve Board. Id. §§ 7(d), 8(a).
300. D.S. LEvIN, supra note 39, at 389-90; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 133-36;J. SELIG-
MAN, supra note 28, at 97.
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Fletcher-Rayburn, adopting several of Rayburn's proposed changes.30 '
Like Rayburn's revision, the Senate's bill referred to "manipulation" in
its substantive provisions. One reference was in a context that demon-
strates the Senate's interpretation of the term. The anti-pool section of
the Senate revision, the predecessor of section 9(a)(2) of the Act, made
it unlawful "[t]o manipulate... the price of any security registered on a
national securities exchange by means of any series of transactions in
such security effected with the specific intent of raising or depressing
such price."' 30 2 As used here, the word "manipulate" has nothing to do
with deception.30 3 The senators thought substantial purchases raised
prices and substantial sales depressed them, 30 4 and they thought peo-
ple should not use trading to cause price changes.30 5 More to the
point, they said that to do so was to manipulate prices.
The Senate Committee made other changes to the manipulation
provisions. Those directed at particular manipulative practices were
again restricted to transactions in exchange-registered securities.30 6
301. Sections 8 and 9 of Fletcher-Rayburn were renumbered § § 9 and 10 in the Senate
revision with the addition of § 4 which established the new Securities Exchange Commission.
302. S. 3420, supra note 298, § 9(a)(3). Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act forbids trad-
ing directed at changing price only if the purpose is to induce trading by others. S. 3420
suggests that Congress was concerned with prices themselves, distinct from a concern with
inducing others to trade. See also H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a)(3) (1934) [hereinafter
House bill], reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 30. The version of this
section in Fletcher-Rayburn banned trading for the purpose of changing prices with the ex-
pectation of creating a false appearance in the market. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20,
§ 8(a)(3). An earlier draft, presumably written by Cohen, made it unlawful to trade for the
purpose of creating a false appearance regardless of expectation. Proposed National Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Jan. 25, 1934), (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 1 SEC
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 236, item 6); see also MEMO RE AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT OF 4-3-
34 (1st Comm. Print) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in I SEC LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 236, item 35). See generally Poser, supra note 36, at 703-05; Thel, supra note
36, at 411-12.
303. It also seems noteworthy that the Senate Committee followed Rayburn's revision in
deleting Fletcher-Rayburn's proscription against bona fide transactions effected "with the ex-
pectation that there will be created a false or misleading appearance of active trading in such
security or securities, or a false or misleading appearance in respect of the market for such
security or securities ...." Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(3).
304. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 17.
305. Id. In the Senate Committee revision, specific intent language replaced the pur-
pose language of Fletcher-Rayburn and Rayburn's revision. One could violate the anti-pool
section of Fletcher-Rayburn even if trading did not actually affect prices. The Senate revision,
in contrast, can be read to require a price effect.
306. The Senate revision also dropped the provision on cornering the market in a secur-
ity, as had Rayburn's revision. The Senate revision did not include the Rayburn revision re-
quirement that all paid publicity be in the form of advertisements, combined in one
subsection the Rayburn revision provisions on payments for publishing information about
market operations, S. 3420, supra note 298, § 9(a)(5), and combined into one subsection the
provisions on stop-loss orders and short sales, id. § 10(a). In the latter, the phrase "in contra-
vention of... rules" was substituted for "except in accordance with ... rules," making it clear
that, in the absence of rules to the contrary, short sales and stop-loss orders would be legal.
See notes 206 & 245 supra. The conference committee later adopted this language in § 10(b).
The prohibition of false statements was rewritten to require a materially false statement
as opposed to a false statement about a material fact. Unfortunately, this change was not
adopted. The stabilization provision was also rewritten. Section 9(a)(6) of the Senate Com-
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The residual provision, finally labeled section 10(b), approached the
form in which it was to be enacted. The Senate Committee would have
made it unlawful
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
which the Commission may by its rules and regulations declare to be
detrimental to the interests of investors.30 7
Like Rayburn's revision, the Senate revision referred to manipula-
tive devices, but the addition of the phrase "or deceptive" might have
indicated that the Senate Committee contemplated greater delegated
powers.308 Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the Committee intended
a broader delegation of authority than Rayburn had, or, for that matter,
anything different from what Fletcher and Rayburn intended in their
original bill. Although the Senate Committee never explained this
change or any other it made in the section,30 9 it probably added "ma-
mittee's bill made it unlawful to effect transactions in exchange-registered securities for the
purpose of stabilizing price in contravention of Commission rules, S. 3420, supra note 298,
§ 9(a)(6), but it did not specifically require the reporting of information regarding such trans-
actions to the Commission, as had Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, § 8(a)(7), and Rayburn's
revision, H.R. 8720, supra note 256, § 8(a)(8)
307. S. 3420, supra note 298, § 10(b).
308. The Committee's report suggests concerns beyond deception. The report begins
by quoting President Roosevelt on the evils of stock market speculation, S. REP. No. 792,
supra note 20, at 1-2, which it labeled one of "the most potent of the factors which have
contributed to the prolonged depression." Id. at 3. Discussing §§ 9, 10, and 16 of the bill
(which correspond to the same sections of the Act) together under the heading "Manipulative
Practices," id. at 7-9, the Committee neither specifically mentioned § 10(b) nor explained
what it meant by the word "manipulative." The discussion of the short-swing trading provi-
sions of § 16 under this heading suggests the Committee gave the word rather broad com-
pass. Id. at 9; see also id. at 6 (§§ 9, 10, and 16 provide sanctions for those manipulative and
deceptive practices that never fulfill a useful function). Unlike the House, the Senate retained
Fletcher-Rayburn's absolute proscription against short-swing trading by insiders, although it
increased the 5% threshold for non-director, non-officer inside shareholders to 10%. The
report's section-by-section summary states that § 10(b) authorizes the SEC to regulate
"other" manipulative or deceptive practices, id. at 18, again suggesting that the meaning of
the section can be found in § 10(a) and perhaps § 9.
309. The addition of "deceptive" was not the only change to the residual section. The
newly created commission would be able to "declare" devices and contrivances detrimental
whereas the FTC was only able to "find" them under Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20, and
Rayburn's revision, H.R. 8720, supra note 256, but the requirement was detriment to the in-
terests of investors; that the device was detrimental to the public interest was not enough.
The deletion of Fletcher-Rayburn's reference to the public interest in § 10(b) of the Sen-
ate Committee's bill might serve as a premise for a narrow reading of § 10(b) as an investor-
protection rather than a public-protection statute, on the theory that the Senate Committee,
in deleting the reference, must have intended to give the measure a narrow scope. Cf Memo-
randum from F.T. Boyd to Roland Redmond, supra note 225 ("The phrase 'in the public
interest' which is found [in § 9 of H.R. 8720 and] all through the Act opens wide the door to
the accomplishment of social purposes having no connection with the protection of the investor
or the proper regulation of security markets." (emphasis in original)). The simple, and per-
haps correct, answer is that the difference between the versions of § 10(b) in S. 3420 and in
the Exchange Act is evidence that there was a struggle over the matter and that the confer-
ence committee consciously rejected a narrow delegation in favor of a broad one. It seems
more likely, however, that the Senate Committee deleted the public-interest standard because
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nipulative" for the same reason the House Committee added "decep-
tive" earlier: to make it clear that the residual rulemaking authority
eventually incorporated in section 10(b) should be read with reference
to the rest of the Act.
It is likely that the Senate Committee added the word "deceptive"
to section 10(b) in response to a suggestion ofJohn Dickinson. By this
time, Dickinson, who had generally been excluded from the drafting
process, was something of an opponent of the bill. Dickinson sug-
gested modifying Rayburn's revision to the Senate Committee in exec-
utive session,3 10 but the published record of the Committee's hearings
contain neither his testimony nor any written proposals.3 'I However,
James Landis's personal papers include a memorandum that is almost
certainly a copy of the changes Dickinson proposed.3 l2
Along with many other provisions of H.R. 8720, Dickinson criticized
section 9(c). According to Dickinson,
[t]he word 'manipulative' is extremely vague and in my opinion sup-
plies no adequate standard for the FTC to act upon. Some word or
words should be used which more specifically indicates the nature of
the evil designed to be rectified. I suggest that the word "deceptive"
be substituted for "manipulative" in [section 9(c)] and in the heading
of Section 9 .... 313
Although others criticized the breadth of the provision, it does not
appear that anyone else suggested incorporating the word "decep-
tive."' 314 However, even if Dickinson's argument impressed the Senate
Committee, it is noteworthy that the Committee did not adopt the sug-
gestion completely. The Committee declined to substitute "deceptive"
members were concerned about the propriety of such a broad rulemaking standard, see note
313 infra, and that the conference committee restored the standard because it better ex-
pressed the seminal ideas behind the residual provision.
310. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 104, at 7536 (Dickinson scheduled to appear
in executive session), 7626 (Pecora mentioning a change he thought Dickinson had sug-
gested); Letter from John Dickinson to J. Harry Covington (Mar. 30, 1934) (on file with the
Stanford Lau, Review) (reporting that he suggested changes to the bill in Senate Committee
executive session) (copy in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493).
311. The scant confidential files of the Committee and Dickinson's Commerce Depart-
ment files in the National Archives are also bereft of any such record.
312. Suggested Amendments to H.R. 8720 Submitted byJohn Dickinson, Assistant Sec-
retary of Commerce (Mar. 30, 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in Harvard
Law School Library, James McCauley Landis Papers, box 1, file 7). The memorandum is writ-
ten in the first person, and appears to have been written by Dickinson. See also note 314 infra
(Dickinson's authorship and influence).
313. Suggested Amendments to H.R. 8720, Submitted by John Dickinson, supra note
312, at 4-5. Dickinson continued, "[it would not be in my opinion for Constitutional pur-
poses a sufficiently clear standard to outlaw any device which the Commission may find 'detri-
mental to the public interest.' " Id. at 5; see also Dickinson, My Philosophy of Law, supra note
162, at 105-06.
314. The Senate Committee's chosen modifications to the title of the second manipula-
tion provision (now § 10) and the detriment clause of the residual subsection (now § 10(b)),
see notes 309 (modification of detriment clause) and 313 (criticism of detriment clause) supra,
are further evidence that the Senate Committee modified § 10 in response to Dickinson's
suggestions.
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for "manipulative," instead adopting both words as a standard.3 15
When the Committee sought to change the section to make the stan-
dard refer more explicitly to the rest of the statute, it declined to for-
mulate that reference exclusively in terms of deception. The most that
can be said is that "deceptive" and "manipulative" were both added to
the section, not in an attempt to change its thrust, but to provide "gui-
dance to those who must determine which types of acts are reached by
the statute. '3 16
The Senate Committee's report on its own bill was the only commit-
tee report that explicitly referred to a precursor of section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and even these references are not particularly helpful.3 17
The report does, however, clearly demonstrate that the Committee in-
tended to confer extensive power on administrators. After quoting
President Roosevelt on stock exchange regulation, 318 the report recited
what had become the official line on stock exchange control: specula-
tion was a terrible problem, 319 and flexible regulation by an agency
with broad discretion was the answer. 320
D. Further Action in the House-The Omission of the Residual Provision
The House Committee and a special subcommittee revised Ray-
bum's revision, this time focusing on problems that troubled mem-
bers.3 21 The Committee reported its bill on April 27, having generally
315. This is not to say that the Committee intended to substantially broaden the scope
of the SEC's power; in construing the similar language of another provision of the Exchange
Act (§ 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1972)), the Supreme Court was probably correct to say that
"words grouped in a list should be given related meaning." Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,
472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984)). Moreover, the overworked draftsmen may have intended
nothing at all when they joined the words "manipulative" and "deceptive" with "or" instead
of "and." In a confidential committee print showing proposed changes to H.R. 8720, I.N.P.
Stokes inserted the words "and/or deceptive." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., H.R. 8720, CONFIDENTIAL COMM. PRINT SHOWING PROPOSED
CHANGES OF SUBSTANCE TO THE TEXT OF H.R. 8720 CONTAINED IN THE HOUSE COMM. PRINT OF
APRIL 3, 1934 (Comm. Print 1934) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (copy in 4 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, item 11).
316. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8.
317. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 6, 18; see also H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 32-33 (1934) (conference report and statement of House conference managers describ-
ing reconciliation of House and Senate bills), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 10,248-65 (1934), and
in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 20.
318. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 1-2.
319. See id. at 3-5 ("Excessive speculation has caused acute suffering and demoralization.
It has brought in its train social and economic evils which have affected the security and pros-
perity of the entire country.").
320. See id. at 5-6 ("From the outset, the committee has proceeded on the theory that so
delicate a mechanism as the modern stock exchange cannot be regulated efficiently under a
rigid statutory program. Unless considerable latitude is allowed for the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion, it is impossible to avoid, on the one hand, unworkable 'strait-jacket' regula-
tion and, on the other, loopholes .... ).
321. D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 389, 391-94; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 132-33,
137-38; cf. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 28, items 7-15 (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) (bills, committee prints and annotations). When Rayburn appointed the
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weakened Rayburn's margin, segregation, issuer-reporting, and proxy
provisions.3 22
The Committee also reworked the manipulation sections, limiting
several section 8 provisions to exchange-registered securities, combin-
ing the fictitious transaction and wash-sale provisions, and deleting the
rule against disseminating information about a security for considera-
tion except as an advertisement. Successful inducement of trades, as
opposed to a purpose to induce, became a required element in the sev-
eral remaining section 8 communication provisions.3 23 Finally, the
House Committee deleted the residual rulemaking section, section 9(c)
of Rayburn's revision.3 24
The Committee report does not explain why the members deleted
the language included in section 9(c) of two earlier House bills.3 25
Nonetheless, the report suggests that the House Committee intended
the Federal Trade Commission to play a substantial role in regulating
the stock exchanges. The report explains that the bill was designed to
reach the causes of the "unnecessary, unwise, and destructive specula-
tion" condemned by President Roosevelt through regulation of the
stock exchanges and of the relationships of the investing public to cor-
porations.326 While the Committee noted that fraud had been a prob-
members of the subcommittee, there were suggestions that the group might liberalize the
pending bill's more rigid provisions. Leaders for Shift on Exchange Bill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7,
1934, at 1, 5, col. 1.
322. House bill, supra note 302. The changes made in the provision that became the
insider trading section, § 16 of the Act, are perhaps particularly relevant to the meaning of
§ 10(b) of the Act. The modification deleted the prohibition of short-swing trading, retaining
only the prohibition of short-selling and "sales against the box," see supra note 191, and a
reporting provision supplemented by required reporting of trades by issuers, directors, and
officers to their stockholders. House bill, supra note 302, § 15(a); see M. PARRISH, supra note
28, at 138 (committee actions and final debate).
323. This change, which endures in the enacted statute, leaves these proscriptions as the
only ones in § 9(a) that reach conduct regardless of purpose. See Market Manipulation and the
Securities Exchange Act, supra note 36, at 630.
Other changes included adding scienter as an element of a false statement offense and
omitting the good faith defense to a private action. Section 9 combined in one provision the
power to regulate stop-loss orders and short sales, and substituted the phrase "in contraven-
tion of. . . rules" for "except in accordance with . .. rules," making it clear that, in the
absence of rules to the contrary, short sales and stop-loss orders were legal. See note 206
supra.
324. The remaining provisions for the regulation of short sales and stop-loss orders
were left in a rewritten § 9 without subparts, still titled "Regulation of the Use of Manipula-
tive Devices."
325. The provision might have been removed at the insistence of Representative George
Huddleston of Alabama, a member of the subcommittee that revised H.R. 8720. See M. PAR-
RISH, supra note 28, at 132-33 (Huddleston on subcommittee). I.N.P. Stokes's master draft of
comments on Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 254, indicated, apparently with respect to § 9(c),
that "Huddleston has doubts [as] to Constlity [sic] of this." Huddleston, who had repeatedly
expressed doubts about the constitutionality of certain aspects of the bill, seemed more
doubtful about the required breadth of the commerce clause than the concept of delegating
legislative power to an administrative agency. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 20, at 29-32,
125, 517-24.
326. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28, at 2. The report characterized the bill as a
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lem,3 2 7 over and over again, it justified the bill as a restraint on
speculation. The Committee also emphasized the bill's "wide delega-
tion of powers to the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade
Commission,"3 28 almost apologizing for failing to deal specifically and
directly in the statute with a variety of problems. 3 29
E. Compromise between the House and Senate-Section 10(b)
On May 4, 1934, the House passed the bill reported out of the
House Committee.33 0 The debate on the floor, while extensive, was
quite broad.3 3' The bill's supporters denounced speculation, Wall
Street, and the exchanges. While agreeing that controlling speculation
was a laudable purpose, opponents complained that much of the bill
did not address exchange practices at all, but instead regulated indus-
try-publicly held corporations. The issuer-reporting requirements
drew particular criticism; some members of the House argued that
these provisions would empower bureaucrats to run the nation's busi-
nesses. Rayburn responded to this criticism in his opening remarks:
This bill now is criticized because it gives too much power to the ad-
ministrative authorities, but all through the hearings the representa-
tives of the exchanges and the so-called "representatives of business"
in this country pounded into the committee the unwisdom of particu-
larizing in the legislation, or going further than simply fixing the out-
standing standards for the administrative body to go by. We went
through the bill, and everywhere that we could find a place to give au-
thority to the [FTC] to make rules and regulations to govern these mat-
ters we gave it to them .... 332
Several Republicans made unsuccessful attempts to amend the bill.
Representative John Cooper, the senior Republican on the Commerce
Committee, proposed removing criminal sanctions for mere rule viola-
tions, complaining that "[i]t is doubtful whether ever in the history of
Congress such a wide and sweeping delegation of power has been given
conservative attempt to restrain stock market speculation that had "accentuated natural mod-
erate fluctuations of our economic system into mad booms and terrible depressions." Id. at 3.
327. Thus, the report explained that "[t]o insure to the multitude of investors the main-
tenance of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national exchanges
are banned. The bill seeks to give to investors markets where prices may be established by the
free and honest balancing of investment demand with investment supply." Id. at 10. It also
decried "the accentuation of temporary fluctuations and the deliberate introduction of a mob
psychology into the speculative markets by the fanfare of organized manipulation." Id. at 11.
328. Id. at 6; see also id. at 14-16 (broad FTC power over operations of exchanges and the
over-the-counter market). The report suggests that the bill gave the FTC broader powers
than a plain reading of the statutory language would seem to indicate. See id. at 15, 25-26
(minimizing limits on FTC's power to change exchange rules).
329. Id. at 6-7.
330. 78 CONG. REG. 8116-17 (1934). See also House bill, supra note 302.
331. The House debate, recorded in the Congressional Record, is reprinted in 4 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 8. The debate in the House and the breakdown of voting by
region is summarized in D.S. LEvIN, supra note 39, at 395-96.
332. 78 CONG. REc. 7696 (1934).
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to any administrative body to create by rule and regulation crimes pun-
ishable by severe fine and imprisonment .... ,"3 Rayburn responded
that Cooper had previously urged the committee "not to go into so
many details in the bill, but to leave the matter to the rules and regula-
tions of the [Federal Trade] Commission. If we should adopt the
amendment.., it would be tantamount to repealing four-fifths of the
law. ... ,,334 The amendment was defeated.A3 5
After the House completed its deliberations and passed the bill, the
Senate simply replaced the House bill with the Senate Committee's bill,
which it had meanwhile amended in a few respects and to which it had
added amendments to the Securities Act.336
At this point, the conference committee still faced the issue that had
dominated the debate over federal stock exchange legislation from the
beginning: the methods and mechanism for regulating the exchanges.
The conferees finally had to decide what body should control or regu-
late the stock exchanges, and how much discretion the legislation
should delegate to that body.33 7
The Senate and House were furthest apart on two related questions:
whether to establish a new regulatory authority, and whether Congress
or an agency should regulate margin levels. Under the House bill, the
FTC would have administered everything except margin levels. The
Federal Reserve Board would have regulated the extension and mainte-
nance of margin credit on registered securities, although the bill in-
cluded a standard the Board would use in setting the rules for the initial
333. 78 CONG. REC. 8112 (1934) (Cooper listed the rulemaking provisions).
334. 78 CONG. REC. 8113 (1934).
335. Id. Representative Schuyler Merritt, the only member of the Commerce Commit-
tee to dissent from the favorable report on H.R. 9323, H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 28,
offered another unsuccessful amendment which made it clear that some opponents of the bill
were concerned less with broad rulemaking authority itself than with the FTC's enforcement
powers. Merritt proposed replacing the bill with another that would merely require ex-
changes to register with a new Federal Stock Exchange Commission, with the granting of a
license conditioned upon the Commission finding that "the constitution and rules of the stock
exchange reasonably guard against undue speculative activity and unwarranted manipulative
practices on such exchange, and otherwise govern the activities of the exchange and its mem-
bers so as to afford reasonably adequate protection for investors." 78 CONG. REC. 8114
(1934) (§ 3); see also 78 CONG. REC. 8113-15 (1934). Merritt's proposal was substantially iden-
tical to bills previously introduced in the House, see H.R. 8575, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprnnted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, item 27, and Senate, S. 3234, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 35, which had been based on the
Dickinson Committee report, 78 CONG. REC. 8579 (1934) (statement of Sen. Gore).
336. H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter Senate bill], reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 20, item 32. The Senate debate recorded in the Congressional Record is
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 10, and various proposed amendments to the Senate
Committee bill are reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY item 38. The debate and the break-
down of voting by region in the Senate is summarized in D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 396-97,
400.
337. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,111 (1934) (explanation of conference by Sen. Fletcher); H.R.
REP. No. 1838, supra note 317 (conference committee); 78 CONG. REC. 10,265-66 (1934) (ex-
planation by Rep. Rayburn); D.S. LEVIN, supra note 39, at 400-02; M. PARRISH, supra note 28,
at 139-42;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 98-100.
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extension of credit. 338 In contrast, the Senate bill established a Federal
Securities Exchange Commission to administer the Act and the Securi-
ties Act.339 Under the Senate bill, the Board would set margin require-
ments for member banks, but the new Federal Securities Exchange
Commission would set all other margin requirements, and without stat-
utory guidelines.3 40
The conferees agreed to the establishment of a new regulatory com-
mission, now called the Securities and Exchange Commission, to ad-
minister most of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. The
conferees divided responsibility for setting and enforcing margin rules
between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Re-
serve Board. The statute would set standards for the initial extension
of credit, and the Board would prescribe regulations for the extension
and maintenance of margin credit, with power to deviate from the stat-
utory standards.34 1
In resolving these and most of the other problems facing the com-
mittee, the conferees faced the tension between statutory standards and
administrative discretion. In almost every instance of substantial con-
flict between the two bills, the conferees chose the alternative, or in-
vented one, that gave the administrators greater power.342 No doubt
the conferees found delegation of authority attractive, in part, because
338. House bill, supra note 302, § 6.
339. Senate bill, supra note 336, §§ 4, 210.
340. Id. § 7.
341. See Exchange Act § 7 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7 8g (1982)); cf. Exchange
Act § 8 (restrictions on borrowing) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1982)); § 19
(SEC orders) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982)); § 21 (SEC prosecution of of-
fenses) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982)). The bill as approved by the confer-
ees is set out in the House Conference Report, supra note 317, and in S. REP. No. 185, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 9930-42 (1934), and in 5 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 20, item 19. It is identical to the enacted Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982
& Supp. V 1987)).
342. See Statement, 78 CONG. REC. at 10,263-65 (1934). The provisions of the Exchange
Act that clearly reflect compromises in which the conferees chose the provision of either the
House or Senate bill that delegated to administrators greater discretion or power include
§ 8(c) (hypothecation of customers' securities in contravention of Commission rules) (compare
House bill, supra note 302, § 7(c), (d) with Senate bill, supra note 336, § 8(c)); § 10(b) (manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance); § 13(b) (form of reports) (compare House bill
§ 12(b) ("in accordance with accepted principles of accounting") with Senate bill § 13(b));
§ 19(a)(1) (SEC could suspend exchange for failing to enforce issuer compliance with the Act)
(compare House bill § 18(a) with Senate bill § 19(a)(1)); § 19(b) (changing exchange rules with
respect to hours of operation) (compare House bill § 18(b) with Senate bill § 19(b)(4)); and
§ 24(b) (cf. Senate bill § 2 3(a) (person objecting to disclosure has right to a hearing)); cf
Senate bill § 13(d) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to
interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer.") (The statement of the House
conference managers, Statement, 78 CONG. REC. at 10,263 (1934), explains that this was omit-
ted from the Act "as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruc-
tion in this respect."); Exchange Act § 16 (permitting recovery by issuers of the profits from
short-swing trading by control persons; the affected parties, rather than the SEC, must sue to
enforce this provision) (compare House bill § 15 with Senate bill § 16). But see Exchange Act
§ 15 (limiting SEC role in over-the-counter market regulation) (compare House bill § 14 with
Senate bill § 15); § 19(c) (directing SEC to study exchange governance and classification of
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it enabled them to avoid conflict over specific reforms. They probably
also believed that administrative agencies were genuinely better suited
than Congress to regulate complicated institutions and practices.
Section 10(b) epitomizes the way the conferees delegated to admin-
istrators the problems posed by stock market speculation, together with
whatever tools they might need to solve them. Even though the section
had been left out of the House bill, the conferees included it, and re-
wrote the Senate provision to increase the SEC's role in regulating
market speculation.343
The Senate bill's residual provision made it unlawful to use or em-
ploy any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance that the SEC
declared detrimental. Similarly, Rayburn's revision, the last House bill
with a residual clause, outlawed the use or employment of any manipu-
members) (compare House bill § 18(b) (authorizing Commission to change rules regarding
these matters) with Senate bill § 19(c) (directing a study)).
Another compromise relating to rulemaking produced what is surely one of the most
interesting features of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 32 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78f (1982)). The House bill provided for imprisonment in cases of willful violation
of some SEC-promulgated rules, House bill, supra note 302, § 32, while the Senate bill pro-
vided for imprisonment only for violations of specific statutory requirements, Senate bill,
supra note 336, § 30; see also notes 333-335 supra and accompanying text (Cooper's proposed
amendment to House bill). The conferees rewrote the provision so that a person who will-
fully violates any SEC-promulgated rule or regulation, the violation of which is made unlawful
or the observance of which is required by the Act, can be imprisoned unless "he proves that
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation." See Statement, 78 CONG. REC. at 10,263
(1934).
343. See notes 341-342 supra and accompanying text; see also Statement, 78 CONG. REC. at
10,260-61 (1934). See Exchange Act § 9(a)(4) (disseminating false information for the pur-
pose of inducing trades) (compare Senate bill, supra note 336, § 9(a)(3) (same) with House bill,
supra note 302, § 8(a)(4) (inducing trades with false information)); Exchange Act § 9(a)(6)
(stabilization by a series of transactions "for the purchase and/or sale") (compare Senate bill
§ 9(a)(6) (same) with House bill § 8(a)(6) ("purchase and sale")).
It is hard to characterize the way the committee rewrote § 9(a)(2), the anti-pool provi-
sion. The Fletcher-Rayburn predecessor to § 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act made it unlawful to
effect transactions for the purpose of changing a security's price or for the purpose or with the
expectation of creating a false appearance of active trading. Fletcher-Rayburn, supra note 20,
§ 8(a)(3). The language of this provision was repeatedly revised in the hope of protecting
block traders who would normally expect their trades to affect price or create the appearance
of active trading in the market. (The hearings on the bill contain several discussions of the
meaning of "intent" which seem reminiscent of a first-year law school class. House Hearings,
supra note 20, at 112-13; Stock &vchange Practices, supra note 104, at 6508-10.) The Senate bill
would have made illegal the use of trades to manipulate the price of a security "with the
specific intent of raising or depressing such price," Senate bill, supra note 336, § 9(a)(3), while
the House would simply have forbidden trading for the purpose of changing price, House bill,
supra note 302, § 8(a)(3).
The conferees agreed to make it unlawful to effect transactions in a security "for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others." The conferees presuma-
bly hoped that this language would protect people who traded legitimately in the market but
knew their transactions might influence others; the conferees also sought to avoid requiring
complainants to prove specific intent. However, this language exempts from the proscription
those who trade for no purpose other than to cause price changes. This had been forbidden
in all the earlier versions of the bill, and is presumably exactly what the section was intended
to address. See Statement, 78 CONG. REc. at 10,260 (1934) ("Both [the House and Senate]
provisions were intended to prohibit pool activities, the rigging, jiggling, or marking up or
down of prices by manipulative operations.").
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lative device or contrivance which the SEC found detrimental. Both
bills by their terms authorized the SEC to prohibit such activity, but did
not appear to contemplate lesser forms of regulation.3 44
The Act makes it unlawful to use devices in contravention of SEC
rules, clearly contemplating a finely tailored regulatory program in
which the SEC would regulate, instead ofjust prohibiting, various prac-
tices. Moreover, the Act permits the SEC to consider a wide variety of
interests in undertaking regulatory initiatives. Whereas the Senate bill
authorized the SEC to forbid a device only upon a declaration that it
was detrimental to the interests of investors, the Act authorizes the SEC
to prescribe rules necessary or appropriate to the public interest, or for
the protection of investors. Congress gave the SEC flexibility to regu-
late in order that it might reshape the market in the public interest.
Two points stand out in the record of the vigorous debate that pre-
ceded the enactment of the Exchange Act. First, the purpose of the Act
was to control speculation, an objective to which virtually everyone
agreed in 1934. Second, Congress intended to give the SEC extraordi-
nary powers to achieve this control. Because the Act's narrowly defined
grants of rulemaking power did not provide for complete and effective
control, and because Congress realized that it lacked the expertise to
enact a complete program of statutory controls, section 10(b) was
designed to serve this purpose.
Broad residual regulatory authority was a key element of the pro-
gram from its inception. 345 The predecessor to section 10(b) in
Fletcher-Rayburn authorized administrators to control all stock market
practices. Almost no one questioned the wisdom of this delegation;
those who might have been expected to contest the delegation champi-
oned it. Although it went through several revisions, all were directed at
clarifying a scope intended from the beginning.
The Senate and the House agreed to the conference report on June
1, 1934,346 and President Roosevelt 'signed the Exchange Act on June
344. Id. (The House bill and the Senate bill "contain similar provisions regulating the
use of manipulative devices, except that the Senate amendment contains a provision prohibit-
ing the use or employment in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance-Which the [SEC] may declare to be detri-
mental to the interests of investors.' "). The drafters never intended to limit regulators to
prohibiting conduct. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, supra note 20, at 18.
345. Substantial studies of the enactment of the Exchange Act have repeatedly con-
cluded that the keystone of the Act was intended to be administrative power. See J. BROOKS,
supra note 95, at 204-05; R. DEBEDTS, supra note 83, at 81;J. FLYNN, supra note 36, at 1; D.S.
LEvIN, supra note 39, at 403-04; M. PARRISH, supra note 28, at 143;J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28,
at 99-100; RAYMOND VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS 132-34 (1941);
G. WRIGHT HOFFMAN, Securities Exchange Acl of 1934, in THE SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 36,
at 700, 700.
346. 78 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1934) (Senate); 78 CONG. REC. 10,269 (1934) (House).
There was an interesting discussion of the Securities Act on the Senate floor, in which Senator
Fletcher stated that, in the judgment of the conference committee, an offering of securities
solely to the employees of an issuer is not a public offering and is therefore exempt from
registration under § 4 of the Securities Act. 78 CONG. REC. 10,182 (1934).
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6, 1934.347
IV. SOME AFTERTHOUGHTS
The extensive record of the debate over the Exchange Act and the
historical situation that prompted its enactment together suggest that
section 10(b) was designed to give the SEC plenary power over the
stock market. At the very least, the legislative history shows that the
drafters intended to delegate considerably more regulatory power over
speculative practices than is encompassed by the Supreme Court's
conception.
As understood by the Exchange Act's contemporaries, including its
drafters, sponsors, and, in a sense, Congress itself, the Act declared a
fundamental change in the relationship between the public and the
market. The interests of market participants were to give way to the
interests of the public, championed by the SEC. The Act charged the
SEC with protecting the public interest and delegated to it the power to
regulate an extraordinarily wide variety of conduct. Moreover, it would
be up to the SEC to define the public interest, with only the broadest of
statutory guidance.
The Court has a profoundly different conception of section 10(b)
and of the Act as a whole. This does not necessarily make the Court's
conception incorrect. It is difficult to say how much weight the histori-
cal record should be accorded in the contemporary meaning of a stat-
ute. Nevertheless, there must be some explanation for this tremendous
divergence of views.
It is possible that the Court was pursuing its own agenda when it
narrowly interpreted section 10(b). The Court may, for example, have
trimmed the SEC's powers because it disagreed as a matter of policy
with expansive regulation of the financial markets, wanted to avoid the
difficult issues raised by such a broad delegation of policymaking
power, or hoped to contain an explosion of litigation. In fact, however,
the Court appears to have attempted to promote what it saw as the will
of Congress. While the Court's conclusions about the intent of Con-
gress may have been inconsistent with the historical record, its holding
that the fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act is to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor simply
repeated a well-settled and entirely unexceptional doctrine. Even
before the Court intervened, section 10(b) had evolved into a very dif-
ferent animal from anything the drafters intended.
While a comprehensive treatment of this evolution is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief examination of the post-enactment history
of the Exchange Act in general, and of section 10(b) in particular, sug-
347. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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gests at least a tentative explanation. 348
A central force at work in shifting the operative meaning of the Ex-
change Act since its enactment may have been the priorities of the SEC.
Through its administration of the federal securities laws, the SEC tac-
itly declared full disclosure to be the primary interest of the public in
the securities markets. According to one distinguished commentator,
the SEC developed a split personality soon after its creation.3 49 The
highly visible and respected "sunlight" SEC vigorously administered
the disclosure and antifraud provisions.350 The "regulatory" SEC,
"the one that regulates the trading markets, has generally played down,
and at times has even disregarded and repudiated, its role."'35 1
This may be an unfair indictment of the SEC. Perhaps fraud has
rightly merited more of the SEC's attention than have manipulation
and market regulation. Or perhaps the SEC has wisely determined that
the best way to control speculation is to require securities issuers and
certain investors to disclose important developments fully and
promptly.3 52 Whatever has motivated it, the SEC has generally empha-
sized disclosure over technical market regulation.353 Given the public
record of the work of the SEC, the overwhelming importance of the
disclosure and antifraud provisions in private securities law practice,
and the composition of the caseload faced by the courts, 354 it is not
surprising that a "full disclosure" emphasis is usually attributed to the
securities laws.
The turning point in the evolving interpretation of the securities
laws may have been the promulgation of rule lOb-5, 355 although it
could hardly have seemed so at the time. The SEC adopted the rule
hastily and without much thought about its consequences. 56 The rule
348. The post-enactment history of the Exchange Act is an interesting example of the
interaction of Congress, an administrative agency, and the courts. The Exchange Act is one
of Congress's most carefully considered pieces of legislation, and its subject matter-the stock
market-is of profound importance, for both its practical and its symbolic significance in our
society. The history of § 10(b), in particular, might serve as an important case study for those
who would assign to the courts the role of actually changing the law in response to social,
economic, and practical developments.
349. Walter Werner, The SEC as a Aarket Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755 (1984).
350. Id. at 755, 783.
351. Id. at 755.
352. For a forceful argument that speculation is still rampant and damaging, despite the
Commission's valuable contribution in ensuring full disclosure, see L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note
47.
353. Werner, supra note 349. The history of the SEC's administration of the securities
laws is discussed extensively in J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, and JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND
THE FUTURE OF FINANCE (1985). During the debate in the early 1970s over fixed commission
rates, the SEC came under overwhelming pressure to regulate stock exchange operations. By
giving in to such pressures, the SEC itself emphasized the open-ended nature of its Exchange
Act mandate as it claimed expansive powers practically disavowed only a few years before. See
Werner, supra note 349, at 770-72, 772 n.91.
354. See supra note 137.
355. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
356. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23
(1967) (recollections of Milton Freeman).
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is hardly the kind of finely tailored regulatory measure the drafters ap-
parently contemplated. Instead, it is as broad as almost any statute,357
a sort of long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids everything the
statute gives it power to forbid.358 Regardless of whether rule lOb-5
was a good idea in the first place, the rule has been given extraordinary
prominence, almost eclipsing everything else as a source of federal se-
curities law at least in the courts.3 59
With the explosive growth of rule lOb-5 litigation, courts and pri-
vate plaintiffs have assumed by default a substantial segment of the pol-
icy-setting powers that Congress delegated to the SEC in 1934. The
rule, which speaks in terms of fraud, ensures that the bulk of cases aris-
ing under it-by the mid-1970s, most cases arising under the federal
securities laws-are alleged to turn on some sort of disclosure
problem.360
Between, on the one hand, the SEC's treating of the securities regu-
latory scheme as directed at achieving full disclosure, and, on the other,
the history of rule lOb-5 litigation in the lower courts, when the
Supreme Court finally entered the fray, it would have had to strain to
treat section 10(b) as anything other than a disclosure provision.3 61
Ironically, then, the SEC may itself bear much of the responsibility for
creating the misconception that full disclosure is the fundamental phi-
losophy of the Exchange Act. If so, the SEC may have led the Supreme
Court to rewrite the Act in a way that has deprived administrators of
powers which section 10(b) conferred.
Regardless of whether Congress was wise to entrust the SEC with
the task of creating a regulatory structure or whether the SEC has done
a good job, the SEC now has much less power than it once had to regu-
late stock market practices under section 10(b), at least if the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements on section 10(b) are taken at face
357. It is in fact based on § 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1983), and largely
tracks the language of that provision. Cf Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Iision of the Securities
Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857, 861 (1984) ("Had Congress wanted to promulgate a prohibition of
such generality, it could have done so and eliminate the intermediate requirement of a Com-
mission regulation. The rule as promulgated drew upon no specific expertise of the SEC. Its
generality meant, moreover, that either the Commission or the courts would have to give it
substance through case-by-case adjudication.").
358. See supra note 10.
359. See note 8 supra; cf Steve Thel, Securities Lau, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 34 Loy. L. REV.
1029, 1059 (1989) (rule lOb-5 cases dominated the court's securities docket).
360. But see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-68 (1977).
361. The Supreme Court has defined the scope of§ 10(b) in negative terms, see notes 3-
12 supra and accompanying text, precisely because it began to rule on the meaning of the
section only after it was confronted by an explosion of rule I Ob-5 litigation. In Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975), the Court candidly stated that its
decision was in reaction to burgeoning litigation. See also note 5 supra. The Court's subse-
quent opinions were grounded in the language of the statute, but the Court freely acknowl-
edged that it was interpreting the statute narrowly. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 214 (1976); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566
n.20 ("On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found it necessary to reject
the SEC's interpretations of various provisions of the Securities Acts.").
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value. That is to say, if the Supreme Court's conception of section
10(b) is fixed and if the SEC is held to the limits of that conception in
the future,3 62 then it seems that the attempt to empower the SEC to
regulate the stock market as it saw fit has failed. This would no doubt
disappoint the drafters, but the operative meaning of the statutes often
changes with time and this may be just another example-albeit a re-
markable one.3 63 The final chapter on section 10(b) may not yet have
been written however. The provision that was designed to create a
flexible regulatory system may itself be flexible.
Despite what appear to be strongly held views about Congress's in-
tentions, it is not inconceivable that the Court will reconsider the pur-
pose of the Exchange Act-and with it, the scope of the Commission's
power under section 10(b)-if the SEC's priorities change in a manner
which suggests a new definition of the public interest in the securities
market.3 64 If, in fact, the reason the Court has construed section 10(b)
narrowly is simply that the SEC has pursued its mandate in a narrow
manner, then the Court's conception of section 10(b) may change with
changes in the way the SEC administers the securities laws. If the scope
of the rulemaking power afforded by section 10(b) turns out to ebb and
flow with changes in the way the SEC uses that power, then section
10(b), which was intended to allow regulators flexibility, is itself re-
markably supple, in a way that even its creators may not have conceived
it to be.
362. The Court has not struck down any rule promulgated under § 10(b), and because
of the breadth of rule 1Ob-5 it did not seem to be intruding on the prerogatives of Congress
or the SEC in the cases in which it narrowly construed § 10(b). The confrontation will be
unavoidable and difficult if the Court ever does strike down a carefully structured and nar-
rowly focused rule just because it regulates innocent or fully disclosed conduct. Several im-
portant rules might not survive scrutiny under the Court's conception of § 10(b), yet the
validity of those rules has not been widely questioned. See generally T.L. HAZEN, supra note 13,
§ 12.1 (Supp. 1988); Thel, supra note 36. Future cases will be further complicated by the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, in which Congress more or
less ratified an expansive application of rule lOb-5. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2 (1988) ("The
Congress finds that (1) the rules and regulations [of the SEC under the Exchange Act] gov-
erning trading while in possession of material nonpublic information are... necessary and
appropriate . . . (2) the Commission has, within the limits of accepted administrative and
judicial construction of such rules and regulations, enforced such rules and regulations vigor-
ously, effectively, and fairly."), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.)
4677, 4677; see also H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 ("These findings are in-
tended as an expression of congressional support for these regulations."), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6072.
363. It is sometimes argued that judicial modification of statutes is appropriate (or, at
least, likely to occur) because statutes are often rigid and susceptible to becoming obsolete.
This argument cannot be applied to § 10(b) without substantial refinement, for almost every-
one involved in the debate over the Exchange Act was acutely aware of problems of statutory
rigidity and obsolescence, and § 10(b) was designed to avoid them. In changing the meaning
of § 10(b), the Court has essentially read out of the provision the expansive administrative
power that Congress incorporated just so that the statute would not have to be revisited. See
generally Donald Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and theJudicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 732 (1987).
364. See note 362 supra.
